United States v. Two Parcels of Real Property Located in Russell County , 92 F.3d 1123 ( 1996 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals,
    Eleventh Circuit.
    No. 95-6267.
    UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    TWO PARCELS OF REAL PROPERTY LOCATED IN RUSSELL COUNTY, ALABAMA,
    and One Parcel of Real Property Located in Lee County, Alabama,
    with all Appurtenances and Improvements Thereon, and More
    Particularly Described Hereinafter, Defendant,
    Joseph Carl Brown, Naomi Matichka, James William Brown, Michael
    W. Brown, Carrie Mae Brown, Claimants-Appellants,
    and
    One Parcel of Real Property Located at Route 1, Box 650, Salem,
    Lee County, Alabama, with all Appurtenances and Improvements
    Thereon, Defendant,
    Carl Brown, Naomi Matichka, Claimants-Appellants,
    Terry Brown, et al., Claimants,
    and
    Four Parcels of Real Property Located in Russell County, Alabama,
    with all Appurtenances and Improvements Thereon, Defendant,
    Angela Brown, et al., Claimants,
    Michael Brown, Joseph Carr Brown, Carrie Mae Brown, Claimants-
    Appellants,
    and
    One Parcel of Real Property Described as Lot 9, Rite-Way
    Subdivision, Highway No. 12, Lee County, Alabama, with all
    Appurtenances and Improvements Thereon, Including a Mobile Home,
    Defendant,
    James William Brown, Carrie Mae Brown, Claimants-Appellants.
    Aug. 28, 1996.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle
    District of Alabama. (Nos. CV-92-D-500-E, CV-92-D-693-E, CV-92-D-
    1332-E, CV-92-D-1436), Ira De Ment, Judge.
    Before ANDERSON and COX, Circuit Judges, and RONEY, Senior Circuit
    Judge.
    PER CURIAM:
    On this appeal from a summary judgment of forfeiture of
    several pieces of property purchased with the proceeds of marijuana
    transactions or used for the production of marijuana, the claimants
    allege several errors:
    1. The complaints should have been dismissed because the
    conclusory allegations did not comply with the strict pleading
    requirements in forfeiture cases.
    2. The court failed to consider claimants' evidence which
    established an issue of fact, or should have resulted in a summary
    judgment for claimants.
    3. The court improperly considered evidence acquired after the
    filing of the complaints.
    4. The court improperly considered the claimants' invocation
    of the Fifth Amendment in response to discovery questions in
    concluding there was probable cause for forfeiture.
    Finding no merit to any of these assignments of error, we
    affirm.
    Law of Forfeiture
    Federal statutes provide that property is forfeited to the
    Government when it is used or intended to be used to facilitate
    illegal drug activities, 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) (Supp.1994);                 or
    when it constitutes proceeds traceable to the exchange of money for
    a    controlled   substance,    section   881(a)(6)   (1981).       Once   the
    Government seizes property, the claimant must establish ownership
    of    the   property   in   question.     E.g.,   United   States   v.     1012
    Germantown Road, 
    963 F.2d 1496
    , 1500 (11th Cir.1992).    Then it is
    the Government's burden to show probable cause for the belief that
    the property to be forfeited is substantially connected to drug
    dealing. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(3) (1988) (incorporating procedures in
    19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1982) for shifting burden of proof in civil
    forfeiture proceeding). 1012 Germantown 
    Road, 963 F.2d at 1500-01
    ;
    United States v. Four Parcels of Real Property, 
    941 F.2d 1428
    , 1440
    (11th Cir.1991) (en banc    ).   Once the Government has met its
    burden, the ultimate burden falls upon the claimant to prove by a
    preponderance of the evidence a defense to the forfeiture, such as
    the innocent owner 
    defense, 963 F.2d at 1501
    , or that the property
    derived from a legitimate source.    Section 
    881(d); 941 F.2d at 1438
    .
    Thus, the critical issue in a forfeiture case is whether the
    Government has shown probable cause which, unrebutted by the
    claimants, is sufficient to permit forfeiture.
    1. Sufficiency of Complaint
    A complaint for forfeiture must adhere to the pleading
    requirements set forth in Rule E(2)(a) of the Supplemental Rules of
    Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims.   These rules impose a more
    stringent obligation on the Government than the notice pleading
    requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to set forth
    grounds for forfeiture.    See generally United States v. Property
    Located at 4880 S.E. Dixie Highway, 
    838 F.2d 1558
    (11th Cir.1988);
    United States v. $38,000 in United States Currency, 
    816 F.2d 1538
    (11th Cir.1987). Specifically Rule E(2)(a) requires a complaint to
    "state the circumstances from which the claim arises with such
    particularity that the defendant or claimant will be able, without
    moving for a more definite statement, to commence an investigation
    of the facts and to frame a responsive pleading."                       To satisfy this
    specificity requirement, the complaint "must allege sufficient
    facts to provide a reasonable belief that the property is subject
    to forfeiture:             in particular, that the Government has probable
    cause to believe that a substantial connection exists between the
    property        to    be    forfeited         and   the   exchange   of    a    controlled
    substance."          
    $38,000, 816 F.2d at 1548
    .
    In      applying         this    standard,     this   Court   has       dismissed   a
    forfeiture complaint where it has contained "not even a whiff of
    evidence" to suggest the property was in any way linked to illegal
    drug activity.              
    $38,000, 816 F.2d at 1548
    .               The complaint in
    $38,000 merely stated that the Government seized the currency, and
    recited some probable cause language from section 881. Neither the
    complaint nor the accompanying affidavit recited any facts to
    support the Government's claim of probable cause.                           
    $38,000, 816 F.2d at 1541
    .
    The complaints in this case allege that James Brown and his
    son, Carl Brown, dealt in quantity sales of marijuana and cocaine
    over       a   period      of    time   and    generally     describe     the    method    of
    operation.1          Specific sales were not alleged, except for two sales
    1
    The complaints state the following facts:
    3. The facts and circumstances supporting the
    seizure and forfeiture of the Defendant property are
    that James William Brown (James Brown) and his son,
    Joseph Carl Brown (Carl Brown), deal in large quantity
    sales of marijuana and cocaine (controlled substances).
    On a weekly or bi-weekly basis one of the Browns would
    go to Texas and purchase 50-100 pounds of marijuana
    which would not generate the kind of money needed for the purchase
    of the properties involved.      The complaints then alleged the
    general methods of large scale drug dealers in the handling of
    cash, and specifically alleged the purchase with cash of each of
    the properties sought to be forfeited, from whom they were bought,
    and how the title was handled.    They alleged the properties were
    purchased with the proceeds of drug sales, and that one parcel was
    used to facilitate the sale of controlled substances.
    The complaints specified no date or location of any purported
    or intended drug dealings, no dollar amounts, no specific types or
    quantities of drugs sold, and no identified participants, other
    than the two Browns.   Yet, there were sufficient facts detailed in
    and/or several ounces of cocaine. Occasionally, the
    Browns would take a "driver" with them and allow the
    driver to return alone in the car with the marijuana or
    cocaine. Generally, the Browns only dealt in pound
    quantities of marijuana and ounce quantities of
    cocaine. The foregoing information was obtained from a
    reliable confidential informant (hereinafter,
    Informant).
    4. In early 1991, this Informant was arrested for
    selling five pounds of marijuana. The Informant had
    received the marijuana from a man known as "James," who
    in fact was James Brown.
    5. The Informant agreed to cooperate with law
    enforcement officials and telephoned James Brown. The
    Informant told James Brown that he/she had the money
    for the five pounds of marijuana and also wanted to
    purchase an additional ten pounds of marijuana. The
    Informant arranged by telephone for the purchase of the
    marijuana and agreed to meet at the mobile home on the
    Defendant Parcel located in Lee County, Alabama
    (hereinafter, Defendant Parcel Three). The Informant
    met with James Brown at Defendant Parcel Three, paid
    James Brown for the original five pounds of marijuana,
    and arranged for the purchase and pickup of the
    additional ten pounds of marijuana. Thereafter, James
    Brown was arrested while in and on Defendant Parcel
    Three.
    the complaint to put claimants on notice as to the Government's
    basis for seizure.        Indeed, as the Government notes, the claimants
    filed responsive pleadings (claims, answers, and on the same day,
    a motion for summary judgment), without obtaining a more definite
    statement, indicating that the complaints were sufficient under
    Rule E(2)(a).        The motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to
    allege a claim with sufficient specificity was not filed until
    later.
    When    probable       cause   is    based    on   evidence   that   the
    participants are generally engaged in the drug business over a
    period of time, have no other source of income, and that the
    properties were bought with the income produced from that drug
    business,       it   is   not    necessary     to     identify   specific     drug
    transactions in the complaint.           See United States v. Four Parcels,
    
    941 F.2d 1428
    , 1440 (11th Cir.1991).
    Contrary to appellants' motion for summary judgment or dismiss
    argument, there was no error in denying the motion to dismiss the
    complaint for insufficiency.
    2. Whether Sufficient Evidence to Establish An Issue of Fact
    Claimants next argue the district court erred in considering
    evidence acquired after seizure in determining whether there was
    probable cause to "forfeit the property."              Examination of probable
    cause in the civil forfeiture context may require a two-tiered
    analysis.   First, the Government must have probable cause toseize
    the property.        Second, the Government in court must show probable
    cause for "forfeit of property."             Claimants, on this issue, appear
    to confuse probable cause to seize the property initially with the
    ultimate determination whether forfeiture was proper.
    At the summary judgment stage where the court's focus is on
    the ultimate determination of whether the property is forfeit, it
    is perfectly appropriate for the court to consider all the evidence
    adduced by the Government.            United States v. $121,100 in United
    States Currency, 
    999 F.2d 1503
    (11th Cir.1993);              Four 
    Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1440
    .
    a. Claimant's Motion for Summary Judgment
    The application of the burdens of proof in reviewing these
    cross-motions is set out in United States v. Four Parcels of Real
    Property, 
    941 F.2d 1428
    (11th Cir.1991).           As a preliminary matter,
    whether it is the Government or the claimant who moves for summary
    judgment, the court must determine whether the Government has shown
    probable cause.          Four 
    Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1439
    .             It is the
    claimant's initial responsibility to point out to the court why it
    believes the Government does not have probable cause for the
    
    forfeiture. 941 F.2d at 1439
    n. 25.
    The verified complaint stated that on a weekly or bi-weekly
    basis, either James Brown or his son, Carl Brown, would travel to
    Texas to purchase 50-100 pounds of marijuana and/or several ounces
    of   cocaine.      The    complaint    also   detailed   a   drug   transaction
    involving James Brown conducted in a mobile home located on one of
    the defendant parcels for which James Brown was later arrested. In
    addition, the complaint detailed the cash purchases of the property
    in question and how it was titled to various members of the Brown
    family.
    As a result of discovery, the Government also adduced the
    following evidence:            (1) four of the claimants, James William
    Brown, Angela Brown, Joseph Carl Brown, and Michael W. Brown had
    been convicted of drug related offenses;                     (2) the cost of the
    purchased property amounted to more than the claimants' income as
    reported on their income tax returns;                 (3) the claimants purchased
    valuable pieces of real property totally, or predominantly, with
    cash;     (4) the claimants are related by blood or marriage;                         (5)
    each of the defendant properties was used for the purposes of at
    least one claimant;       and (6) some of the claimants asserted their
    Fifth    Amendment     right    against    self-incrimination             during   their
    depositions.
    Evidence that claimants are generally engaged in the drug
    business    over   a    period    of    time,        have   no   visible     source    of
    substantial income, use cash for large purchases, and are nominee
    owners is all probative evidence of probable cause, Four 
    Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1441-42
    , as is a history of drug violations, $121,100
    in United States 
    Currency, 999 F.2d at 1506-07
    .                          Finally, as we
    discuss in more detail below, claimants' invocation of the Fifth
    Amendment can also be considered as an element of probable cause.
    We hold that the Government's showing in this case is sufficient to
    establish probable cause.
    Even though the Government has shown probable cause, summary
    judgment     for     claimants     would        be     proper      if    they   offered
    uncontroverted       evidence    that     the    funds      used    to    purchase    the
    property were obtained from legitimate sources, or that they were
    innocent owners unaware of the property's connection with drug
    sales.    U.S. v. A Single Family Residence, 
    803 F.2d 625
    , 629 (11th
    Cir.1986);   United States v. $4,255,000 in United States Currency,
    
    762 F.2d 895
    , 906 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 
    474 U.S. 1056
    , 
    106 S. Ct. 795
    , 
    88 L. Ed. 2d 772
    (1986).
    As evidence the property was bought with legitimate funds,
    claimants offered the affidavit of Robert Jones, who testified that
    he loaned Carl Brown in excess of $100,000 and that he frequently
    loaned Carl Brown large amounts of cash.     Claimants point to no
    other evidence in the record to establish this defense, nor do they
    offer any detailed explanation of the allocation of these funds to
    purchase the various properties. That affidavit is insufficient to
    prove that the property was obtained from legitimate funds.
    As to the innocent owner defense, the claimants attempt to
    cast the burden on the Government, stating the Government has
    failed to offer evidence that claimants were not innocent owners.
    It is claimants' burden, not the Government's, to prove innocent
    ownership.    Claimants identify nothing in the record to support
    such a defense.     The district correctly denied their motion for
    summary judgment.
    b. Government's Motion for Summary Judgment
    Once the Government has met its initial responsibility to
    establish probable cause and the absence of a genuine issue of
    material fact, the claimants must produce "significant, credible
    evidence" that the claimant is entitled to the property.      Four
    
    Parcels, 941 F.2d at 1439
    .   The claimants filed no response to the
    Government's motion, and the bare bones affidavit concerning the
    loan of cash from a friend is insufficient to create an issue of
    fact on that defense.
    In their appellate brief, claimants contend the district
    court erred by holding all the property forfeit rather than making
    decisions about individual pieces of property.                  By example, the
    claimants contend Naomi Matichka's property should not be forfeited
    when she stated in her deposition that she purchased part of the
    defendant property for $75,000 with $100,000 she alone had saved
    from her $6.00 per hour job at the mill.            The mere allegation of a
    highly unlikely legitimate source of income without some support to
    give the allegation credibility cannot constitute an issue of
    material fact defeating summary judgment for forfeiture.                  Claimant
    produces nothing to establish her total income versus expenditures
    to explain how she could have established such a large amount of
    cash.
    As     for   claimants'      complaint   that    the   district     court
    considered all income of the claimants against the total purchases,
    such    a     particularized     accounting    is   not    necessary      for   the
    Government to establish probable cause, and the claimants offered
    no evidence that would enable the court to make an accurate
    analysis.        In   any    event,   considering   the    income   of    all   the
    claimants rather than just the income of only Carl Brown and James
    Brown    as    the    true   purchasers    inured   to    the   benefit    of   the
    claimants.
    3. Consideration of the Claimants' Invocation of the Fifth
    Amendment
    In deposition, three of the seven claimants refused to answer
    questions, asserting their Fifth Amendment privilege. The district
    court inferred that the answers to the questions would not have
    been favorable to the claimants asserting the privilege.
    The claimants had a right to assert the Fifth Amendment
    privilege in this civil forfeiture proceeding.                United States v.
    United States Coin and Currency, 
    401 U.S. 715
    , 
    91 S. Ct. 1041
    , 
    28 L. Ed. 2d 434
    (1971);       Boyd v. United States, 
    116 U.S. 616
    , 
    6 S. Ct. 524
    , 
    29 L. Ed. 746
    (1886).        This Court has held, however, that the
    trier of fact may take an adverse inference against the parties to
    a civil action refusing to testify on Fifth Amendment grounds.
    United States v. A Single Family Residence, 
    803 F.2d 625
    , 629 n. 4
    (11th Cir.1986).         There is an exception to this rule when a
    claimant in the civil case is also a defendant in the criminal case
    and is forced to choose between waiving the privilege and losing
    the case on summary judgment. United States v. Premises Located at
    Route 13, 
    946 F.2d 749
    (11th Cir.1991).            The testifying claimants
    here were not defendants in a criminal case.
    The   claimants   argue   that    because   of    a    recent   trend   in
    forfeiture     cases,    we   should    hold   that     the   so-called    civil
    forfeiture is no longer civil and that the criminal rules should
    apply.    See Austin v. United States, 
    509 U.S. 602
    , 
    113 S. Ct. 2801
    ,
    
    125 L. Ed. 2d 488
    (1993) (Excessive Fines Clause limits scope of
    civil forfeiture judgments);           United States v. 2751 Peyton Woods
    Trail, S.W., 
    66 F.3d 1164
    (11th Cir.1995) (notice and hearing in
    accordance with Due Process Clause required prior to seizure).
    This    argument   is    foreclosed     by   the   Supreme     Court's    recent
    pronouncement in United States v. Ursery, --- U.S. ----, 
    116 S. Ct. 2135
    , 
    135 L. Ed. 2d 549
    (1996), that civil in rem forfeitures do not
    constitute "punishment" for double jeopardy purposes.
    Contrary to the claimants' argument, their invocation of the
    Fifth Amendment was not the "linchpin" of the summary judgment
    case, and the district court would have been justified in making
    its decision without regard to the assertion of the Fifth Amendment
    privilege.
    AFFIRMED.