Bill A. Corbin v. Supreme Court of Florida , 233 F. App'x 917 ( 2007 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAY 21, 2007
No. 06-14444 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00193-CV-5-RS-EMT
BILL A. CORBIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA,
FLORIDA BAR ASSOCIATION,
STATE OF FLORIDA,
c/o John Ellis Bush, Governor
JOHN F. HARKNESS, JR.,
Executive Director of Florida Bar,
JOHN ANTHONY BOGGS, Staff
Counsel of Florida Bar, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(May 21, 2007)
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Bill A. Corbin, a former Florida attorney proceeding pro se, appeals the
district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his third amended civil rights complaint for
lack of jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1 Corbin, who was
disbarred by the Florida Supreme Court in 2002, argues on appeal that he has
constitutionally guaranteed liberty and property interests in his law license.
Corbin’s notice of appeal also stated that he was appealing the district court’s
denial of his Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) motion to alter or amend a judgment. Lastly,
Corbin argues that the district court and this Court erred in refusing to grant his
motions for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.
Background
According to Corbin’s third amended complaint, in 1996 the Florida Bar
(“Bar”) filed a false formal complaint against him alleging that he violated the
rules of professional conduct by making misrepresentations to the tribunal during a
state court proceeding. A state judge acting as referee recommended that the
Corbin’s attorney license be suspended for six months. Corbin sought review from
1
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416, 44 S. Ct. 149, 68 L. Ed. 362 (1923);
District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 75 L. Ed.
2d 206 (1983).
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the Florida Supreme Court, which upheld the suspension but imposed a penalty of
90-days. In 1998, the Bar seized Corbin’s trust account records, pursuant to a
subpoena, and after reviewing the records, the Bar filed a petition for an
emergency suspension of the plaintiff’s attorney license. The Florida Supreme
Court issued a temporary injunction suspending Corbin from the practice of law
and freezing the trust fund accounts. The Bar filed a formal complaint, and the
referee recommended disbarment. In 2001, The Florida Supreme Court ordered
the disbarment and a “second trial” to prove the charges. Corbin alleges that
during the second trial, the Bar admitted that some of the charges were false, but
this was covered up by the referee’s issuance of a protective order. In 2003, the
Florida Supreme Court ordered that Corbin pay restitution and court costs.
Additionally, the Bar filed two other formal complaints against Corbin in 1997 and
2000, which were subsequently voluntarily dismissed. Corbin sought relief in the
federal district court, claiming violations of his due process, equal protection, and
Fourth and Eighth amendment rights.
I.
As a preliminary matter, to the extent that Corbin argues that the district
court erred in denying his motion for leave to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis
(“IFP”) under Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1), this order is not a final appealable order,
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and the proper avenue for review of such an order is a motion for leave to proceed
on appeal IFP with us. To the extent that Corbin argues that we erred in denying
his motion for leave to proceed on appeal IFP under Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(5), the
proper avenue for making this argument would have been a motion for
reconsideration. Corbin had 21 days to file a motion for reconsideration under
11th Cir. R. 27-2, and he failed to do so. Therefore, Corbin’s arguments related to
IFP are not properly before us.
II.
Whether the district court correctly determined that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine divested it of subject matter jurisdiction is reviewed de novo. Goodman
ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1331 (11th Cir. 2001). Further, we
liberally construe allegations contained in pro se civil rights complaints. Brown v.
Sikes, 212 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2000).
We have held that bar disciplinary actions are judicial in nature. In re Calvo,
88 F.3d 962, 965 (11th Cir. 1996). A federal district court may not review the final
decisions of a state court of competent jurisdiction. Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415-416,
44 S.Ct. at 149. A federal district court lacks jurisdiction to review state court
decisions where: (1) the party in federal court is the same as the party in state
court; (2) the prior state court ruling was a final or conclusive judgment on the
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merits; (3) the party seeking relief in federal court had a reasonable opportunity to
raise its federal claims in the state court proceeding; and (4) the issue before the
federal court was either adjudicated by the state court or was inextricably
intertwined with the state court’s judgment. Amos v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax
Assessors, 347 F.3d 1249, 1265 n.11 (11th Cir. 2003). According to the Supreme
Court:
United States District Courts . . . have subject-matter jurisdiction over
general challenges to state bar rules, promulgated by state courts in
non-judicial proceedings, which do not require review of a final state
court judgment in a particular case. They do not have jurisdiction,
however, over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases
arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that
the state court's action was unconstitutional. Review of those
decisions may be had only in [the Supreme Court on certiorari].
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486, 103 S. Ct. at 1317, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 225.
The district court properly determined that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
barred Corbin’s claims. Specifically, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars Corbin’s
due process, equal protection, and Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims. Further,
Corbin’s requests for mandamus relief requiring the retraction of false statements
and for an injunction from a state court judgment are also barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine. According to Corbin’s complaint, he was a party and obtained a
final judgment in Florida state actions in which his law license was suspended and
he was disbarred. Thus, Corbin had an opportunity to raise these specific claims
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before the Florida Supreme Court. For instance, attorneys are able to raise due
process and equal protection challenges before the Florida Supreme Court during
their disciplinary proceedings. See Fla. Bar v. Carricarte, 733 So.2d 975, 978-979
(Fla. 1999); Fla. Bar v. Brown, 905 So.2d 76, 82 (Fla. 2005). Furthermore, these
issues were inextricably intertwined with the Florida Supreme Court’s judgments.
These claims, including his request for an injunction, would succeed only to the
extent that the district court determined that the Florida Supreme Court wrongly
decided that Corbin should have been disbarred and made to pay restitution.
Although district courts have jurisdiction to review general constitutional
challenges to state bar rules, see Berman v. Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 794 F.2d
1529, 1530 (11th Cir. 1986), the district court correctly determined that Corbin is
not making a general challenge to the procedures but challenges the procedures as
applied to him. Furthermore, while the district court did not specifically address
Corbin’s state law claims of privacy infringement, defamation, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, third party contract breach, and wrongful
injunction, the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it
has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
Given that the district court correctly decided it lacked jurisdiction over
Corbin’s claims because of the Florida Supreme Court decision in the matter, we
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affirm the dismissal of all Corbin’s claims.
AFFIRMED.
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