Mike H. Samadi v. MBNA America, Inc. , 178 F. App'x 863 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-14387 APR 21, 2006
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 04-00137-CV-AAA-1
MIKE H. SAMADI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
MBNA AMERICA BANK, N.A.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
_________________________
(April 21, 2006)
Before BLACK, CARNES and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Mike H. Samadi, proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his complaint
without prejudice following the grant of MBNA’s motion to compel arbitration.
Samadi asserts the arbitration agreement was not binding. The district court did
not err, and we affirm.
I.
MBNA contends this Court lacks jurisdiction because Samadi’s notice of
appeal failed to identify the court to which the appeal was taken, as required by
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1). A notice of appeal “must:
(A) specify the party or parties taking the appeal . . .; (B) designate the judgment,
order, or part thereof being appealed; and (C) name the court to which the appeal is
taken.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1). However, “[a]n appeal must not be dismissed for
informality of form or title of the notice of appeal, or for failure to name a party
whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear from the notice.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(4).
Additionally, pro se litigants’ pleadings are to be liberally construed. Tannenbaum
v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
Although Samadi’s notice of appeal did not specify he was appealing to this
Court, his notice was timely filed in the correct district court and identified the
correct parties to the suit and the district court’s case number. Construing
Samadi’s pro se filing liberally, his notice of appeal was clear and otherwise
complied with the requirements of Rule 3(c), and we have jurisdiction over this
appeal.
2
II.
We review the district court’s decision to compel arbitration de novo. Caley
v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1368 n.6 (11th Cir. 2005), petition
for cert. filed, (U.S. Jan 30, 2006) (No. 05-959). “If all the provisions of the
arbitration clause are enforceable, then the court must compel arbitration according
to the terms of the agreement.” Terminix Int’l. Co., LP v. Palmer Ranch Ltd.
P’ship, 432 F.3d 1327, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005).
The validity of an arbitration agreement is generally governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA). 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. 9 U.S.C. § 2 states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or
the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement
in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out
of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.
“[W]hile the FAA requires that the arbitration agreement be in writing, it does not
require that it be signed by the parties.” Caley, 428 F.3d at 1368. If a suit brought
in the district court contains “any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement
in writing for such arbitration,” and one of the parties makes a motion to stay the
proceeding, the district “shall . . . stay the trial of the action until such arbitration
has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement . . . .” 9 U.S.C. § 3.
3
“[C]ourts have consistently found that claims arising under federal statutes
may be the subject of arbitration agreements and are enforceable under the FAA.”
Caley, 428 F.3d at 1367 (citations omitted). General contract principles apply to
arbitration agreements. Id. at 1372. “[S]tate law generally governs whether an
enforceable contract or agreement to arbitrate exists.” Id. at 1368. “Thus, in
determining whether a binding agreement arose between the parties, courts apply
the contract law of the particular state that governs the formation of contracts.” Id.“[A] court can decline to enforce an arbitration agreement under the FAA only if
the plaintiffs can point to a generally applicable principle of contract law under
which the agreement could be revoked.” Id. at 1371 (emphasis omitted).
“A federal district Court is bound to apply the conflict of laws rules
prevailing in the forum state.” Judge v. Am. Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1565, 1577
(11th Cir. 1990). Under Georgia law, choice-of-law provisions in contracts are
enforced in the absence of contrary public policy. Scales v. Textron Fin. Corp.,
622 S.E.2d 903, 904 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005). In this case, where the contract
explicitly designates Delaware law as the law that applies, and no public policy
contrary to enforcing the parties’ choice of law has been identified, Delaware law
should be applied.
4
Under Delaware law, “a bank may at any time” amend a revolving credit
plan agreement “in any respect, whether or not the amendment or the subject of the
amendment was originally contemplated or addressed by the parties or is integral
to the relationship between the parties.” Del. Code. Ann. tit. 5, § 952(a) (2005).
Arbitration is specifically listed as one of the terms of an agreement that may be
altered. Id. “Any notice of an amendment sent by the bank may be included in the
same envelope with a periodic statement or as part of the periodic statement or in
other materials sent to the borrower.” Id.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(e) provides: “When a motion is based on
facts not appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented
by the respective parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly
or partly on oral testimony or deposition.” We have held it is not an abuse of
discretion to decide a motion to dismiss based on affidavits and other documents
where neither party made a timely request for a hearing. Sunseri v. Macro Cellular
Partners, 412 F.3d 1247, 1249-51 (11th Cir. 2005).
The Delaware Superior Court has held the same arbitration clause at issue in
this case, sent out in the same manner as in the instant case, was enforceable.
Edelist v. MBNA Am. Bank, 790 A.2d 1249, 1257-60 (Del. Super. Ct. 2001). In
that case, MBNA presented the affidavit of a Senior Vice President, stating MBNA
5
had mailed notice of the amendment to the address where the plaintiff’s statements
were sent on or about December 20, 1999, and MBNA’s files contained no
information that the plaintiff opted out of the arbitration provision. Id. at 1251,
1254. As in the instant case, the plaintiff claimed he never received the notice of
the amendment, but provided nothing more than his assertion he never received the
mailing. Id. at 1258. The Delaware court held MBNA’s affidavit was sufficient to
show the plaintiff received the notice and failed to opt out of the arbitration
agreement. Id.Samadi never objected to MBNA’s affidavit or requested an evidentiary
hearing, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in relying on the
affidavit. The original agreement stated it could be amended pursuant to Delaware
law and MBNA’s affidavit showed the amendment had been sent out in
compliance with Delaware law, thus, the arbitration agreement was valid. The
agreement was broad enough to cover all of Samadi’s claims, and the district court
did not err in dismissing the case and granting the order to compel arbitration. The
district court protected Samadi’s right to litigate any issues found non-arbitrable by
dismissing the case without prejudice.
AFFIRMED.
6