Osahar v. United States Postal Service , 297 F. App'x 863 ( 2008 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
October 23, 2008
No. 08-11332 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-22080-CV-FAM
OMAR R. OSAHAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,
John Potter, Postmaster,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(October 23, 2008)
Before ANDERSON, HULL and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Omar Osahar appeals the dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a
claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court concluded that Osahar failed to
comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). We affirm.
We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim.
Glover v. Liggett Group, Inc., 459 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006). We accept
the allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Id. “The standard for notice pleading set forth in Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.’” In re Southeast Banking Corp., 69 F.3d 1539, 1551
(11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). A district court may dismiss a
complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8(a)(2) if the plaintiff can prove no facts
that would entitle him to relief. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514,
122 S. Ct. 992, 998 (2002).
Osahar’s complaint is neither short nor plain. The 62-page document is a
quintessential “shotgun” pleading replete with factual allegations and rambling
legal conclusions. See Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg
Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2002). Osahar contends that the exhibits
to his complaint clarify his arguments, but to force the parties and the court to sift
through an additional 100 pages of letters, reports, and contracts would frustrate
the purpose of Rule 8(a)(2). Despite the leniency afforded pro se plaintiffs, the
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district court does not have license to rewrite a deficient pleading. GJR Invs., Inc.
v. County of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998).
Osahar’s complaint fails to state a claim for relief. Osahar complains that
the Post Office discriminated against him based on his race, but he fails to allege
that the denial of overtime or training opportunities had a material effect on the
terms or conditions of his employment. See Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961,
970–71 (11th Cir. 2008). Osahar complains about retaliation, but admits that the
alleged adverse employment action occurred “45 days previous to [the] date [he]
fil[ed] [his] EEO complaint[.]” See Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d
739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996). Osahar complains about breaches of his union contract,
but draws no connection between the provisions of the contract and any duty of the
Post Office. Osahar complains of age-based discrimination, but he fails to mention
the age of the employee who was given the work assignment and repeats
allegations that he was denied the assignment because of his race. See Kelliher v.
Veneman, 313 F.3d 1270, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002).
The district court did not err when it dismissed Osahar’s complaint with
prejudice. Osahar attempted to amend his complaint five times. Before the last
amendment, the district court warned Osahar that his failure to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2)
would result in a dismissal. Osahar did not comply and failed repeatedly to state a
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claim upon which relief could be granted. It would have been futile to allow
Osahar to amend his complaint yet again. See Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307,
1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Leave to amend a complaint is futile when the complaint
as amended would still be properly dismissed . . . .”).
AFFIRMED.
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