Richard S. Gallaher v. United States , 271 F. App'x 946 ( 2008 )


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  •                                                               [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    March 31, 2008
    No. 06-13370                   THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                   CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket Nos. 05-60130-CV-WJZ
    01-06166-CR-WJZ
    RICHARD S. GALLAHER,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (March 31, 2008)
    Before TJOFLAT, ANDERSON and HULL, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Richard Gallaher was convicted in the district court of failing to pay a child
    support obligation in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 228(a)(1) and (a)(3). After his
    conviction became final, he moved the district court to vacate his sentence
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The court denied the motion, and he now appeals.
    We issued a certificate of appealability (“COA”) certifying one issue for appellate
    review:
    Whether the district court erred in denying [Gallaher’s] claim
    that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to convict him under
    18 U.S.C. § 228(a) because [Gallaher] and his children resided in the same
    state.
    In an appeal from an unsuccessful motion to vacate, our review is limited to
    the issues specified in the COA. Murray v. United States, 
    145 F.3d 1249
    , 1250-51
    (11th Cir. 1998); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3). “When reviewing the district court’s
    denial of a habeas petition, we review questions of law and mixed questions of law
    and fact de novo, and findings of fact for clear error.” Nyland v. Moore, 
    216 F.3d 1264
    , 1266 (11th Cir. 2000) (addressing a federal habeas petition filed pursuant to
    28 U.S.C. § 2254).
    Gallaher urges us to resolve this issue in his favor by agreeing with him that
    both he and his children lived in Georgia. The Government concedes that if
    Gallaher established that he and his children resided in the same state during the
    time period described in the indictment, the district court would have been required
    to vacate his conviction.
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    “Subject-matter jurisdiction defines the court’s authority to hear a given type
    of case . . . .” United States v. Morton, 
    467 U.S. 822
    , 828, 
    104 S. Ct. 2769
    , 2773,
    
    81 L. Ed. 2d 680
    (1984).
    [S]ubject matter jurisdiction in every federal criminal prosecution
    comes from 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and, in almost all criminal cases, that’s
    the beginning and the end of the jurisdictional inquiry. Congress,
    however, can create additional statutory hurdles to a court’s subject
    matter jurisdiction through separate jurisdictional provisions found in
    the substantive criminal statute itself under which a case is being
    prosecuted.
    United States v. Tinoco, 
    304 F.3d 1088
    , 1105 n.18 (11th Cir. 2002) (citation,
    quotation, and alterations omitted). “[S]ubject matter jurisdiction cannot be
    waived or conferred on a court by consent of the parties.” Eagerton v. Valuations,
    Inc., 
    698 F.2d 1115
    , 1118 (11th Cir. 1983). However, parties “may stipulate to
    facts that bear on [the] jurisdictional inquiry.” Engineering Contractors Ass’n v.
    Metropolitan Dade County., 
    122 F.3d 895
    , 905 (11th Cir. 1997); see West
    Peninsular Title Co. v. Palm Beach County., 
    41 F.3d 1490
    , 1492 n.4 (11th Cir.
    1995) (“Parties may not stipulate jurisdiction. And we do not say that jurisdiction
    was proper because jurisdiction was stipulated. Instead, we look to the record; we
    affirm the district court’s conclusion that the stipulated facts give rise to
    jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)).
    Under 18 U.S.C. § 228, anyone who “willfully fails to pay a support
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    obligation with respect to a child who resides in another State,” is subject to
    punishment if the obligation is of a specified amount and remains unpaid for a
    specified period of time. 18 U.S.C. § 228(a) and (c).
    We perceive no clear error in the district court’s determination that Gallaher
    failed to establish that his children resided in the same state as he during the
    relevant time period. The evidence Gallaher presented did not overcome his
    stipulation at trial that his children resided in a different state at such time.
    The judgment of the district court is, accordingly,
    AFFIRMED.
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