Denny C. Cormier v. Maria Green , 141 F. App'x 808 ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-16220 JULY 12, 2005
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 04-00019-CV-HL-6
DENNY C. CORMIER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MARIA GREEN, Acting Director,
Georgia Department of Human Resources,
in her official capacity,
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
RESOURCES, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(July 12, 2005)
Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and FAY, Circuit Judges
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Denny C. Cormier, a Georgia resident, appeals pro se the
district court’s dismissal of his civil action, which was filed pursuant to the
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201,1 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the
Georgia Department of Human Resources (“GDHR”); Maria Green, in her official
capacity as Acting Commissioner of the GDHR; the Georgia Board of Human
Resources (“GBHR”); Bruce E. Cook, in his official capacity as Chairman of the
GBHR; the Colquitt County Superior Court; and the Honorable H. Arthur McLand,
in his official capacity as Chief Judge of the Colquitt County Superior Court (“the
defendants”). The court’s dismissal was based on the doctrine of abstention as set
forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971).
Cormier also appeals the court’s denial of his post-judgment motion, which, as
discussed below, should be construed as a Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion for
reconsideration. Cormier argues on appeal that the district court abused its
discretion both in dismissing his complaint, and in denying his post-judgment
motion. For the reasons set forth more fully below, we affirm.
1
The Declaratory Judgment Act provides, in part, that “[i]n a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction, . . ., any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate
pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have
the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.” See 28
U.S.C. § 2201(a).
2
In April 2004, Cormier filed a pro se civil complaint against the defendants,
challenging under both the U.S. Constitution and the Georgia Constitution the State
of Georgia’s permanent alimony provisions, as contained in O.C.G.A. §§ 19-6-1
through 19-6-35. Cormier explained that his state divorce proceedings with his
wife, Nancy Cormier, were initiated in October 2003, and these proceedings were
pending when he filed the instant action. Cormier also asserted that the named
defendants were the Colquitt County, Georgia, officials who would enforce any
alimony orders that were entered as part of these divorce proceedings. Cormier
identified his wife as an “interested party” and gave her notice, but he did not list
her as a named defendant.
Cormier asserted in this complaint that he had suffered an “injury in fact”
because, as part of these state divorce proceedings, (1) his marriage was being
invaded and examined, (2) his titled property and monies were being assigned to
his wife, and (3) he had been placed in jeopardy of civil and criminal contempt.
Cormier also stated that he had not raised his constitutional challenges to Georgia’s
alimony provisions as part of these state court proceedings. As relief, Cormier
sought either injunctive relief under § 1983, or a declaration by the court, under
§ 2201, that Georgia’s alimony provisions violated (1) the right to privacy,
protections of the equal protection clause, and prohibitions against involuntary
3
servitude, as contained in the U.S. Constitution; and (2) the right to privacy, due
process provisions, equal protection provisions, privileges and immunities clause,
prohibitions on involuntary servitude, and prohibitions against legislation based on
social status, as guaranteed by the Georgia Constitution.
In lieu of answering this complaint, the defendants filed a joint motion to
dismiss, based on the doctrine of abstention in Younger. The defendants explained
that, because Cormier’s constitutional claims could be raised and addressed as part
of his state divorce proceedings, the district court should not intervene. On June
21, 2004, Cormier responded that the court should deny the defendants’ motion to
dismiss because (1) the defendants had failed to show the existence of a parallel
state proceeding based on the same claims and between the same parties,
(2) Cormier might be liable for his wife’s costs if he raised the same constitutional
challenges in state court, (3) Cormier was not attempting to use the federal court to
enjoin a state-court proceeding, and (4) no important state interests were implicated
by his federal claims.
The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss and entered
judgment for them.2 In doing so, the court initially explained that, although the
2
In addition to dismissing Cormier’s federal claims, the court also declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Cormier’s pending state law claims, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c). Because Cormier has not challenged in his appeal brief this decision not to exercise
4
Declaratory Judgment Act is not an independent ground for jurisdiction, the court
had subject-matter jurisdiction because Cormier was (1) challenging federal
constitutional provisions, and (2) seeking relief pursuant to § 1983. The court
discussed that discretionary relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act was
unwarranted because the claims raised could be raised as part of Cormier’s divorce
proceedings in state court, despite that the named defendants in the instant case
were not parties in the divorce proceedings. The court also determined that,
although Cormier might incur his wife’s expenses in defending the constitutional
claims if they were raised in state court, the benefits of having the state court
determine these claims outweighed this potential cost, and this potential cost would
be limited by Cormier’s ability to pay.
Furthermore, the court concluded that, to the extent Cormier also was
seeking injunctive relief, the court was abstaining pursuant to the Younger
doctrine. The court explained that, although Cormier may not have directly
requested that the court intervene in the state divorce proceedings, a ruling by the
court on the issues in his complaint would have that effect. The court also
determined that Cormier’s claims implicated the important state interest of
supplemental jurisdiction, we conclude that he has abandoned any arguments on it. See Access
Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) (issues not argued in
initial brief are deemed abandoned).
5
determining and enforcing alimony awards. Finally, the court summarily stated
that “[r]espect for the right of the State of Georgia to perform its domestic function
dictates that [the court] should abstain from deciding Cormier’s entitlement to
injunctive relief.”
Within ten days of the court’s entry of its order dismissing his complaint,
Cormier filed a motion for reconsideration, purportedly pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.
60(a) and (b). Cormier asserted in support of this pleading that (1) through
“inadvertence and a good faith mistake,” the district court was unaware that
Cormier had removed his divorce proceedings to the district court on June 24,
2004; (2) Cormier had notified the court of this related case by completing and
filing with the removal a “JS 44” civil cover sheet; and (3) Cormier had acted in
good faith in removing the divorce proceeding to federal court. Cormier, thus,
argued that the dismissal was unwarranted because no state court proceeding
existed. Cormier also attached as exhibits copies of (1) his pro se notice of
removal; (2) his civil cover sheet in the removal proceeding; and (3) a copy of a
contempt motion for arrearages of temporary alimony, which was entered by the
state court on May 26, 2004.
The defendants responded that, to the extent Cormier removed his divorce
proceedings to federal court, (1) other than filing his civil cover sheet, he failed to
6
notify the court of the removal; (2) the removal appeared to be done in bad faith;
and (3) the removal was filed well past the 30-day time period permitted for
removals under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The defendants further contended that,
regardless of the removal, Cormier still should raise his claims as part of his
divorce proceedings.
The court denied this post-judgment motion, concluding that Rule 60 relief
was not warranted. In doing so, the court also (1) stated that it was “strongly of the
opinion” that Cormier had acted in this case with the intent of harassing the
defendants and parties in related proceedings and to cause delay; (2) directed
Cormier to familiarize himself with Fed.R.Civ.P. 11; and (3) advised him that
similar harassing conduct within the court’s jurisdiction would result in sanctions.
Cormier argues on appeal that the court erred in dismissing his complaint
because, after he removed his divorce proceedings to federal court, no state
proceedings existed and Younger abstention, therefore, was not applicable.
Cormier also contends that the court’s dismissal was erroneous because (1) none of
the defendants in the instant case were parties in the state divorce proceedings,
(2) Cormier might be liable for his wife’s expenses if she had to defend Georgia’s
permanent alimony provisions against his constitutional challenges in state court,
and (3) the defendants had failed to establish an important state interest. In
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addition, Cormier (1) contends that the district court had subject-matter
jurisdiction, and generally reasserts his constitutional challenges.3
We review a district court’s decision to abstain from exercising its
jurisdiction for an abuse of discretion. Wexler v. Lepore, 385 F.3d 1336, 1338
(11th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court has stated that federal courts have a
“virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them.”
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-18,
96 S.Ct. 1236, 1246, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). “Abstention from the exercise of
federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.” Id., 424 U.S. at 813, 96 S.Ct. at
1244.
Nevertheless, as discussed above, in Younger, the Supreme Court ordered a
federal court to abstain from hearing a plaintiff’s constitutional challenge of a state
3
To the extent Cormier is asserting that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction,
the district court, itself, found that subject-matter jurisdiction existed, but, nevertheless, granted
the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Moreover, because, as analyzed below, the court did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing the action under Younger abstention, we need not review
Cormier’s underlying constitutional challenges. See Adler v. Duval County School Bd., 112
F.3d 1475, 1479 (11th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that “[a] fundamental and longstanding principle
of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the
necessity of deciding them”). Finally, to the extent the defendants assert in response that we
should impose “sanctions” because Cormier failed to state in his appellate brief that his divorce
proceedings subsequently were remanded back to the state court, Cormier is proceeding pro se,
and the defendants have provided no evidentiary support showing that such remand occurred.
Thus, we will not impose sanctions. See Woods v. Internal Revenue Service, 3 F.3d 403, 404
(11th Cir. 1993)(declining to grant the government’s request for the Court to impose sanctions
for frivolous appeal because the appellant was proceeding pro se).
8
criminal statute under which he was being prosecuted, concluding that a sufficient
state forum existed for the plaintiff to raise his claim. Younger, 401 U.S. at 53-54,
91 S.Ct. at 755. Moreover, although Younger involved state criminal proceedings,
the Supreme Court subsequently determined that Younger abstention is “fully
applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are
involved.” Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457
U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). Thus, Younger
abstention is applicable if (1) there are pending state proceedings, (2) the
proceedings implicate important state interests, and (3) the proceedings provide an
adequate opportunity for raising federal constitutional questions. 31 Foster
Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1274-75 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Middlesex, 457
U.S. at 432, 102 S.Ct. at 2515).
Cormier contends that abstention was not warranted under the first
Middlesex requirement of a pending state proceeding because he removed his
divorce proceedings to the district court after he filed the instant action. However,
the date a plaintiff files his or her federal complaint is the relevant date for
purposes of determining the applicability of Younger abstention. See Liedel v.
Juvenile Court of Madison County, Ala., 891 F.2d 1542, 1546 n.6 (11th Cir. 1990);
see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 17, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 1529, 95
9
L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (holding that Younger abstention applies if state court
proceedings were pending at the time of the filing of the federal complaint).
Because Cormier conceded in his complaint that state proceedings were pending
when he filed the instant complaint, the first Middlesex factor was satisfied.4
Under the second Middlesex factor, Cormier asserts that the defendants
failed to identify an important state interest that would be implicated by his
constitutional claims. However, the Supreme Court has determined that states have
important interests in administering certain aspects of their judicial systems that are
sufficient to support the invocation of Younger abstention, even in the context of
civil proceedings involving purely private parties. See Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 14,
107 S.Ct. at 1527. Concluding that a federal court should have abstained on
Younger grounds in the context of a civil punitive award, the Pennzoil Court
explained:
Not only would federal injunctions in such cases interfere with the
execution of state judgments, but they would do so on grounds that
challenge the very process by which those judgments were obtained.
So long as those challenges relate to pending state proceedings, proper
respect for the ability of state courts to resolve federal questions
4
Although we have determined that an important component of the first Middlesex
factor is whether the federal proceeding will interfere with an ongoing state court proceeding, see
31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1276, Cormier has abandoned argument on this component by
failing to raise it on appeal, see Access Now, 385 F.3d at 1330.
10
presented in state-court litigation mandates that the federal court stay
its hand.
See id. Following this reasoning, we similarly concluded in Old Republic Union
Ins. Co. v. Tillis Trucking Co., Inc., 124 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 1997), that abstention
on Younger grounds was warranted because, for the district court to award the
plaintiff the declaratory relief sought, the federal court would have had to
determine that the State of Alabama’s procedures for awarding damages under its
wrongful death statutes were inadequate. See id. at 1264.
Moreover, the Georgia Supreme Court has determined that Georgia “has a
substantial interest in enforcement of all of the orders of its court, . . . and an
especially strong interest in enforcement of alimony judgments.” See Smith v.
Smith, 330 S.E.2d 706, 708 (Ala. 1985). The Georgia Supreme Court further
explained in Smith that “when a court directs the payment of alimony, it is a duty
owed, not only to the needy spouse but to the public.” See id. at 708 n.4 (internal
quotations and marks omitted). Because the declaratory relief Cormier was seeking
in the instant action would have impacted the enforcement of Georgia’s permanent
alimony provisions, and these provisions involve an important state interest, the
second Middlesex factor also was satisfied.
11
Finally, under the third Middlesex factor, Cormier had the burden of
showing that the state divorce proceedings did not provide an adequate remedy for
his federal claims. See 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1279. “Minimal respect for
the state processes, of course, precludes any presumption that the state courts will
not safeguard federal constitutional rights.” Id. (quoting Middlesex, 457 U.S. at
431, 102 S.Ct. at 2521) (emphasis in original)). Thus, a federal court “should
assume that state procedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absence of
unambiguous authority to the contrary.” 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1279(quoting Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 15, 107 S.Ct. at 1528). Moreover, in determining
whether state remedies are adequate, we have concluded:
[W]hether a claim would likely be successful on the merits in the state
court is not what matters. Instead, what matters is whether the
plaintiff is procedurally prevented from raising his constitutional
claims in the state courts, from which a certiorari petition can be filed
seeking review on the merits in the United States Supreme Court.
Pompey v. Broward County, 95 F.3d 1543, 1551 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in
original).
Applying this analysis to Georgia’s alimony provisions, Cormier may raise
his federal constitutional challenges as part of his state divorce proceedings. See
Stitt v. Stitt, 253 S.E.2d 764, 765 (Ga. 1979) (holding that temporary alimony
statutes violated federal equal protection of the laws because they failed to allow
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alimony awards to husbands); see also Sims v. Sims, 253 S.E.2d 762, 762 (Ga.
1979) (invalidating as a violation of federal equal protection a “live in lover” bill
that provided for modification of alimony of the wife, but not of the husband).
Indeed, an appeal from the final judgment in a divorce proceeding is within the
jurisdiction of the Georgia Supreme Court, even if the only issue is custody or
some other issue ancillary to divorce and alimony. See Gates v. Gates, 587 S.E.2d
32, 33 (Ga. 2003).
To the extent Cormier also is arguing that he would be responsible for
reimbursing his wife for defending these challenges as part of their state divorce
proceedings, Georgia law provides that the “grant of attorney’s fees as a part of the
expenses of litigation . . . whether the action is for alimony, divorce and alimony,
or contempt of court arising out of either an alimony case or a divorce and alimony
case . . . shall be . . . [w]ithin the sound discretion of the court.” See Thedieck v.
Thedieck, 470 S.E.2d 265, 267 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 19-6-
2(a)(1)). This statute, however, includes that a court must consider the financial
circumstances of both parties as part of its determination regarding the amount of
attorney fees. See id. Cormier, therefore, also did not meet his burden of showing
that Georgia’s divorce proceedings failed to provide an adequate remedy for his
federal constitutional challenges. See 31 Foster Children, 329 F.3d at 1279. Thus,
13
all the factors for Younger abstention were met, and the district court did not abuse
its discretion in dismissing Cormier’s complaint. See id. at 1274-75; see also
Wexler, 385 F.3d at 1338.5
In addition, to the extent Cormier was seeking relief under the Declaratory
Judgment Act, “[s]ince its inception, [this Act] has been understood to confer on
federal courts unique and substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the
right of litigants.” Old Republic, 124 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Wilton v. Seven Falls
Co., 515 U.S. 277, 284, 115 S.Ct. 2137, 2142, 132 L.Ed.2d 214 (1995)). Factors to
be considered in determining whether to exercise this discretion include the scope
of the pending state proceeding, the nature of the applicable defenses in state court,
whether the claims of all parties in interests can be adjudicated in the proceeding,
and whether all necessary parties have been joined. Wilton, 515 U.S. at 283, 115
S.Ct. at 2141.
5
As the district court briefly noted in its order denying Cormier’s post-judgment motion,
and the defendants assert in their response brief, the Supreme Court in Ankenbrandt v. Richards,
504 U.S. 689, 112 S.Ct. 2206, 119 L.Ed.2d 468 (1992), reaffirmed the “domestic relations
exception” to exercising diversity jurisdiction and noted that this exception “divests the federal
courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.” See id., 504 U.S. at 703-
06, 112 S.Ct. at 2215-16. The Court further explained in Ankenbrandt that, even when subject-
matter jurisdiction might be proper, such as in the instant case, sufficient grounds may exist to
warrant a court’s abstention from the exercise of jurisdiction in cases involving elements of a
domestic relationship. See id. at 704, 112 S.Ct. at 2215. Nevertheless, because the district court
did not abuse its discretion in abstaining under Younger, we need not determine whether the
“domestic relations exception” is applicable in the instant case.
14
However, “[c]onsistent with the nonobligatory nature of the remedy, a
district court is authorized, in the sound exercise of its discretion, to stay or to
dismiss an action seeking a declaratory judgment . . ..” Id. at 288, 115 S.Ct. at
2143. In addition, the principles of Younger apply to declaratory judgments that
would effectively enjoin state proceedings. Old Republic, 124 F.3d at 1261 (citing
Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73, 91 S.Ct. 764, 768, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971)).
As discussed above, Cormier may raise his constitutional challenges to Geogia’s
alimony provisions as part of his state divorce proceedings, see Gates, 587 S.E.2d
at 33, and Georgia has an important state interest in enforcing these provisions, see
Smith, 330 S.E.2d at 708. Thus, the court also did not abuse its discretion in
deciding not to exercise its discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
Cormier also argues on appeal that the court erred in denying his post-
judgment motion because, following his filing of his civil complaint in federal
court, he removed the divorce proceedings to federal court. Cormier asserts that, in
the absence of a pending state proceeding, the district court abused its discretion by
not reconsidering the issue of abstention. Cormier also contends for the first time
on appeal that the district court erred in including in its order denying post-
judgment relief that Cormier should not file in the court further constitutional
challenges to Georgia’s alimony provisions.
15
“A post-judgment motion may be treated as made pursuant to either
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59 or 60—regardless of how the motion is styled by the
movant—depending on the type of relief sought.” Mays v. U.S. Postal Service,
122 F.3d 43, 46 (11th Cir. 1997). We treat a motion that is filed within ten
business days of the entry of judgment and that asks for reconsideration of matters
encompassed in the judgment as a motion under Rule 59(e). Finch v. City of
Vernon, 845 F.2d 256, 258-59 (11th Cir. 1988). Here, Cormier cited to Rule 60(a)
and (b) in filing his post-judgment motion. However, because Cormier filed this
motion within ten days of the court’s entry of its judgment for the defendants, and
because Cormier was seeking the court’s reconsideration of matters encompassed
in the judgment, we construe it as a Rule 59(e) motion. See Finch, 845 F.2d at
258-29.
We review the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of discretion.
Lambert v. Fulton County, Ga., 253 F.3d 588, 598 (11th Cir. 2001). “Motions for
reconsideration should not be used to raise legal arguments which could and should
have been made before the judgment was issued.” Sanderlin v. Seminole Tribe of
Florida, 243 F.3d 1282, 1292 (11th Cir. 2001). Moreover, when a party attempts to
introduce previously unsubmitted evidence as part of a motion to reconsider, the
16
court should not grant relief absent some showing that the evidence previously was
unavailable. Mays, 122 F.3d at 46.
Cormier asserted in his Rule 59(e) motion that the court should reverse its
judgment because Cormier had removed his divorce proceedings to federal district
court; therefore, Younger abstention no longer was applicable. However, in
Cormier’s June 21, 2004, response to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, he failed
to discuss his intent to remove these proceedings, or to explain how this removal
would impact the defendants’ arguments in support of abstention. In addition, after
Cormier removed his divorce proceedings to the district court on June 24, 2004, he
failed to move to supplement this response. Thus, Cormier failed to show that this
argument, and the evidence on which he was relying in filing his Rule 59(e)
motion, were previously unknown or unavailable, and the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying this motion. See Sanderlin, 243 F.3d at 1292; see
also Mays, 122 F.3d at 46.
Finally, to the extent Cormier is arguing for the first time that the court erred
in directing him not to file in the district court further constitutional challenges to
Georgia’s permanent alimony provisions, we decline to review this argument in the
first instance. See Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 616 n.6 (11th Cir.
2004) (declining to consider a legal theory that was not presented to the district
17
court), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 1850 (2005). Regardless, under the All Writs Act,
“[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by an Act of Congress may issue
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651. A court’s power
to protect its jurisdiction under this Act includes:
the power to enjoin a dissatisfied party bent on re-litigating claims that
were (or could have been) previously litigated before the court from
filing in both judicial and non-judicial forums, as long as the
injunction does not completely foreclose a litigant from any access to
the courts.
Riccard v. Prudential Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 1277, 1295 n.15 (11th Cir. 2002). Because
the court’s order was in response to what the court construed as bad conduct on the
part of Cormier, and because this order did not completely foreclose Cormier from
accessing the courts, the court was acting within its authority under the All Writs
Act.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion
either in dismissing Cormier’s federal complaint, or in denying his Rule 59(e)
motion for post-judgment relief. We, therefore, affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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