James Richard Hurley v. RaceTrac Petroleum, Inc. , 146 F. App'x 365 ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-10119 August 22, 2005
Non-Argument Calendar THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 03-02779-CV-IPJ
JAMES RICHARD HURLEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
RACETRAC PETROLEUM, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(August 22, 2005)
Before HULL, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
James Richard Hurley appeals the district court’s denial of equitable relief,
requested pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29
U.S.C. § 621 et seq., after a jury returned a verdict in favor of Hurley on his ADEA
claim, but awarded no damages. The jury also returned a verdict in favor of RaceTrac
Petroleum, Inc. (“RaceTrac”) on Hurley’s claim pursuant to the American with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. On appeal, Hurley argues that,
in light of the jury’s finding on his ADEA claim -- that RaceTrac discriminated
against him by failing to hire him based on his age -- the district court erred by
denying equitable relief. After thorough review of the record and careful
consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
The relevant facts are straightforward. Hurley sued RaceTrac for age
discrimination (Count 1) and disability discrimination (Count 2), based on his
unsuccessful attempt to obtain employment with RaceTrac. In January 2003, Hurley
interviewed for employment with RaceTrac, at which time he completed a job
application. He subsequently attended an employee orientation session, during which
he completed a test on RaceTrac’s policies and procedures. At the behest of a
RaceTrac manager, he reported to the Trussville, Alabama store to pick up a work
schedule. At that time, he was informed that RaceTrac was not going to hire him. He
testified that he was told the decision was based on his age, 72 years old. Three
weeks later, Hurley filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”), alleging age discrimination against RaceTrac for its failure
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to hire him. In May 2003, while the EEOC charge was pending, RaceTrac contacted
Hurley and offered him a job, which he refused.
At trial, it was RaceTrac’s theory of defense that, in January 2003, it extended
a conditional offer of employment to Hurley, conditioned on his completion of
required paperwork. It further argued that the May 2003 offer was an unconditional
offer of employment, which Hurley unreasonably refused. RaceTrac contended that,
based on Hurley’s unreasonable rejection of the May 2003 job offer, he was barred
from recovering on his ADEA claim.
The district court’s charge to the jury included the issuance of special
interrogatories. Hurley did not object to the court’s instructions to the jury or to the
special interrogatories. The interrogatories required the jury, in the event that they
found in favor of Hurley on any claim, to determine, inter alia, whether to award
damages to compensate for a net loss of wages and benefits to the date of trial. The
jury returned a verdict in favor of Hurley on Count 1 and in favor of RaceTrac on
Count 2. To the special interrogatory concerning damages to compensate for a loss
of wages and benefits, the jury responded “No” and indicated a “0” dollar amount to
be awarded.
Hurley then moved for equitable relief, in the form of front pay or
reinstatement, based on the jury’s verdict in his favor on Count 1. The district court
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conducted a hearing on Hurley’s motion, at which it heard additional testimony from
Hurley concerning his earnings and the lack of benefits associated with his
independently-owned lawn care maintenance business, as well as his anticipated
earnings and benefits had RaceTrac hired him. During his testimony at the hearing
on equitable relief, as he had at trial, Hurley maintained that he continued to be
interested in working at RaceTrac during the relevant period.
The district court denied Hurley’s motion, finding that the jury awarded no
back pay due to Hurley’s rejection of an unconditional offer of employment (a result
consistent with RaceTrac’s theory of defense at trial). In its order denying equitable
relief, the district court stated:
The issue of whether the defendant’s employment offer to the
plaintiff in May, 2003 was an unconditional offer of employment was
squarely addressed in the court’s charge to the jury. The charge stated:
The defendant maintains that it made an unconditional
offer of employment to plaintiff on June 17, 2003. The
plaintiff maintains that it was not an unconditional offer of
employment as expressed in his letter to defendant on June
18, 2003. If you find that defendant made an unconditional
offer of employment, I charge you as follows:
The unconditional offer of employment by the employer
can toll or stop the continuing accrual of back pay liability.
The plaintiff’s rejection of an unconditional offer of a job
previously denied ends the accrual of back pay.
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If you find the unconditional offer of employment made by
RaceTrac to the plaintiff was rejected and plaintiff failed to
offer any legitimate reason for rejecting RaceTrac’s
unconditional offer of employment, then you must reduce
the amount of plaintiff’s damages by the amount that
would have been reasonably realized if the plaintiff had
taken advantage of such an opportunity.
The district court denied equitable relief, noting that, consistent with the
foregoing special interrogatory and the jury’s answers to it, the jury found that Hurley
(1) rejected an unconditional offer of employment; (2) did not provide a legitimate
reason for the rejection; and (3) therefore, was not entitled to back pay. As for
reinstatement or front pay, the court, citing our decision in Lewis v. Fed’l Prison
Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1277 (11th Cir. 1992), concluded that Hurley’s rejection of the
unconditional offer and the unreasonable basis for that rejection (that Hurley had
relied on his attorney’s advice that the offer was a settlement offer, not a job offer)
warranted denying equitable relief. This appeal followed.
We review the district court’s decision to grant or deny equitable relief under
ADEA for abuse of discretion. See Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d
1322, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999). The district court enjoys broad discretion in fashioning
an equitable remedy, so long as it is consistent with the statutory purposes of the
ADEA. Id. The ADEA authorizes a district court to award equitable relief to a
prevailing plaintiff. See 29 U.S.C. 626(b). However, “[t]he central purpose of [the
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statute] is to make the plaintiff “whole,” to restore the plaintiff to the economic
position the plaintiff would have occupied but for the illegal discrimination of the
employer.” Farley, 197 F.3d at 1338 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Consistent with the ADEA’s “make whole” purpose, “once liability for
harassment and constructive discharge on the basis of age is established, the injured
victim is presumptively entitled to back pay from the date of the discriminatory
discharge until the date of judgment, unless the victim obtains or could have obtained
substantially equivalent work before that time.” E.E.O.C. v. Massey Yardley
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 117 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing 29 U.S.C. §
626(b)) (emphasis added). Likewise, where a plaintiff requests reinstatement or back
pay, once an employer makes a “good faith” offer of reinstatement, a plaintiff who
rejects the offer forfeits his right to such equitable relief unless his refusal of the
employer’s offer was reasonable. Stanfield v. Answering Serv., Inc., 867 F.2d 1290,
1296 (11th Cir. 1989).
We require a district court to articulate its rationale for denying legal or
equitable relief to a plaintiff who insists that such relief is necessary to make him
whole. See Verbraeken v. Westingouse Elec. Corp., 881 F.2d 1041, 1052 (11th Cir.
1989). Here, the district court concluded that RaceTrac’s May 2003 job offer was
reasonable and made in good faith. The court articulated its reason for denying
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equitable relief, that is, the jury accepted RaceTrac’s theory of defense that Hurley
refused an unconditional offer of employment. The district court found Hurley’s
reason for rejecting the offer unreasonable and, thus, concluded that he was not
entitled to equitable relief. Cf. Stanfield, 867 F.2d at 1295-96 (affirming denial of
equitable relief based on plaintiff’s unreasonable rejection of employer’s offer of
reinstatement). On this record, we can find no abuse of discretion.1
AFFIRMED.
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Hurley did not submit an application for attorneys’ fees, nor did he argue his entitlement to
fees at the hearing on his request for equitable relief (or otherwise object at any point), in the district
court. Accordingly, his argument that there was error based on the district court’s failure to award
fees is without merit. Cf. Novak v. Cobb County Kennestone Hosp. Auth., 74 F.3d 1173, 1177 (11th
Cir. 1996) (refusing to consider errors alleged for first time on appeal) (internal citation omitted).
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