Richardson v. Leeds Police Dept. , 71 F.3d 801 ( 1995 )

PUBLISH
IN THE UNITED STATED COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 94-6316
________________________
D.C. Docket No. CV-92-AAR-1588-S
JERROLL RICHARDSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LEEDS POLICE DEPARTMENT; LEEDS, CITY OF,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
________________________
(December 15, 1995)
Before EDMONDSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and HENDERSON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Jerroll Richardson, a former police officer for the City of
Leeds, Alabama ("City"), appeals from the judgment of the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
dismissing this action alleging racial discrimination in violation
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et
seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We reverse and remand
for further proceedings.
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Richardson, an African American, was an officer of the Leeds
Police Department ("Department") from January 1989 until he
resigned in May 1991. A short time after leaving the Department he
changed his mind and sought reinstatement. His efforts were
unsuccessful. On July 29, 1991, he filed an administrative
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
alleging that he resigned because of disparate treatment in job
assignments during his period of employment. He also accused the
Department of refusing to rehire him because of his race. After
receiving a right to sue letter from the EEOC, Richardson commenced
this action in the district court against the City and the Chief of
Police, Thomas W. McDonald. He alleged in deposition testimony
that his resignation amounted to a constructive discharge because
it stemmed from the denial of opportunities for advancement while
employed by the City, as well as racial slurs directed at him by a
fellow officer and general hostility within the Department toward
black citizens. He also claimed that he was not restored to his
former position with the Department on account of his race and
2
because he complained that black citizens were treated more
severely by the City's police officers than were white citizens.
The complaint as amended included causes of action for alleged
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("1964
Act"), § 1981 and § 1983.1 He sought declaratory and injunctive
relief, backpay, compensatory and punitive damages and
reinstatement to the position he would have held absent the
purported discrimination.2
1
The petition did not specify the provision or provisions of
Title VII relied upon by Richardson. Section 2000e-2(a)(1) of the
1964 Act, however, clearly applies to the allegations. It states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer--
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. . . .
Section 1981 bars racial discrimination in the making and
enforcement of contracts. Richardson's cause of action under
§ 1983, which prohibits the deprivation of federal rights,
privileges or immunities under color of state law, was based upon
charges that the defendants violated his equal protection rights
protected by the United States Constitution.
2
The complaint also invoked the Civil Rights Act of 1991
("1991 Act" or "Act"), which expanded the scope of § 1981 and
provided for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages for
certain violations of Title VII, as well as the right to a jury
trial when such damages are sought. The 1991 Act did not apply to
the defendants' conduct alleged here, however, because it occurred
prior to the Act's November 21, 1991 effective date. Landgraf v.
USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 1483, 128 L. Ed. 2d 229
(1994); Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. , 114 S. Ct.
1510, 128 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1994); Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d
1155, 1159 (11th Cir. 1993). Consequently, under this court's
precedent, which construed Title VII claims as equitable in nature,
Richardson was not entitled to a jury trial on his Title VII cause
of action. Lincoln v. Board of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga.,
3
The City subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on
all charges against it. The district court granted the motion with
respect to the claim for constructive discharge, finding that
Richardson's reapplication for his old position foreclosed a
conclusion that he resigned because of unbearable working
conditions. See Morgan v. Ford, 6 F.3d 750, 755-56 (11th Cir.
1993) (employee who involuntarily resigns to escape illegal
discrimination must prove that his employment situation was so
intolerable that a reasonable person his position would have felt
697 F.2d 928, 934 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826, 104
S. Ct. 97, 78 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1983). Nor was he permitted to seek
Title VII compensatory or punitive damages. Walker v. Ford Motor
Co., 684 F.2d 1355, 1364 (11th Cir. 1982). Moreover, Richardson's
§ 1981 allegations were governed by the pre-1991 Act rule of law
announced in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 109
S. Ct. 2363, 105 L. Ed. 2d 132 (1989), in which the Court held that
the reach of § 1981 was limited to discriminatory actions taken
during the initial formation of a contract and conduct designed
to impair the enforcement of contracts through the legal process.
Id. at 179-80, 109 S.Ct. at 2374, 105 L. Ed. 2d at 152. Accordingly,
Richardson's complaints of constructive discharge and disparate
treatment during the course of his employment were not actionable
under that statute, but only under Title VII and § 1983. We need
not decide whether Richardson's claim for failure to rehire was
cognizable under § 1981 as interpreted by Patterson, see Wall v.
Trust Co. of Ga., 946 F.2d 805, 808 (11th Cir. 1991) (test is
whether a "new and distinct" relationship would be formed), because
the procedures and relief available under that law, including the
right to have a jury determine compensatory and punitive damages,
are duplicative of those afforded by § 1983 when, as here, state
actors are sued as defendants. See Johnson v. Railway Express
Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460, 95 S. Ct. 1716, 1720, 44 L. Ed. 2d
295, 301 (1975) (§ 1981 plaintiffs may seek both equitable and
legal relief, including compensatory damages and, in limited
circumstances, punitive damages); Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 103
S. Ct. 1625, 75 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1983) (both compensatory and punitive
damages are available under § 1983); but see City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc. , 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S. Ct. 2748, 2762, 69
L. Ed. 2d 616, 634-35 (1981) (punitive damages may not be assessed
against municipalities). We therefore treat the complaint as
alleging infractions of Title VII and § 1983.
4
compelled to leave), cert. denied, U.S. , 114 S. Ct. 2708,
129 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1994). The court denied summary judgment on all
other claims. The court then, on July 23, 1993, entered final
judgment for the City on the constructive discharge issue pursuant
to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).3 Richardson did not appeal.
A jury trial on the § 1983 cause of action stemming from the
alleged disparate treatment during the course of employment and in
rehiring was held in 1994. At the conclusion of Richardson's case-
in-chief, the defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law in
compliance with Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. The district court denied the
motions and continued with the trial. After the close of all the
evidence, the defendants renewed their Rule 50 motions. The court
took the motions under advisement and submitted the case to the
jury, which was instructed to respond to a set of interrogatories
as part of its deliberations. By its answers the jury exonerated
McDonald of all alleged wrongdoing. It also found that the City
did not discriminate against Richardson during his tenure with the
Department. It could not reach a verdict, however, on the question
of whether Richardson's race played a part in the City's refusal to
rehire him. The district court announced that it would enter
orders on the partial verdict and released the jury.
Thereafter, in a memorandum opinion, the court granted the
City's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the reinstatement
3
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an
action, Rule 54(b) permits the entry of final judgment on a single
count "upon an express determination that there is no just reason
for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment."
5
claim. In arriving at this decision, the court found that
Richardson failed to prove a prima facie case of discrimination in
the rehiring context because, unlike other white officers who were
reemployed after they resigned, Richardson indicated when he left
the Department that he was "burned out." The court consequently
determined that Richardson was not similarly situated to the
nonminority officers who were restored to their former positions.
The court found further that, even assuming Richardson carried his
initial burden of proof, he did not actually want the job for which
he made application. In support of this finding the court relied
on the jury's negative response to interrogatory number five, which
inquired whether Richardson "presently" desired a position with the
City as a police patrolman. 4 The court concluded that Richardson
4
Richardson testified as follows:
Q. Do you wish to go back to work for the
City of Leeds as a police officer if you win
this case?
A. I'm afraid.
Q. Afraid of what?
A. I have put so many people in prison for
drugs that it would be too easy for a while on
the night shift or patrolling or an abandoned
car stop for someone to shoot me. I'm not
necessarily saying that it would be an
individual that I had arrested. But when the
investigation took place, then that, that is
what would probably come out.
. . . .
Q. . . . you said you didn't think you
wanted your job back, that you were afraid to
go back?
A. No, sir, that's not what I said. I did
not say that I didn't want my job back. I
still want my job back. I'm just afraid, and
that fear is a fear that I did not have at the
6
could not prevail on the claim for reinstatement under any theory
of recovery given this circumstance. The court found additionally
that, to the extent that the evidence presented an issue of
credibility, Richardson's admission that he resigned because he was
"burned out" was a legitimate reason for declining to rehire him
which was not pretextual.
Pursuant to the jury's partial verdict and the ruling on the
motion for judgment as a matter of law, the district court
dismissed the action in its entirety against both defendants.
Richardson subsequently filed this appeal in which he challenges
only the judgment rendered as a matter of law in favor of the City
on the § 1983 and Title VII causes of action arising from the
failure to restore him to his former position.
II. DISCUSSION
We review a decision to grant a judgment as a matter of law de
novo, applying the same standards utilized by the district court.
Daniel v. City of Tampa, Fla., 38 F.3d 546, 549 (11th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, U.S. , 115 S. Ct. 2557, 132 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1995).
time that I went and asked to be rehired.
Q. You say that whatever that fear is, you
still want your job back now?
A. After taking certain precautions, yes,
sir.
Q. So that fear, whatever it is, was not so
great that you don't want your job back now?
A. Sir?
Q. You want it back? You want to go back to
work with the City of Leeds doing what you
were doing?
A. I want to go back to work for the City of
Leeds, yes, sir.
(R4 at 196-97, 325-26).
7
A judgment as a matter of law is warranted "[i]f during a trial by
jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no
legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find
for that party on that issue." Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). When
evaluating a Rule 50 motion, the court must consider all of the
evidence and reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Beckwith v. City of Daytona
Beach Shores, Fla., 58 F.3d 1554, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995). A
judgment as a matter of law may be affirmed only when "'the facts
and inferences point so overwhelmingly in favor of the movant . . .
that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict.'"
Pulte Home Corp. v. Osmose Wood Preserving, Inc., 60 F.3d 734, 739
(11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Roboserve, Ltd. v. Tom's Foods, Inc., 940
F.2d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1991)).
In a case such as this alleging disparate treatment, in which
§ 1983 is employed as a remedy for the same conduct attacked under
Title VII, "'the elements of the two causes of action are the
same.'" Cross v. State of Ala., 49 F.3d 1490, 1508 (11th Cir.
1995) (quoting Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1369 n.16 (11th
Cir. 1982)). In both instances, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant acted with discriminatory intent. Hardin, 691 F.2d at
1369 n.16.
Identical methods of proof, as described in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973),
are also employed. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S.
, n.1, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2746 n.1, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407, 415 n.1
8
(1993) (assuming that the McDonnell Douglas analysis applies
equally to § 1983 and Title VII claims of discrimination). First,
the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, which raises a
presumption that the employer's decision was more likely than not
based upon an impermissible factor.5 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411
U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 677; Texas Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S. Ct. 1089,
1094, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207, 216 (1981). The defendant may rebut this
presumption by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its decision. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802, 93
S.Ct. at 1824, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 678; Texas Dep't of Community Affairs,
450 U.S. at 254-55, 101 S.Ct. at 1094, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 216. If the
defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff must then have the
opportunity to persuade the trier of fact, through the presentation
of his own case and by cross-examining the defendant's witnesses,
that the reason proffered was not the real basis for the decision,
but a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411
U.S. at 804, 93 S.Ct. at 1825, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 679; St. Mary's Honor
Center, 509 U.S. at , 113 S.Ct. at 2747, 125 L. Ed. 2d at 416.
5
The proof required to establish a prima facie case will vary
depending on the circumstances. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S.
at 802 n.13, 93 S. Ct. at 1824 n.13, 36 L. Ed. 2d at 677 n.13. In
McDonnell Douglas Corp., in which the plaintiff likewise alleged
that his former employer refused to rehire him on account of his
race, the Court stated that this initial burden may be satisfied
with evidence that (1) the applicant belonged to a racial minority;
(2) he applied and was qualified for the job; (3) he was rejected;
and (4) after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek qualified applicants. Id. at 802, 93
S. Ct. at 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d at 677.
9
The distinction between the Title VII and § 1983 causes in the
present case was in the availability of a jury trial and
compensatory damages under § 1983, but not with respect to the
Title VII equitable claims, which were tried to the court. See
supra note 2. When legal and equitable causes are joined in one
action, the legal issues must be decided first. Dairy Queen, Inc.
v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 479, 82 S. Ct. 894, 900-01, 8 L. Ed. 2d 44, 52
(1962). To the extent that the elements of the two types of claims
mirror one another, the jury's findings on the legal questions are
binding in resolving the equitable issues. Lincoln v. Board of
Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 697 F.2d 928, 934 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826, 104 S. Ct. 97, 78 L. Ed. 2d 102 (1983).
Richardson argues on appeal that the district court erred by
visiting whether he had established a prima facie case of
discrimination after the action was fully tried on the merits, in
violation of United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711, 103 S. Ct. 1478, 75 L. Ed. 2d 403 (1983). We agree that
it was wrong for the court to follow this procedure. In Aikens,
the Supreme Court held that
when the defendant fails to persuade the
district court to dismiss the action for lack
of a prima facie case, and responds to the
plaintiff's proof by offering evidence of the
reason for the plaintiff's rejection, the
factfinder must then decide whether the
rejection was discriminatory within the
meaning of Title VII.
Id. at 714-15, 103 S.Ct. at 1481, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 410 (footnote
omitted). When the trier of fact has before it all the evidence
needed to decide the ultimate issue of whether the defendant
10
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff, the question of
whether the plaintiff properly made out a prima facie case "is no
longer relevant." Id. at 715, 103 S.Ct. at 1482, 75 L. Ed. 2d at
410; see also Wall v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 946 F.2d 805, 809-10
(11th Cir. 1991).
The district court's reliance on Richardson's statement that
he was "burned out" to find that he failed to establish a prima
facie case was substantively flawed as well. "The burden of
establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment is not
onerous." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs, 450 U.S. at 253, 101
S.Ct. at 1094, 67 L. Ed. 2d at 215; see also Howard v. BP Oil Co.,
Inc., 32 F.3d 520, 524 (11th Cir. 1994) (characterizing the
requirements of demonstrating a prima facie case as "minimal"). To
raise an inference of discrimination, it was not necessary for
Richardson to show that he and the nonminority applicants who were
rehired gave the same reason or reasons for resigning. Rather, it
was sufficient for him to show that he belonged to a racial
minority, that he applied for and was qualified for the job and
that after his rejection, the position remained open and the
Department continued to seek qualified applicants. See supra note
5.
The district court also decided that Richardson's admission of
"burn out" was a legally acceptable ground for the City's decision,
which was not pretextual. Richardson urges us to hold that the
evidence relating to pretext was sufficient to create a jury
11
issue.6 After reviewing the trial transcript, we agree that the
district court could have reached its conclusion only by improperly
resolving conflicting inferences arising from the evidence in the
light most favorable to the City.
The proof at the trial established that Richardson worked
initially in the detective division as an undercover narcotics
officer, which he understood would be a temporary assignment. In
April 1989, after the undercover detail ended, he was reassigned to
patrol duty. While working the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift, he
was required to testify during the day in court proceedings
resulting from his prior undercover work. During this time he was
also "loaned" to several other police departments to assist in
narcotics work conducted in nearby counties. After certain
conversations with McDonald, Richardson expected to be considered
for the next available permanent position in the detective
6
Richardson argues on appeal that Lynn Maxey, the City's mayor
with whom the decision ultimately rested, never proffered
Richardson's "burnout" as a reason for not rehiring him. Maxey
testified, however, that he was aware that Richardson complained of
being "burned out" when he resigned. (R6 at 674-75). Although
Maxey did not directly state that this influenced his decision, the
jury could have inferred that it did. Maxey cited additional
reasons for not rehiring Richardson, chief among them that he
already had someone else in mind for the position when Richardson
expressed an interest. Richardson maintains that the evidence
reveals the existence of an issue of fact as to whether the other
grounds given by the mayor were also pretextual. The district
court specifically declined to consider these various explanations,
however (R2-96 at 4), and rested its judgment solely on its finding
that Richardson was "burned out" (id. at 9). We confine our
review, therefore, to whether this particular motive cited by the
district court must lead inexorably to a finding of no
discrimination. We also note that the City's contention on appeal
that Richardson failed to demonstrate that the mayor was the final
decisionmaker for purposes of municipal liability under § 1983 is
without merit.
12
division, which McDonald indicated would be filled by someone from
within the Department. Instead, the next opening went to a white
applicant from outside the Department. Richardson remained in a
patrol slot until his resignation.
Richardson testified that he left "basically due to the
adverse treatment, the type of double standards. I was, I was
burnt out." (R4 at 168). He explained that
between working narcotics, patrol, narcotics
on loan, court time, and all of this running
together, trying to perform my job the best
that I could in patrol, that culminated with,
at the time that the position was filled in
the detective division, it was from outside
and not from within. Also when the DARE
program came around, it was filled from the
outside, not from within.
When the subject that had went to the
DARE program left, leaving a slot open again,
and two hires were made and then the slot was
filled by one of the hires coming in, it was
just all culminating. And at the time I felt
that I was fighting a losing battle.
(Id. at 170).7 He stated further that he informed McDonald of the
foregoing reasons when he submitted his letter of resignation.
(Id. at 183). Later, after time for reflection, he decided that he
wished to continue in his old job. (Id. at 184-85). After he was
turned down by the mayor, he sought out and obtained other police
work. (Id. at 191-93).
There was also evidence that the mayor reinstated three white
patrolmen after they had resigned. McDonald testified that one of
7
Richardson had expressed an interest in participating in
DARE, which was a Department-sponsored drug awareness program for
teenagers.
13
the officers left the Department because he was unhappy over the
denial of a promotion. (R5 at 403). Another was dissatisfied with
his pay and felt he had been treated unfairly with respect to a
request for military leave. (Id. at 406-07, 416-17). The third
was rehired despite a poor work record and an evident lack of
interest in performing cooperatively with other members of the
force. (Id. at 424-25).
The district court apparently believed that the evidence
failed to create an issue of fact as to the decisionmaker's intent
with respect to Richardson because it was undisputed that
Richardson complained he was "burned out" when he left the
Department. Although the evidence would have permitted a
reasonable jury to infer an innocent motive on the City's part--
that the mayor viewed Richardson as a poor candidate for
reemployment because he was "burned out" by police work and no
longer inspired to perform to the best of his ability--a reasonable
jury could also have concluded that Richardson's professed "burn
out" was not the true reason he was not rehired. Like Richardson,
two of the white officers who were rehired voiced dissatisfaction
with their treatment within the Department. Richardson was
8
arguably more qualified than the third reinstated patrolman.
Apart from Richardson's race, the evidence did not demonstrate any
circumstances peculiar to his situation which set him apart from
8
Although Richardson's record was not unblemished, he received
commendations for his undercover work. In addition, McDonald
recommended against rehiring the poorly qualified white officer,
but did not oppose Richardson's reapplication.
14
the white officers who were restored to their jobs.9 In short, the
evidence presented a question of fact as to whether the mayor's
decision not to rehire Richardson was racially motivated.
As additional support for the judgment, the district court
cited the jury's finding that Richardson did not "presently" desire
to be reinstated.10 This factor, of course, could not have served
as a rationale for the mayor's decision to reject Richardson's
application in 1991, because it came to light for the first time
during the trial in 1994. The district court construed this
circumstance, however, as interposing a complete obstacle to
granting any type of relief. In doing so the court confused the
issue of liability with the type of warranted relief.
According to an "Amended Damage List" which was filed in
support of the action, Richardson asked for backpay, reinstatement,
declaratory and injunctive relief, costs and attorney's fees under
Title VII. In his § 1983 suit he sought compensation for
"financial hardship, pain, suffering and mental anguish." (R2-49).
The jury's finding that, at the time of trial, Richardson no longer
wanted his old job, may well have been relevant to fashioning a
remedy in the event of the City's liability. See Goldstein v.
Manhattan Indus., Inc. , 758 F.2d 1435, 1448 (11th Cir.) (the
9
In each case, the applicant sought to return to the same
position he had vacated, a similar length of time elapsed between
the officer's departure and his request to be rehired and the mayor
made the final decision.
10
We reject without discussion Richardson's assertion that the
jury's finding was inconsistent with its deadlock on the issue of
whether the City's refusal to rehire him was motivated by a
discriminatory purpose.
15
decision of whether reinstatement should be ordered is within the
sound discretion of the district court), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1005, 106 S. Ct. 525, 88 L. Ed. 2d 457 (1985); Carmichael v.
Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1136 (11th Cir. 1984)
(injunction ordering employer to refrain from discriminatory
practices not justified where the plaintiff is not reinstated).
But it would not have foreclosed a declaratory judgment that the
City acted with bad intent, making it liable for backpay and
compensatory damages. The district court's alternative reasoning
for ordering judgment as a matter of law was therefore erroneous.
III. CONCLUSION
The judgment rendered as a matter of law in favor of the City
on Richardson's § 1983 and Title VII causes of action alleging he
was not rehired on account of his race is hereby VACATED. The case
is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
16