United States v. Pedro Pinales-Espinal , 375 F. App'x 937 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-13576 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 21, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 08-00492-CR-WSD-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
PEDRO PINALES-ESPINAL,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(April 21, 2010)
Before BLACK, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant Pedro Pinales-Espinal (“Pinales”) appeals his 46-month sentence
for possessing with intent to distribute at least 100 grams of heroin, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(i), and importing the same into the United
States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 960(a)(1) and (b)(2)(A). On appeal,
he argues that the district court erred in denying him a two-level reduction for
being a minor participant under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). Pinales also argues that his
sentence is unreasonable because the court unduly emphasized the sentencing
guideline range and did not account for the § 3553(a) factors, other than general
deterrence, resulting in a sentence greater than necessary to comply with the
purposes of sentencing. Having read the parties’ briefs and reviewed the record,
we discern no error. Accordingly, we affirm.
I.
We review a district court’s determination of whether a defendant is entitled
to a mitigating role reduction for clear error. United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d
930, 937 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). The defendant has the burden of establishing
entitlement to a reduction by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 939.
“[A] district court’s determination of a defendant’s mitigating role in the
offense should be informed by two modes of analysis.” De Varon, 175 F.3d at
945. First, and most important, the district court must decide whether the
defendant is a minor participant in relation to the relevant conduct for which he has
been held accountable. Id. This inquiry will often be dispositive. Id. If a
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defendant’s actual conduct is identical to the relevant conduct considered for
sentencing purposes, the defendant cannot prove that an adjustment is appropriate
“simply by pointing to some broader criminal scheme in which [he] was a minor
participant but for which [he] was not held accountable.” Id. at 941. Second, “the
district court may also measure the defendant’s role against the other participants,
to the extent that they are discernable, in that relevant conduct.” Id. at 945. Not all
participants are relevant, and two guiding principles apply in this regard: (1) “the
district court should look to other participants only to the extent that they are
identifiable or discernable from the evidence”; and (2) “the district court may
consider only those participants who were involved in the relevant conduct
attributed to the defendant. The conduct of participants in any larger criminal
conspiracy is irrelevant.” Id. at 944.
In making the ultimate finding concerning the defendant’s role, the district
court should measure the facts against each mode of the analysis. Id. at 945. In the
drug courier context, we have set forth a non-exhaustive list of factors for the
district court to consider in making the determination, including the amount of
drugs, their fair market value, the amount of money to be paid to the courier and
any equity interest the courier might have in the drugs, the courier’s role in
planning the criminal scheme, and the courier’s role in the distribution. Id. In the
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final analysis, the decision of whether a drug courier qualifies for a minor-role
reduction “falls within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id.In this case, the district court’s conclusion that Pinales was not entitled to a
minor role reduction was not clear error. The district court properly applied the
analytical framework set out in De Varon. In relation to the first inquiry under De
Varon, the district court correctly found that Pinales’ actual conduct, ingesting and
carrying 614 grams of heroin into the country, was identical to the relevant conduct
for which he was held accountable. In relation the second inquiry under De
Varon, the district court did not err when it found that Pinales failed to name any
identifiable participant in the same relevant conduct against whom his conduct
could be measured. Although it is undisputed that a man identified as Machado-
Morales notified U.S. agents that Pinales might try to enter the country with drugs,
Pinales produced no evidence demonstrating that Machado-Morales was involved
in Pinales’ relevant conduct. That being the case, the district court did not err in
finding that Machado-Morales was not a participant in Pinales’ relevant conduct.
Because both modes of analysis set out in De Varon indicate that Pinales was not
entitled to a minor-role reduction, the district court did not clearly err in finding
that Pinales was not entitled to a minor-role reduction.1
1
Additionally, we note that Pinales’ argument that the district court did not give
consideration to the purity level of the heroin in this case is without merit.
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II.
In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we apply an abuse-of-
discretion standard. United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008).
We first review a sentence for procedural error. Id. If no procedural error is
found, we then examine whether the sentence is substantively reasonable under the
totality of the circumstances. Id.A district court commits procedural error where, among other things, it
miscalculates the advisory guideline range, treats the guidelines as mandatory, fails
to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, selects a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or fails to explain adequately the chosen sentence. Id. In its
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, the district court does not need to discuss
each factor explicitly. United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005).
“[A]n acknowledgment by the district court that it has considered the defendant’s
arguments and the factors in section 3553(a) is sufficient under [United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S. Ct. 738, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005)].” Id.The party challenging the sentence has the burden of establishing
unreasonableness in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 788. A
sentence is substantively unreasonable “if it does not achieve the purposes of
sentencing stated in § 3553(a).” Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1191 (internal quotation marks
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omitted). “The weight to be accorded any given § 3553(a) factor is a matter
committed to the sound discretion of the district court,” and this Court “will not
substitute [its] judgment in weighing the relevant factors.” United States v.
Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although we apply no presumption as to the reasonableness of a sentence within
the Guidelines range, “ordinarily we would expect a sentence within the Guidelines
range to be reasonable.” Talley, 431 F.3d at 788.
The district court committed no procedural error. Because it was not error to
deny Pinales a minor-role reduction, the Guidelines range calculation was correct.
The record does not support Pinales’ argument that the Guidelines range alone
motivated the court’s sentencing decision. The court explicitly stated that it took
into account all of the § 3553(a) criteria, along with the parties’ arguments.
Moreover, the court discussed Pinales’ background, the nature of his offense, the
seriousness of his offense, and the need to afford adequate deterrence. Thus,
Pinales has failed to demonstrate any procedural error.
Finding no procedural error, we now examine whether the sentence is
substantively unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances. The record
does not support Pinales’ contention that the district court somehow unduly
emphasized general deterrence at the expense of the other § 3553(a) factors.
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Instead, the record shows that the district court considered the Guidelines range
and the arguments of the parties pertaining to the § 3553(a) factors. As we noted,
the district court specifically discussed the nature and circumstances of the offense,
the background of the defendant, the applicable Guidelines range, and both specific
and general deterrence. Weighing those factors, the district court rendered an
individualized sentence, one that was at the low end of the Guidelines range. This
Court does not ordinarily substitute its judgment in weighing the relevant factors,
Amedeo, 487 F.3d at 832, and the record does not indicate that the district court
abused its considerable discretion in this regard. Under the totality of the
circumstances, it cannot be said that Pinales’ sentence, imposed at the low end of
the Guidelines range, was greater than necessary to accomplish the purposes of
sentencing. Accordingly, Pinales has not satisfied his burden of establishing
substantive unreasonableness in light of the record and the § 3553(a) factors.
Upon review of the record, and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
affirm.2
AFFIRMED.
2
Appellant’s request for oral argument is denied.
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