Roe v. Mobile Cty. Appointing Board , 52 F.3d 300 ( 1995 )

United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
Nos. 94-7138, 94-7155.
Larry ROE, Perry O. Hooper, Sr., James D. Martin, Plaintiffs-
Appellees,
v.
STATE OF ALABAMA, By and Through its Attorney General James
EVANS, Defendant-Appellant,
James Bennett, Honorable Alabama Secretary of State, Defendant-
Appellant,
John W. Davis, a representative of a class of persons who have
sought to have their ballots counted in an action in the Circuit
Court of Coosa County, Alabama, Defendant-Appellant,
Mobile County Appointing Board, Lionel W. Noonan, Defendants,
Wilcox County Appointing Board, Jerry Boggan, Defendants-
Appellants,
O.P. Woodruff, Honorable Probate Judge of Lowndes County, Willie
Vaughner, Honorable Sheriff of Lowndes County, et al., Defendants,
Elsie Davis, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Lowndes County, W.A.
Kynard, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Dallas County, Mary C. Moore,
Honorable Circuit Clerk of Perry County, Curtis J. Elzie, Honorable
Circuit Clerk of Bullock County, David S. Nix, Honorable Circuit
Clerk of Barbour County, Devon Kiker, Honorable Circuit Clerk of
Russell County, Eddie D. Mallard, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Macon
County, Debra P. Hackett, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Montgomery
County, Barbara Craft, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Calhoun County,
Polly Conradi, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Jefferson County, Billy
S. Yates, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Etowah County, Earl Carter,
Honorable Circuit Clerk of Jefferson County, Bessemer Division,
Carolyn M. Smith, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Cherokee County, Jean
Browning, Honorable Circuit Clerk of St. Clair County, Samuel L.
Grice, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Talladega County, Jackie Calhoun,
Honorable Circuit Clerk of Baldwin County, Jackie B. Howard,
Honorable Circuit Clerk of Washington County, Susan F. Wilson,
Honorable Circuit Clerk of Mobile County, Donald R. Gibson,
Honorable Circuit Clerk of Choctaw County, Wayne Brunson, Honorable
Circuit Clerk of Clarke County, John Sawyer, Honorable Circuit
Clerk of Monroe County, James D. Taylor, Honorable Circuit Clerk of
Escambia County, Brenda M. Peacock, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Pike
County, Ann W. Tate, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Crenshaw County,
Bobby T. Branum, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Butler County, Jean E.
Riley, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Conecuh County, Julia L. Trant,
Honorable Circuit Clerk of Houston County, Jim Ellis, Honorable
Circuit Clerk of Coffee County, Roger A. Powell, Honorable Circuit
Clerk of Covington County, Connie Burdeshaw, Honorable Circuit
Clerk of Henry County, Willie Powell, Honorable Circuit Clerk of
Wilcox County, Veleria Thomley, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Geneva
County, Bettye B. Garrett, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Dale County,
Vinita B. Thompson, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Walker County, James
E. Renfroe, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Fayette County, Carl F.
Woods, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Lamar County, Seyaine Sealy,
Honorable Circuit Clerk of Marengo County, Jack T. Pate, Honorable
Circuit Clerk of Pickens County, Johnnie Knott, Honorable Circuit
Clerk of Greene County, Carole Smith, Honorable Circuit Clerk of
Sumter County, Betty Gayle Pate, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Hale
County, Kim S. Benefield, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Randolph
County, Frank Lucas, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Tallapoosa County,
Fred Posey, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Autauga County, Horace D.
Perry, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Cleburne County, Robert Giddens,
Honorable Circuit Clerk of Clay County, Phyllis Cumbee, Honorable
Circuit Clerk of Chambers County, Earl Sayers, Honorable Circuit
Clerk of Elmore County, Dan Reeves, Honorable Circuit Clerk of
Shelby County, Doris T. Turner, Honorable Circuit Clerk of
Tuscaloosa County, Mike Smith, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Chilton
County, Gerald D. Parker, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Coosa County,
R.L. Foster, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Bibb County, Billy D.
Harbin, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Madison County, Jimmy Lindsey,
Honorable Circuit Clerk of DeKalb County, Jean Albert Scott,
Honorable Circuit Clerk of Marshall County, Charles Page, Jr.,
Honorable Circuit Clerk of Limestone County, Leonard V. Griggs,
Honorable Circuit Clerk of Jackson County, J.T. Newton, Honorable
Circuit Clerk of Franklin County, James O. Garrard, Honorable
Circuit Clerk of Marion County, W.F. Bailey, Honorable Circuit
Clerk of Winston County, Robert G. Bates, Honorable Circuit Clerk
of Cullman County, Michael E. Criswell, Honorable Circuit Clerk of
Blount County, C. Phillip Bowling, Honorable Circuit Clerk of
Colbert County, Kenneth C. Austin, Honorable Circuit Clerk of
Lauderdale County, W. Larry Smith, Honorable Circuit Clerk of
Lawrence County, Cleo D. Teague, Honorable Circuit Clerk of Morgan
County, Defendants-Appellants.
Jan. 4, 1995.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Alabama. (No. CV 94-885-AH-S), Alex T. Howard, Jr.,
Judge.
Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, EDMONDSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In Alabama, a person voting by absentee ballot must execute an
"affidavit" in the presence of a " "notary public or other officer
authorized to acknowledge oaths or two witnesses 18 years of age or
1
older.' " Ala.Code § 17-10-7 (1980). Section 17-10-9 of the code
prescribes the physical form of the ballot and the affidavit. The
affidavit form must be printed on an envelope. A second, smaller
envelope, which does not identify the absentee voter and contains
the voter's completed ballot, must be sealed inside the affidavit
envelope, and that envelope must then be mailed to the appropriate
county election official. See Ala.Code § 17-10-9 (1980).
The affidavit envelopes are held unopened until noon on
election day. Beginning at noon, the "absentee election manager"
delivers the envelopes to the "election officials" for counting.
They, in turn, with poll watchers present, call the name of each
voter casting an absentee ballot, "open each affidavit envelope,
review the affidavit to certify that such voter is entitled to vote
and deposit the plain envelope containing the absentee ballot into
a sealed ballot box." Ala.Code § 17-10-10 (1980). These ballots
are then "counted and otherwise handled in all respects as if the
said absentee voter were present and voting in person." Id.2
1
The contents of this affidavit are prescribed by § 17-10-7
of the Alabama Code, the full text of which appears in the
appendix to this opinion.
2
The Secretary of State's Election Handbook for 1994
interpreted these requirements as follows:
The task of absentee poll workers on election day
falls into two phases. Beginning at noon (or later)
they are to open the affidavit envelopes, review the
affidavits, and deposit the plain envelopes in a sealed
ballot box.
If, upon examination, the affidavit is not
properly witnessed or notarized, is not signed by the
voter, or does not otherwise contain sufficient
information to determine that the person is a qualified
elector and is entitled to vote absentee, the ballot
should not be counted [Attorney General's opinion 80-
Alabama law also provides a method of contesting statewide
elections such as those involved in this case. Section 17-15-50 of
the Alabama Code provides that any elector may contest certain
statewide elections by filing a written statement and a bond with
the state legislature within ten days after the Speaker of the
House of Representatives has opened the election returns. Ala.Code
§ 17-15-50 (1940).3 The legislature is then required to elect a
commission of three senators and five representatives to take
testimony submitted in the contest. Id. § 17-15-53. The
commission is provided with subpoena and contempt powers. Id. §§
17-15-55, 17-15-57. "[T]he final judgment of the joint convention
[of the House and Senate] upon the contest shall [be] effective as
00551]. Otherwise, the ballot should be deposited into
a sealed ballot box.
Alabama Election Handbook 257 (6th ed. 1994) (citation in
original) (emphasis added). The Attorney General's Opinion
cited in the election handbook states:
If, upon examination, the affidavit obviously does not
comply with Alabama law, that is, if it is not properly
witnessed or notarized, is not signed by the voter, or
does not otherwise contain sufficient information to
determine that the person is a qualified elector and is
entitled to vote absentee, the ballot should not be
counted.
80 Op. Att'y Gen. 551 (1980). The Secretary of State, James
Bennett, testified in the proceedings below that it was "his
understanding that ballots that are not witnessed by two
people over the age of 18 or notarized [were] not counted
prior to the Montgomery County [Circuit] Court case," Odom
v. Bennett, No. 94-2434-R (Montgomery County Cir.Ct., filed
Nov. 16, 1994).
3
The statewide offices for which elections are contestable
in the state legislature are Governor, Secretary of State,
Auditor, Treasurer, Attorney General, Commissioner of Agriculture
and Industries, Justices of the Supreme Court, and Judges of the
Court of Appeals. Ala.Code § 17-15-50.
a judgment and shall have the force and effect of vesting the title
to the office ... in the person in whose favor the judgment may be
rendered." Id. § 17-15-52.4 Thus, the legislature is the final
4
The Alabama legislature has ensured that the decision of
the joint convention of the House and Senate shall be conclusive
by providing that no judge or court shall have jurisdiction to
decide election contests involving the specified statewide
offices. Section 17-15-6 provides:
No jurisdiction exists in or shall be exercised by
any judge, court or officer exercising chancery powers
to entertain any proceeding for ascertaining the
legality, conduct or results of any election, except so
far as authority to do so shall be specially and
specifically enumerated and set down by statute; and
any injunction, process or order from any judge, court
or officer in the exercise of chancery powers, whereby
the results of any election are sought to be inquired
into, questioned or affected ... save as may be
specially and specifically enumerated and set down by
statute, shall be null and void and shall not be
enforced by any officer or obeyed by any officer or
obeyed by any person....
Ala.Code § 17-15-6. This provision is especially
significant in light of the common law of Alabama:
[E]lection contests exist only by virtue of statutory
enactment and such statutes are to be strictly
construed. [Groom v. Taylor, 235 Ala. 247, 178 So. 33(1938) ]. "The right to contest an election is not a
common-law right (Cosby v. Moore, 259 Ala. 41, 65 So.2d
178 [ (1953) ] ). Elections belong to the political
branch of the government, and, in absence of special
constitutional or statutory provisions, are beyond the
control of judicial power." 29 C.J.S. Elections § 246.
Further at § 247 the rule is stated that statutes
providing for election contests "should be strictly
construed or observed as to those provisions for
inaugurating the contest and which are necessary to
jurisdiction [citing Walker v. Junior, 247 Ala. 342, 24
So.2d 431 (1945); Groom, 235 Ala. 247, 178 So. 33]....
An election contest being purely statutory, the courts
are limited in their investigation to such subjects as
are specified in the statutes. The remedy is not to be
extended to include cases not within the language of
the statute; and the right of contest is not to be
inferred from doubtful provisions."
Longshore v. City of Homewood, 277 Ala. 444, 171 So.2d 453,
arbiter of statewide office contests.
On November 8, 1994, Alabama held a general election for
several statewide offices, including the offices of Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court of Alabama and Treasurer of the State of
Alabama. Between 1000 and 2000 absentee voters failed to properly
complete their affidavits, either by failing to have their
signatures notarized or by failing to have them witnessed by two
people. Pursuant to the statutory mandate of section 17-10-10, and
the statewide practice prior to the general election, these ballots
were not counted: they were not removed from their affidavit
envelopes and, therefore, were not placed in the ballot box.5
The elections for Chief Justice and Treasurer, especially the
former office, were quite close. Informal estimates place the two
candidates for Chief Justice a mere 200 to 300 votes apart without
counting the contested absentee ballots. Following the general
election, two individuals who voted absentee, on behalf of
themselves and similarly situated absentee voters, filed a
complaint in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Alabama,
seeking an order that the contested absentee ballots be counted.
Odom v. Bennett, No. 94-2434-R (Montgomery County Cir.Ct., filed
Nov. 16, 1994). On November 17, 1994, the circuit court entered a
"Temporary Restraining Order" requiring that "those persons
counting the absentee ballots for each county shall count each
455 (1965).
5
We refer to any ballot that was accompanied by an
unnotarized or unwitnessed affidavit—whether or not the ballot
has been removed from its affidavit envelope—as a "contested
absentee ballot."
ballot which contains: (1) the place of residence of the person
casting the ballot; (2) the reason for ... voting by absentee
ballot; and (3) the signature of the voter. Absentee ballots may
not be excluded from being counted because of a lack of
notarization or a lack of witnesses." (Emphasis added). The
circuit court also ordered the Secretary of State to refrain from
certifying the election until the vote totals, including the
contested absentee votes, are forwarded to him; after receiving
these revised totals, the Secretary must certify the election.6
Following the entry of this temporary restraining order, the
election officials began counting the contested absentee ballots.7
On December 5, 1994, the United States District Court for the
6
On December 9, 1994, the circuit court entered a
preliminary injunction incorporating its "Temporary Restraining
Order" and further elaborating on the reasons for the court's
conclusion that the contested absentee ballots were required to
be counted under Alabama law. The circuit court felt that Wells
v. Ellis, 551 So.2d 382, 383 (Ala.1989), and Williams v. Lide,
628 So.2d 531, 536 (Ala.1993), required that the contested
absentee ballots be counted because the affidavit envelopes
accompanying them were in "substantial compliance" with § 17-10-
7. The circuit court determined that it had the authority to
enter the injunction despite the jurisdictional bar of § 17-15-6,
quoted supra note 4, because the circuit court was exercising its
power for the "limited purpose of ordering public officials to
comply with legal principles." Odom v. Bennett (citing Sears v.
Carson, 551 So.2d 1054, 1056 (Ala.1989)).
7
The parties indicated at oral argument before this panel on
December 29 that 30 counties have removed the contested absentee
ballots from their corresponding affidavit envelopes, placed the
ballots in the ballot pool, recounted the votes, and forwarded
the revised results to the Secretary. In the remaining 37
counties, the contested absentee ballots are in various
conditions: some remain in their unopened affidavit envelopes;
some have been removed from their affidavit envelopes but remain
unopened and uncounted; and some have been removed from their
affidavit envelopes, opened and counted. As to the ballots in
the latter two groups, each ballot envelope, or ballot, has been
placed with the affidavit envelope that contained it.
Southern District of Alabama, in a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1988)8 by Larry Roe, a voter suing on behalf of himself and
others similarly situated, Perry O. Hooper, Sr., the Republican
candidate for Chief Justice, and James D. Martin, the Republican
candidate for Treasurer, entered a preliminary injunction against
the Secretary and the election officials of Alabama's sixty-seven
counties precluding them from complying with the circuit court's
order.9 The district court, in its memorandum order granting the
preliminary injunction, found from the evidence the parties
presented that "the past practice of the Alabama election officials
prior to [the] general election has been to refrain from counting
any absentee ballot that did not include notarization or the
signatures of two qualified witnesses," that "the past practice of
the Secretary of [the] State of Alabama has been to certify Alabama
election results on the basis of vote counts that included absentee
votes cast only by those voters who included affidavits with either
notarization or the signatures of two qualified witnesses," and
that the Montgomery County Circuit Court's order changed this past
practice. The district court then concluded that, in obeying the
circuit court's order, the defendant election officials were
8
"Section 1983 is the federal statute under which a citizen
may bring suit in a federal court, alleging that persons acting
under color of state law have deprived him or her of rights
secured by the Constitution of the United States." Curry v.
Baker, 802 F.2d 1302, 1305 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1023, 107 S.Ct. 1262, 93 L.Ed.2d 819 (1986). The plaintiffs also
sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1974 (1988) and the Voting Rights
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988). The plaintiffs' claims for relief
under those statutes are not at issue in this appeal.
9
John Davis is also involved in the case as a defendant,
representing a group of absentee voters who seek to have their
contested absentee ballots counted.
violating the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court, therefore,
ordered that the contested ballots and other election materials be
preserved and protected; that the Secretary refrain from
certifying any election results based on a vote count that included
the contested absentee ballots; that Alabama's sixty-seven county
election officials forward vote totals to the Secretary without
counting the contested absentee ballots; and that the Secretary,
upon receipt of those vote totals from the county election
officials, certify the election results.
The defendants appeal,10 raising several issues. They contend
that: (1) the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
entertain the plaintiffs' case; (2) the plaintiffs failed to state
a claim for relief under the United States Constitution; and (3)
assuming that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction
and that the plaintiffs stated a constitutional claim, the district
court should have abstained from exercising its jurisdiction. We
address each issue in turn.
I.
Appellants claim that the district court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. According
to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, "a United States District Court has
10
If the district court's order is treated as a preliminary
injunction, we have jurisdiction to review the order under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1988). If the order is treated as a
permanent injunction, our jurisdiction lies under 28 U.S.C. §
1291 (1988). Arguably, the district court's order is a permanent
injunction. The district court found the material facts, which
are not in dispute, on the liability issues, and a further
evidentiary hearing regarding those facts appears to be
unnecessary; the district court was presented with pure
questions of law regarding the liability issues.
no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial
proceedings." District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1315, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).
Appellants contend that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs' claims because those
claims, in effect, require the district court to review the final
judgment of the Montgomery County Circuit Court. We reject this
argument for two reasons. First, the plaintiffs in this case are
not, by the admission of all parties, parties to the circuit court
action. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to such
circumstances. See Johnson v. De Grandy, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114
S.Ct. 2647, 2654, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994). Second, because the
plaintiffs are not parties to the circuit court action, the
plaintiffs had no opportunity to raise their constitutional claims
in the circuit court and their claims, therefore, were not
considered by the circuit court. See Wood v. Orange County, 715
F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir.1983) ("[T]he Rooker bar can only apply
to issues that the plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to
raise."), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210, 104 S.Ct. 2398, 81 L.Ed.2d
355 (1984).11
II.
Appellants contend that the plaintiffs failed to allege, or
to demonstrate, the violation of a right "secured by the
Constitution" as required under section 1983. Baker v. McCollan,
11
In its December 9, 1994, memorandum order, see supra note
6, the Montgomery County Circuit Court identified the issues
before it as: "(1) whether the Court had jurisdiction to
entertain the proceeding and (2) whether the ballots in question
were legally cast and due to be counted." Odom v. Bennett.
443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2692, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). We disagree. In this case, Roe,
Hooper, and Martin allege that "[t]he actions of the Defendants and
the Defendant Class ... would constitute a retroactive validation
of a potentially controlling number of votes in the elections for
Chief Justice and Treasurer" that "would result in fundamental
unfairness and would violate plaintiffs' right to due process of
law" in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that this
violation of "the plaintiffs' rights to vote and ... have their
votes properly and honestly counted" constitutes a violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments.
The right of suffrage is "a fundamental political right,
because preservative of all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 370, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 1071, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). "[T]he right of
suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of
a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the
free exercise of the franchise." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
554, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1377, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). Not every state
election dispute, however, implicates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and thus leads to possible federal court
intervention. Generally, federal courts do not involve themselves
in " "garden variety' election disputes." Curry, 802 F.2d at 1315
(quoting Welch v. McKenzie, 765 F.2d 1311, 1317, vacated on other
grounds and remanded, 777 F.2d 191 (5th Cir.1985)). If, however,
"the election process itself reaches the point of patent and
fundamental unfairness, a violation of the due process clause may
be indicated and relief under § 1983 therefore in order. Such a
situation must go well beyond the ordinary dispute over the
counting and marking of ballots." Id. (quoting Duncan v.
Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 703 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1012, 103 S.Ct. 368, 74 L.Ed.2d 504 (1982)). We address,
then, whether the plaintiffs have demonstrated fundamental
unfairness in the November 8 election. We conclude that they have.
The plaintiffs acknowledge that the State of Alabama is free
to place reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on voting,
and that Alabama can require that voters be qualified electors.
See generally Burdick v. Takushi, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct.
2059, 2063, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992) ("Common sense, as well as
constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government must
play an active role in structuring elections...."). They argue,
however, that section 17-10-7 of the Alabama Election Code clearly
requires that affidavits accompanying absentee ballots be either
notarized or signed by two witnesses; that the statewide practice
in Alabama prior to the November 8 general election was to exclude
absentee ballots that did not comply with this rule; and that the
circuit court's order requiring the state's election officials to
perform the ministerial act of counting the contested absentee
ballots,12 if permitted to stand, will constitute a retroactive
change in the election laws that will effectively "stuff the ballot
box,"13 implicating fundamental fairness issues. Cf. United States
12
The counting of ballots is a "ministerial act" under
Alabama law. Cosby v. Moore, 259 Ala. 41, 65 So.2d 178, 181
(1953).
13
According to the record before the district court, in one
Alabama county, Greene County, nearly 33% of the votes cast were
from absentee voters. Secretary Bennett testified that he has
v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385, 389, 64 S.Ct. 1101, 1103, 88 L.Ed. 1341(1944).
We agree that failing to exclude the contested absentee
ballots will constitute a post-election departure from previous
practice in Alabama. See Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1075
(1st Cir.1978). This departure would have two effects that
implicate fundamental fairness and the propriety of the two
elections at issue. First, counting ballots that were not
previously counted would dilute the votes of those voters who met
the requirements of section 17-10-7 as well as those voters who
actually went to the polls on election day. Second, the change in
the rules after the election would have the effect of
disenfranchising those who would have voted but for the
inconvenience imposed by the notarization/witness requirement.
See, e.g., Brown v. O'Brien, 469 F.2d 563, 569 (D.C.Cir.), vacated
as moot, 409 U.S. 816, 93 S.Ct. 67, 34 L.Ed.2d 72 (1972) ("If the
party had adopted [the rule change] prior to the ... primary
election, the candidates might have campaigned in a different
manner.... Voters might have cast their ballots for a different
candidate; and the State of California might have enacted an
alternative delegate selection scheme...." (footnote omitted)).
Appellants point out that "[a] judicial construction of a
statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant
before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to
"had concerns about absentee voter fraud for years" and that, if
absentee ballots exceed 6% to 7% of the total votes cast, "bells
and sirens ought to go off. There cannot be that many sick,
infirm or out-of-county voters on one day." Odom v. Bennett.
that construction." Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., --- U.S. ----
, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1510, 1519, 128 L.Ed.2d 274 (1994). Thus,
appellants urge, the Montgomery County Circuit Court's ruling
merely articulated in a clearer way what the law has always been in
Alabama. This argument, however, ignores the fact that section 17-
10-7, on its face, requires notarization or witnessing, that the
Secretary and the Attorney General have acknowledged the
requirement and that, as the district court found, the practice of
the election officials throughout the state has been to exclude
absentee ballots that did not meet this requirement. We consider
it unreasonable to expect average voters and candidates to question
the Secretary's, the Attorney General's, and the election
officials' interpretation and application of the statute,
especially in light of its plain language. See Griffin, 570 F.2d
at 1076.
Appellants also argue that this case presents a case of
enfranchisement of those who cast the contested absentee ballots,
rather than a disenfranchisement of qualified voters, and thus does
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. They rely
heavily on Partido Nuevo Progresista v. Barreto Perez, 639 F.2d 825(1st Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 985, 101 S.Ct. 2318, 68
L.Ed.2d 842 (1981). In that case, the plaintiffs challenged the
tallying of ballots in a local election in Puerto Rico. A section
of the Electoral Law of Puerto Rico provided that, if a handwritten
ballot was used in an election, the Electoral Commission had to
guarantee that the elector was qualified to vote by making a mark
in a specific place on the ballot.14 The section stated that if the
mark was not made in the correct space, the ballot would be null
and void. After the election, the Administrator of the Election
Commission and the Commonwealth's Electoral Review Board held that
several ballots were invalid because they were not marked
correctly. The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico reversed, holding
that, despite the section's clear language, the ballots should be
counted. The Barreto Perez plaintiffs, citing Griffin, alleged
that the Puerto Rico Supreme Court's ruling constituted a change in
the method of counting ballots after the election and, therefore,
violated the Constitution. Id. at 826.
The First Circuit did not agree for two reasons. First, the
court found it significant that "this case does not involve a state
court order that disenfranchises voters; rather it involves a ...
decision that enfranchises them—plaintiffs claim that votes were
"diluted' by the votes of others, not that they themselves were
prevented from voting." Id. at 828 (emphasis in original).
Second, the court found that "no party or person is likely to have
acted to their detriment by relying upon the invalidity of [the
contested] ballots...." Id. Accordingly, the First Circuit found
no constitutional injury. We need not address the court's apparent
holding that dilution is not a constitutional injury because the
facts of this case differ markedly from those of Barreto Perez. We
believe that, had the candidates and citizens of Alabama known that
something less than the signature of two witnesses or a notary
14
It is not clear whether the Electoral Commission itself,
or a representative of the Commission at the polling place, was
required to mark the ballots.
attesting to the signature of absentee voters would suffice,
campaign strategies would have taken this into account and
supporters of Hooper and Martin who did not vote would have voted
absentee.15
III.
The appellants contend that, since this case involves "a
sensitive area of state policy," the district court should have
stayed its hand and required the plaintiffs to invoke their state
remedies—either an election contest in the legislature or a
judicial declaration from the Supreme Court of Alabama. See
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman, 312 U.S. 496, 501-02, 61 S.Ct. 643,
645-46, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941).16 We agree that federal courts should
refrain from holding a state election law unconstitutional when a
reasonable alternative course of action exists. See Burdick v.
Takushi, 846 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir.1988). We are, therefore,
reluctant to reach a final decision in this case while the proper
application of the Alabama Election Code remains muddled.
There are two ways to show deference to the state
decisionmakers in this matter: we can leave the plaintiffs to
their state remedies; or we can certify a question to the Supreme
Court of Alabama, retain jurisdiction, and await that court's
15
We take judicial notice of the fact that reducing the
inconvenience of voting absentee—by eliminating the necessity of
obtaining the signature of a notary or two witnesses—would
increase the number of absentee ballots.
16
The defendants contend that the plaintiffs could obtain a
judicial declaration from the Supreme Court of Alabama by seeking
and obtaining intervention in Odom v. Bennett, the Montgomery
County Circuit Court case, and then, if they do not prevail,
appealing.
answer. We choose the latter form of abstention; leaving the
plaintiffs to their state remedies is neither workable nor
appropriate in this case.
Because Alabama has barred its courts from entertaining
statewide election contests, see Ala.Code § 17-15-6 (quoted supra
note 4), there is only one state remedy in this case: a contest in
the legislature. The legislature, however, is not an adequate or
proper forum for the resolution of the federal constitutional
issues presented. Moreover, even if the plaintiffs were to
intervene successfully in the Montgomery County Circuit Court
proceeding, Odom v. Bennett, and the Alabama appellate courts17 were
to find—despite the clear jurisdictional bar—that the circuit court
had the power to hear the plaintiffs' constitutional claims, the
urgency of this matter counsels against such a course of action.
The unnecessary delay that would result were we to leave the
plaintiffs to their state court remedy would be particularly
insidious: it would extend the time that the two offices at issue
remain in limbo, hindering those offices in the handling of state
affairs. Time is, therefore, of the essence. Cf. Harman v.
Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 537, 85 S.Ct. 1177, 1183, 14 L.Ed.2d 50(1965) (holding that a district court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to abstain "[g]iven the importance and immediacy of the
problem[ ] and the delay inherent in referring questions of state
law to state tribunals"); Badham v. United States Dist. Court, 721
F.2d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir.1983) ("Although we are mindful of the
important principles of federalism implicit in the doctrine of
17
The Alabama Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
abstention, these principles may be outweighed in an individual
case by the countervailing interest in ensuring each citizen's
federal right to vote.").
By certifying the question to the Supreme Court of Alabama, we
can accommodate Alabama's interest in having its high court settle
the question whether a notarization or the signatures of two
witnesses is required before an absentee ballot may be counted.
Certification will achieve the proper balance between the interest
of federalism and timely resolution of this matter. We therefore
issue the following certification:
CERTIFICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA PURSUANT TO RULE
18 OF THE ALABAMA RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE.
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA AND ITS HONORABLE JUSTICES:
It appears to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit that this case involves a question of Alabama
state law that is determinative of the cause, but unanswered by
controlling precedent of the Supreme Court of Alabama or any
Alabama Court of Appeals. We therefore certify this question for
resolution by the highest court of Alabama:
WHETHER ABSENTEE BALLOTS THAT, ON THE ACCOMPANYING AFFIDAVIT
ENVELOPE, FAIL TO HAVE TWO WITNESSES AND LACK PROPER
NOTARIZATION (FOR EXAMPLE, BALLOT ENVELOPES THAT HAVE ONLY A
SIGNATURE OR ONLY ONE WITNESS, OR ON WHICH THE VOTER AND THE
NOTARY HAVE SIGNED THE BALLOT BUT THE NOTARY FAILS TO FILL IN
THE "TITLE OF OFFICIAL") MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF ALABAMA LAW,
SPECIFICALLY ALABAMA CODE SECTION 17-10-7, TO BE LEGAL BALLOTS
DUE TO BE COUNTED IN THE NOVEMBER 8, 1994 GENERAL ELECTION.
While we await the Supreme Court's answer, to preserve the
status quo with respect to the two elections at issue and, at the
same time, allow the processing of the uncontested elections to
proceed, we modify and clarify the district court's injunction as
follows: (1) We affirm the portion of the district court's
injunction requiring the defendants to preserve all election
materials. We clarify this portion of the injunction by stressing
that contested absentee ballots are not to be opened, altered, or
tampered with in any manner. (2) We affirm the portion of the
district court's injunction enjoining the Secretary of the State of
Alabama from certifying any election results in the general
election of November 8, 1994 that have not been purged of known or
identifiable contested absentee ballots. Once the election results
have been purged of any contested absentee ballots, the Secretary
may certify the results of elections for offices that are not
contested in this case, to wit: all the elections except those for
Chief Justice and Treasurer. (3) With respect to those two
offices, we vacate the provisions of the district court's
injunction requiring that county election officials forward purged
election results to the Secretary and requiring the Secretary to
certify the elections based on those forwarded results. We order
the Secretary not to certify the elections for the offices of Chief
Justice and Treasurer.
QUESTION CERTIFIED; INJUNCTION AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND
CLARIFIED pending further order of this court.
EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I know of no other case involving disputed ballots in which a
federal court has intervened in a state election where the
plaintiff failed to show, in fact, either:
1. that plaintiff had "lost" the election but would have won the
election if lawful votes only had been counted (that is, the
alleged constitutional error changed the election result); or
2. that it was impossible ever to know that his opponent (the
apparent winner) had truly won the election because of the
nature of the voting irregularities (that is, the alleged
constitutional error placed in everlasting doubt what was the
true result of the election).
Nothing is known in this case about whether the alleged
illegalities have affected or will affect the outcome of the
pertinent elections. Yet today we plow into Alabama's election
process and uphold a preliminary injunction that, in effect,
overrules a pre-existing state court order which had directed that
the contested votes be counted. And, instead, the federal courts
(basically, stopping short the state election processes) order that
the contested votes be not counted at all. This high level of
federal activity seems unnecessary and, therefore, improper. So,
I conclude that the district court abused its discretion.
For all we or anyone else knows, if the contested absentee
votes in this case were counted, plaintiffs' candidates would win
the elections, even taking those contested votes into account. In
such event, none of the plaintiffs would be aggrieved by the
decision to count absentee ballots not strictly complying with the
state's statute. I believe everyone involved in this election
dispute would understand that a court's allowing the simple adding
up of which of the contested absentee votes went to which candidate
would not be the same thing as saying that the contested votes will
have value ultimately, as a matter of law, for deciding the final,
official outcome of the elections. But instead of letting the
votes be counted as an Alabama court has directed and then seeing
if there is even a controversy about the election's outcome, the
federal courts have jumped into the process and blocked the very
step that might show there is no big problem to be dealt with by
federal judges.1 I would not interfere with the counting of the
contested ballots, although I agree that all the ballots and
envelopes and other election materials pertinent to the contested
ballots should be maintained and protected so that additional
judicial review, if needed, would be convenient and possible.
This difference with my colleagues is more than just academic
bickering about technicalities. Federal courts are not the bosses
in state election disputes unless extraordinary circumstances
affecting the integrity of the state's election process are clearly
present in a high degree. This well-settled principle—that federal
courts interfere in state elections as a last resort—is basic to
federalism, and we should take it to heart.
Principles of federalism limit the power of federal
courts to intervene in state elections, however. The
Constitution leaves "the conduct of state elections to the
states." Gamza v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449, 453 (5th Cir.1980).
We have cautioned before against excessive entanglement of
federal courts in state elections. "The very nature of the
federal union contemplates separate functions for the states.
If every state election irregularity were considered a federal
constitutional deprivation, federal courts would adjudicate
every state election dispute...." Id. Burton v. State of
Georgia, 953 F.2d 1266, 1268 (11th Cir.1992).
As I understand the law, "[o]nly in extraordinary
circumstances will a challenge to a state election rise to the
1
A showing that the state irregularity affects the outcome
of the election has jurisprudential importance either because the
controversy is not fully ripe for adjudication of the merits
until the outcome is shown to be, in fact, in doubt or because in
a case like this, a plaintiff just cannot show a violation of
substantive due process if he cannot show that what the state did
or did not do made a real difference in the election.
level of a constitutional deprivation." Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d
1302, 1314 (11th Cir.1986). To my way of thinking, the federal
courts have acted too aggressively too soon and have, as a result,
become entangled in Alabama's state election too much. At a time
when we do not know whether the contested votes, in fact, will make
any difference at all in the outcome of the elections, it is hard
for me to say that I am now facing the kind of extraordinary
circumstances—patent and fundamental unfairness tied to concrete
harm—that will amount to a constitutional deprivation and that will
justify immediate significant federal interference in the election
processes of a state.
I would dissolve the district court's injunction except to the
extent that the injunction requires all election materials in the
defendants' control to be preserved and protected in a way (for
example, keeping questionable individual absentee ballots and their
envelopes together) that a fair review of the election remains, in
fact, possible and convenient.2 This limited relief should be
2
I also would certify no question now from this court to the
Supreme Court of Alabama, although I agree that we need to know
what the Alabama law is before we decide whether the Alabama law
violates the Federal Constitution. This case is before us on an
appeal of a preliminary injunction. (The parties in district
court were not notified that the preliminary injunction hearing
would also be the trial on the merits; the preliminary
proceedings were rushed; it is not plain that the district court
has heard all the evidence on such significant points as what was
the custom for receiving and counting absentee ballots in the
past.) By its nature, a preliminary injunction decides nothing
finally. And, as a result, an appellate court reviewing the
grant of the injunction is also not rendering its final judgment
on the merits of the underlying case. The State of Alabama has
been good enough to create a procedure by which federal courts
can ask for guidance on matters of Alabama law. But Alabama's
rule provides that the questions which federal courts ask
Alabama's Supreme Court to answer must be questions "which are
determinative of said cause," by which I understand us to be
enough to protect plaintiffs until the Alabama law becomes clear,
assuming that there is a live controversy about this election after
the contested ballots are counted.3
Some of the ideas expressed in today's court opinion are, to
me, doubtful: such as the theory that Alabama's legislature has
the power in election contests to act contrary to the law of
Alabama as declared by Alabama's highest court; the conclusion
advised to send no questions that would not lead directly to the
final resolution of the cause of action in federal court. Given
the procedural posture of this case, I worry that certification
from this court is probably an unauthorized imposition on the
Alabama Supreme Court. If I were not dissenting otherwise, I
would raise no question about the time and manner of
certification. But I worry about the precedent we are setting.
I do not want to abuse the certification process and, perhaps,
wear out our welcome when we ask for help from state supreme
courts.
The merits of this case remain to be decided finally in
the district court. That court can (and I think should)
certify the state law question speedily to the Alabama
Supreme Court. Coming from the district court, I think it
can be more accurately said that the certified question can
be "determinative of said cause."
3
This kind of injunction is far more narrow and far less
intrusive on the state's affairs than the one granted by the
district court or the modified injunction issued by this court.
Depending on what the law of Alabama is (once it is definitively
set out by Alabama's high court, by certification from the
district court or otherwise), plaintiffs' likelihood of success
on federal constitutional grounds could become pretty good. So,
today I can say plaintiffs have a fair chance of success.
Jumbling, in the meantime, of the contested absentee ballots with
other ballots in such a way that evidence would be lost and that
would obstruct further review would doubtlessly result in
irreparable harm and would be contrary to the public interest in
honest elections. (This concern to ensure against the risk of
vanished evidence also explains why this case is ripe for some
adjudication now even when the state election process has not
been concluded.) Given the serious nature of the harm and the
importance of the public interest, some injunctive relief seems
justified. I am confident that the parties and the district
court could work out the details of how best to preserve the
evidence and still not burden defendants too much.
that an election contest before the legislative commission is
inadequate to determine the legal issues raised by plaintiffs; the
thought that only absolute identity of parties in the state court
action and federal court action (without regard to state-case
parties possibly under the control of or in privity with
federal-case parties) will trigger a Rooker-Feldman bar in federal
court; and the perception that a federal court order that
countermands a pre-existing Alabama court order maintains the
status quo in Alabama.
Much of my objection to what this court says today, however,
is not that I am sure that what it has said is wrong, but that,
given the facts actually before us at this time, I am pretty sure
it is unnecessary to decide or to speak about many of these
sensitive issues. I see no need for a lot of immediate federal
court action yet. I would wait a bit longer and let Alabama's
election process finish (or come closer to finishing) before the
federal courts cut in. I do know that bad facts can result in bad
law,4 and here the facts had they been allowed to develop fully
might have been such that no law (good or bad) would have to be
made.
4
Considering how much honest elections matter and
considering the nature of the statewide offices in question, this
case may also be seen as one in which the outcome is of unusual
importance and immediate interest. "Great cases like hard cases
make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason of
their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but
because of some accident of immediate overwhelming interest which
appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. These
immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which
makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which
even well settled principles of law will bend." Northern
Securities Co. v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197, 400-401, 24 S.Ct. 436, 486-
87, 48 L.Ed. 679 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).