Wilson v. Strong , 156 F.3d 1131 ( 1998 )

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
FILED
No. 97-3563 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
09/28/98
D. C. Docket No. 95-2055-CIV-T-26A THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
LINDA LIGERTWOOD WILSON,
Plaintiff - Counter-Defendant - Appellee,
versus
RICHARD A. STRONG,
Defendant - Counter-Claimant,
LORETTA MAGEE,
Defendant-Appellant,
HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY; DEPARTMENT
OF ANIMAL SERVICES; and CAL HENDERSON,
Hillsborough County Sheriff,
Defendants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(September 28, 1998)
Before TJOFLAT, COX and HULL, Circuit Judges.
HULL, Circuit Judge:
Appellee Linda Ligertwood Wilson brought this action alleging, inter alia, that Appellant
Loretta Magee, an animal control officer in Hillsborough County, Florida, and Hillsborough
County Sheriff’s Deputy Richard A. Strong (“Deputy Strong”) violated her rights under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.1 Magee and Deputy
Strong moved to dismiss Wilson’s claims based on qualified immunity, and the district court
denied their motions. Magee appeals the district court’s ruling that she was not entitled to
qualified immunity. After review, we reverse.
I. FACTS
Magee and Deputy Strong dispute Wilson’s version of the facts. However, in reviewing
the denial of a motion to dismiss, we are required to accept the following factual allegations in
Wilson’s complaint as true.
On the evening of July 12, 1993, Magee and Deputy Strong arrived at Wilson’s home to
investigate a complaint regarding unleashed dogs running loose in the neighborhood. A
complainant had informed authorities that dogs fitting the description of the unleashed dogs
resided at Wilson’s home. Upon arriving at Wilson’s home, Magee and Deputy Strong informed
Wilson and Emma Ligertwood, another occupant of the home, that they were there to investigate
a complaint. However, Magee and Deputy Strong did not identify the nature of the complaint.
Instead, Magee and Deputy Strong began asking questions about dogs, and asked whether they
could observe any dogs living in or around the house.
Wilson and Ligertwood related to Magee and Deputy Strong that they were
uncomfortable answering questions to officers who refused to identify the nature of the
complaint they were investigating, but the questioning persisted. Wilson and Ligertwood
ultimately felt pressured to allow Magee and Deputy Strong to inspect the dogs in the house.
1
Wilson also brought other claims against these and other defendants, but these other
claims are not relevant to this appeal.
2
Wilson informed Magee and Deputy Strong that the dogs belonged to a third person who was not
present, and that the dogs always were kept in the house or fenced in on the property and that
they never roamed freely in the neighborhood.
After observing the dogs, Deputy Strong demanded identification from Wilson and
Ligertwood and threatened to arrest them if they did not comply and accept citations on
unleashed dog charges. At this point, Wilson withdrew into her home and called the
Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office to request assistance. A Sheriff’s Office representative
informed her that a supervisor would be notified and dispatched to the premises.
Wilson returned to the front door and informed Ligertwood, Magee, and Deputy Strong
what she was told over the telephone. According to Wilson’s allegations, Deputy Strong,
without warning, entered the house through the front door, grabbed Wilson, forced her to leave
her home, handcuffed her, and arrested her. Deputy Strong put Wilson in the back of his patrol
car. Wilson’s complaint alleges that Magee then wrote citations, but the complaint does not
allege what offenses were charged in the citations. Wilson’s complaint does allege that Wilson
subsequently was taken to the Hillsborough County Jail and that at the jail Wilson was charged
with interfering with an animal control officer, resisting arrest without violence, and battery on a
law enforcement officer. At this juncture, the record does not reveal the disposition of these
charges.2
2
Wilson’s original complaint alleges that all the charges against her were dismissed.
However, Wilson’s second amended complaint, at issue here, does not allege that the charges
were dismissed. Wilson’s second amended complaint also does not allege that Wilson was cited
for any unleashed dog violations.
3
Wilson subsequently filed suit alleging that Magee and Deputy Strong’s actions violated
her rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Magee and Deputy Strong each filed
motions to dismiss Wilson’s claims against them in their individual capacities based on qualified
immunity. The district court denied the motions, finding Magee and Deputy Strong’s arresting
Wilson violated her clearly established constitutional rights. Magee appeals that ruling.
II. DISCUSSION3
A. This Court Has Jurisdiction To Review The District Court’s Denial Of Magee’s Qualified
Immunity Defense
In reviewing a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity, the district court is
required to accept the factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true and draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Nolen v. Jackson, 102 F.3d 1187, 1190 (11th Cir.
1997). Thus, the only issue before the district court here was whether the plaintiff’s allegations
set forth a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. It is well settled that this is an
issue of law. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996); Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226,
232 (1991); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480,
1484 (11th Cir. 1996). Consequently, the district court’s order in this case is an appealable final
order.
B. General Qualified Immunity Principles
Qualified immunity shields a § 1983 defendant from liability for harms arising from her
discretionary acts, so long as her acts do not violate any clearly established statutory or
3
This court reviews a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss a complaint on the
basis of qualified immunity de novo. Flores v. Satz, 137 F.3d 1275, 1277 (11th Cir. 1998).
4
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlowe v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Jenkins by Hall v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 823
(11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S. Ct. 412 (1997); Lassiter v. Alabama A &
M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc). To be clearly established, the contours
of an asserted constitutional right “must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would
understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987); Williams v. Alabama State Univ., 102 F.3d 1179, 1182 (11th Cir. 1997). “[I]n the light
of pre-existing law, the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640; Madiwale
v. Savaiko, 117 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 1997).
The Supreme Court and this court have stated that a plaintiff cannot strip a § 1983
defendant of her qualified immunity by citing to general rules or abstract rights. See Anderson,
483 U.S. at 639; Walker v. Schwalbe, 112 F.3d 1127, 1132 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Plaintiffs may not
discharge their burden [of showing that a right is clearly established] by referring to general rules
and abstract rights.”), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___,118 S. Ct. 1794 (1998). “Qualified immunity
focuses on the actual, specific details of concrete cases.” Id. (citing Lassiter, 28 F.3d at
1149-50).
C. Magee’s Acts Did Not Violate Wilson’s Clearly Established Rights4
Wilson’s complaint alleges that Magee and Deputy Strong violated her rights under the
Fourth Amendment. Although Wilson failed to articulate which of her Fourth Amendment rights
were violated, the district court concluded that Wilson’s complaint–specifically, the allegations
4
The parties do not dispute that Magee and Deputy Strong were acting within their
discretionary authority at all relevant times.
5
that Deputy Strong entered her home, grabbed her, forced her to leave her home, handcuffed her,
and arrested her–were sufficient to state violations of Wilson’s right to be free from arrest
without probable cause and her right not to be arrested in her home without an arrest warrant
(absent sufficient exigent circumstances). See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984);
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980); Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350
(1972). The district court further concluded that these rights were clearly established so that
Magee and Deputy Strong should have been aware that their actions violated Wilson’s
constitutional rights under the circumstances. With respect to Magee, we disagree.
In concluding that Magee was not entitled to qualified immunity, the district court relied
solely on Deputy Strong’s conduct. However, it is axiomatic that a § 1983 defendant cannot be
stripped of qualified immunity unless “what [s]he is doing violates [a clearly established] right.”
Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (emphasis supplied). Wilson’s complaint contains no allegation that
Magee entered her home, or that Magee made any physical contact with her, or that Magee
handcuffed her or placed her in Deputy Strong’s patrol car, or that Magee told Deputy Strong to
do any of the foregoing. In short, Deputy Strong, and not Magee, effectuated Wilson’s allegedly
unlawful arrest. Magee only witnessed the arrest. Indeed, as an animal control officer, Magee
has no authority to arrest.5 Also, Magee’s ministerial actions of writing the citations after
Wilson was placed in Deputy Strong’s patrol car did not make Magee a co-arresting officer in
this particular arrest.
5
By statute, an animal control officer in Florida “is not authorized to bear arms or make
arrests . . . .” Fla. Stat. ch. 828.27(1)(b).
6
Wilson attempts to avoid the crucial fact that Magee did not arrest her by alleging that
Magee had a clearly established constitutional duty to intervene to halt Deputy Strong’s actions.
For this proposition, Wilson relies almost exclusively on the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Durham
v. Nu’Man, 97 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom. Glover v. Durham, ___ U.S. ___,
117 S. Ct. 1337 (1997). There, the Sixth Circuit held that a hospital nurse–whose complaints
about a patient ultimately led to the patient’s being beaten by hospital security guards–had a
clearly established constitutional duty to intervene to halt the beating. Id. at 868. Wilson argues
that similar to the nurse in Durham, Magee should be held liable for Deputy Strong’s conduct
because Magee initiated the investigation which ultimately led to Deputy Strong’s actions and
Magee failed to intervene to stop Deputy Strong’s allegedly unconstitutional conduct.
Wilson’s reliance on Durham is misplaced. First, Wilson’s complaint does not allege that
Magee failed to intervene to halt Deputy Strong’s actions or that Magee violated any of Wilson’s
constitutional rights by failing to intervene. See GJR Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia,
Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]his circuit, along with others, has tightened the
application of Rule 8 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] with respect to § 1983 cases in an
effort to weed out nonmeritorious claims, requiring that a § 1983 plaintiff allege with some
specificity the facts which make out its claim.”). Thus, Wilson’s complaint did not allege with
sufficient particularity a violation of the right she now claims was clearly established on the day
of her arrest.
Second, “[i]n this circuit, the law can be ‘clearly established’ for qualified immunity
purposes only by decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, or the
highest court of the state where the case arose.” Jenkins, 115 F.3d at 826 n.4. In other words,
7
Wilson cannot rely upon the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Durham to show that Magee violated a
clearly established legal duty. Wilson fails to cite, and we have not uncovered, any decision of
the United States Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, or the Florida Supreme Court which
holds that a non-law enforcement officer, in circumstances materially similar to those here, has a
duty to intervene to halt an unlawful arrest by a law enforcement officer.
Finally, the facts of Durham–hospital security guards beating a defenseless patient–are
totally different from the facts of the instant case. See Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1150 (stating that in
determining whether a prior case creates a clearly established right, “[t]he facts [of the prior
case] need not be the same as the facts of the immediate case. But they do need to be materially
similar.”). Thus, the Sixth Circuit’s recognizing a duty to intervene on the facts in Durham in no
way suggests that Magee should have known that her failing to intervene here was unlawful
under the circumstances.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Magee is entitled to qualified immunity
on Wilson’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district
court’s denial of Magee’s motion to dismiss those claims and REMAND to the district court for
further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
8