PUBLISH
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
08/30/99
No. 97-8299 THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:96-CV-00102-WLH
SYLVIA CRAWFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BRUCE BABBITT, Secretary
of the Department of the Interior,
Defendant-Appellee.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(August 30, 1999)
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Before CARNES, Circuit Judge, KRAVITCH, Senior Circuit Judge, and MILLS*,
Senior District Judge.
CARNES, Circuit Judge:
*
Honorable Richard Mills, Senior U.S. District Judge for the Central District
of Illinois, sitting by designation.
The Supreme Court has vacated our prior opinion in this case, Crawford v.
Babbitt,
148 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 1998), and remanded the case to us for further
consideration in light of its decision in West v. Gibson, 527 U.S. –,
119 S. Ct. 1906
(1999). See Babbitt v. Crawford, 527 U.S. –,
119 S. Ct. 2363 (1999). In
compliance with the Supreme Court's directive, we substitute this opinion for our
prior one in this case.
In 1993, Sylvia Crawford, a former employee at the Fish and Wildlife
Service, a Division of the Department of the Interior (the "Agency"), was sexually
harassed by her supervisors and then retaliated against when she complained about
it. After Crawford filed an administrative complaint, the Agency issued a final
decision finding it had discriminated against her and awarding injunctive relief.
Crawford subsequently brought suit in federal district court seeking compensatory
damages. The court entered summary judgment against her on her claim for
compensatory damages. Because we conclude that Crawford failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies prior to filing this action, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Crawford worked for the Agency during the latter part of 1993. On
November 8, 1993 and December 28, 1993, she filed Equal Employment
Opportunity ("EEO") discrimination claims with the Agency's Office for Equal
2
Opportunity alleging that her supervisors had sexually harassed her and then
retaliated against her when she complained. An investigator for the Agency's
Office of Human Resources investigated the claims. Among other things,
Crawford informed the investigator that one incident of harassment “upset” her and
that the stress of the harassment led to a bleeding ulcer and other physical problems
for which she had seen a doctor. The investigator issued a Report of Investigation
in February 1995. By letter dated February 23, 1995, the Agency's Office of
Human Resources sent Crawford the report and informed her that she could request
a final decision on her claims from the Agency, with or without an administrative
hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
administrative judge. On March 29, 1995, Crawford requested an administrative
hearing.
On May 30, 1995, Judge Davi, the EEOC administrative judge, informed
Crawford and the Agency that he had scheduled a pre-hearing conference on July
17, 1995 and a hearing on July 25, 1995. At the pre-hearing conference, the parties
discussed their settlement negotiations. The Agency stated that it would not
consider monetary settlement for compensatory damages because Crawford had
not provided it with objective evidence of her alleged injuries or evidence
demonstrating a causal connection between the harassment and Crawford's alleged
3
injuries. The Agency also requested Crawford to provide any medical records or
other evidence she intended to rely on at the July 25, 1995 hearing to substantiate
her alleged injuries and causation. Crawford did not provide the Agency with the
medical records or any other evidence, but she did indicate that two doctors would
testify at the hearing to substantiate her entitlement to compensatory damages.
On July 25, 1995, Crawford requested a continuance of the hearing. Judge
Davi denied the request and renewed settlement discussions between the parties.
The Agency stated it would not pay Crawford compensatory damages unless she
produced the evidence substantiating her injuries and causation as it had requested.
After learning that the two doctors Crawford mentioned at the pre-hearing
conference would not be testifying at the hearing, Judge Davi informed her that the
hearing would proceed; but he also warned her that without the substantiating
medical evidence, no compensatory damages would be awarded. Crawford then
elected to waive the hearing and requested a final decision from the Agency on her
claims. Although fully aware that the Agency had requested additional evidence to
substantiate her alleged injuries and causation, Crawford did not submit that
evidence in the nearly three months prior to the issuance of the Agency’s final
decision.
4
The Agency issued its final decision on October 20, 1995. In the decision,
the Agency found it had subjected Crawford to sexual harassment and retaliation in
violation of Title VII, and it awarded her injunctive relief, costs, and attorney fees.
Although the decision noted Crawford’s contention that she had “developed
physical problems from the stress of [her] supervisor's sexual harassment," it did
not award Crawford compensatory damages for those alleged injuries. The
decision informed Crawford that if she was dissatisfied, she had the choice of filing
an appeal with the EEOC or filing a civil action in United States District Court.
She chose the latter option.
On January 12, 1996, Crawford filed this lawsuit against Bruce Babbitt in
his official capacity as Secretary of the Interior. (For simplicity, we will refer to
Babbitt as the Agency). Crawford's complaint referred to the Agency's final
decision and alleged that as a result of the Agency's discrimination, she had
suffered hospitalization and physical, mental, and emotional distress. The
complaint requested that the court (1) enter a declaratory judgment stating that the
Agency had discriminated against her in violation of Title VII, and (2) "enter a
judgment against the [Agency] for compensatory damages associated with the
undue stress suffered by Plaintiff as a result of the unlawful employment practices
of Defendant."
5
After the parties consented to having the case tried before a magistrate
judge, Crawford moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. She
argued that the Agency's final decision conclusively established its liability under
Title VII, and she requested that the issue of compensatory damages for her alleged
injuries proceed to a jury trial. The Agency responded that since compensatory
damages were not awarded as part of its final decision, Crawford could seek either
(1) enforcement of the Agency's final decision but forego a claim for compensatory
damages, or (2) a de novo review of the entire dispute, including liability and
damages.
On March 11, 1997, the magistrate judge granted Crawford's motion for
partial summary judgment as to liability and ordered the injunctive relief set out in
the Agency's decision. In addition, although the Agency had not filed a summary
judgment motion, the magistrate judge entered judgment for it on Crawford's
claim for compensatory damages. After Crawford's motion for reconsideration of
that order was denied, she appealed, contending that the magistrate judge erred in
dismissing her claim for compensatory damages. The Agency did not cross-appeal
the entry of judgment in Crawford's favor on the issue of the Agency's liability for
violating Title VII.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
6
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, using the
same legal standard employed by the district court. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. City of
Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1117 (11th Cir.1993). "Summary judgment is appropriate if
the record shows no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. When deciding whether summary
judgment is appropriate, all evidence and reasonable factual inferences drawn
therefrom are reviewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party." Witter
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,
138 F.3d 1366, 1369 (11th Cir.1998) (internal citations
and quotations omitted).
III. ANALYSIS
The crux of Crawford's claim is that she is entitled to compensatory damages
for injuries she suffered as a result of the Agency's sexual harassment and
retaliatory conduct in violation of Title VII. In granting judgment to the Agency
on Crawford's claim for compensatory damages, the magistrate judge relied upon
two grounds, either of which, if valid, will support the judgment. First, the judge
found that Crawford was barred from raising her claim for compensatory damages
in district court because she had failed to adequately pursue it administratively,
which means she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, although the
judge did not use exhaustion language.
7
Second, the judge ruled that Crawford's reliance on the Agency's final
decision in her motion for partial summary judgment precluded her from litigating
de novo the compensatory damages issue. The magistrate judge observed that, in
essence, Crawford was seeking to enforce the favorable parts of the Agency's final
decision (the finding of discrimination and the award of equitable relief) while at
the same time litigating de novo the unfavorable parts (the failure to award her
compensatory damages). The judge reasoned that since Crawford had elected to
rely on the Agency's final decision, she was bound to its terms. Therefore, the
judge concluded, because the Agency's final decision did not award Crawford
compensatory damages, she could not recover those damages in the district court.
In our prior opinion in this case, Crawford v. Babbitt,
148 F.3d 1318 (11th
Cir. 1998), we pointed out that the magistrate judge's reasons for dismissing
Crawford's compensatory damages claim rested on the premise that an employing
agency can award an employee compensatory damages in the administrative
process as part of "full relief." Believing that compensatory damages could not be
awarded in the administrative process, we concluded that neither of the grounds
upon which the magistrate judge relied justified dismissal of Crawford's claim for
compensatory damages.
8
Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court held in West v. Gibson, 527 U.S.
–,
119 S. Ct. 1906, 1910 (1999), that compensatory damages can be awarded in the
administrative process. In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in West, our basis
for rejecting the magistrate judge’s reasons for dismissing Crawford’s claim for
compensatory damages is no longer valid. Accordingly, we must reconsider
whether either of the magistrate judge’s reasons for dismissing Crawford’s
compensatory damages claim is correct.
As mentioned earlier, the first ground relied upon by the magistrate judge in
dismissing Crawford’s claim for compensatory damages was that she had failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies. A federal employee must pursue and exhaust
her administrative remedies as a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a Title VII
action. See Brown v. General Servs. Admin.,
425 U.S. 820, 832-33,
96 S. Ct.
1961, 1967-68 (1976). “[T]he purpose of exhaustion is to give the agency the
information it needs to investigate and resolve the dispute between the employee
and the employer. Good faith effort by the employee to cooperate with the agency
and EEOC and to provide all relevant, available information is all that exhaustion
requires.” Wade v. Secretary of the Army,
796 F.2d 1369, 1377 (11th Cir. 1986).
Where an agency or the EEOC requests information relevant to resolving the
employee’s complaint and the employee fails to provide that information, the
9
employee has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. See Johnson v.
Bergland,
614 F.2d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 1980) (concluding plaintiff failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies where his “responses to the agency request for
information were insufficient to enable the agency to determine what complaint of
discrimination was made and when it had occurred”). See also Briley v. Carlin,
172 F.3d 567, 571 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[i]n order to exhaust administrative remedies,
the claimant is required to demonstrate good faith participation in the
administrative process, which includes making specific charges and providing
information necessary to the investigation.”).
Because Crawford failed to respond to the Agency’s request for information
relevant to her claim for compensatory damages, she failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies. At the pre-hearing conference before the EEOC
administrative judge on July 17, 1995, the Agency specifically requested that
Crawford provide it with additional evidence substantiating her alleged injuries
and the causal connection between those injuries and the harassment. She did not
comply with that request. Although Crawford did promise that her doctors would
testify at the hearing scheduled for July 25, 1995, when the date of that hearing
arrived, she produced neither the testimony of those doctors nor any other
evidence. Instead, after the Agency again informed her that, in order to resolve her
10
claim for compensatory damages, it needed the additional evidence it had
requested, Crawford elected to waive the hearing before the administrative judge
and requested a final decision from the Agency. Despite the fact that she knew
the Agency had requested additional evidence to substantiate her alleged injuries
and the causal connection between those injuries and the harassment, Crawford did
not submit the requested evidence to the Agency in the nearly three months prior to
the issuance of its final decision on October 20, 1995.1
The administrative record indicates that the only information the Agency
had concerning the injuries for which Crawford sought compensatory damages was
her statement to an investigator that the harassment had upset her and that the
stress of the harassment had led to physical problems for which she sought medical
attention. Given the nature and paucity of that information, it was reasonable for
the Agency to seek additional information from Crawford to substantiate her
1
We note that Crawford’s counsel informed the magistrate judge that he
believed that the administrative record would remain open to submit additional
evidence concerning Crawford’s alleged injuries after the Agency issued its final
decision. It is true that once the Agency issued its final decision, Crawford had the
option of appealing that decision to the EEOC, see 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405, and she
could have attempted to introduce additional evidence in the administrative record
concerning her alleged injuries. However, Crawford chose to immediately file this
action in federal court after the Agency’s final decision, thereby passing up her
final opportunity to submit the additional evidence into the administrative record
that the Agency had requested.
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alleged injuries and the causal connection between those injuries and the
harassment. Because Crawford indicated she had seen a doctor, her medical
records, the testimony of her doctor, or both would have been particularly valuable
to the Agency in resolving the issue of her entitlement to compensatory damages.
Had Crawford complied with the Agency’s request for additional evidence,
especially the medical information, substantiating her alleged injuries and the
causal connection between those injuries and the harassment, the Agency could
have ruled on the merits of her compensatory damages claim. The need for a court
case might have been avoided. By failing to provide the Agency with the relevant
information it requested to resolve her claim, Crawford did not participate in good
faith in the administrative proceedings and therefore did not exhaust her
administrative remedies with regard to her claim for compensatory damages. See
Wade, 796 F.2d at 1377 (“[g]ood faith effort by the employee to cooperate with the
agency and EEOC and to provide all relevant, available information is all that
exhaustion requires.”);
Briley, 172 F.3d at 574 (employee’s failure to comply with
employing agency’s request for additional information concerning her entitlement
to compensatory damages “amounts to a breach of her duty to cooperate in good
faith in the administrative procedure, which is a failure to exhaust administrative
12
remedies.”). The magistrate judge’s dismissal of Crawford’s claim for
compensatory damages is affirmed.2
IV. CONCLUSION
AFFIRMED.
2
In light of our conclusion that Crawford failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies, we have no occasion to address the magistrate judge’s alternative reason
for dismissing Crawford’s claim for compensatory damages, i.e., that she could not
enforce the favorable parts of the Agency's final decision (the finding of
discrimination and the award of equitable relief) while at the same time litigating
de novo the unfavorable parts (the failure to award her compensatory damages).
13
