Dontrell Stephens v. Adams Lin , 612 F. App'x 581 ( 2015 )


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  •                 Case: 15-10396   Date Filed: 08/11/2015   Page: 1 of 4
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 15-10396
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 9:14-cv-80425-BSS
    DONTRELL STEPHENS,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    versus
    ADAMS LIN, Deputy Sheriff, individually,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (August 11, 2015)
    Before MARTIN, ANDERSON, and COX, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    This is a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 excessive force case. The Plaintiff, Dontrell
    Stephens (“Stephens”), claims that the Defendant, Deputy Adams Lin (“Lin”),
    used excessive force against him in violation of the Fourth Amendment by
    Case: 15-10396        Date Filed: 08/11/2015      Page: 2 of 4
    shooting him four times at close range after stopping Stephens for riding his
    bicycle on the wrong side of the road.                The shooting rendered Stephens a
    paraplegic. After Lin moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity
    from Stephens’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, the district court
    denied the motion. (DE 163). We affirm. 1
    I. Facts
    In denying Lin’s summary judgment motion, the district court considered the
    facts in the light most favorable to Stephens. We presume the parties’ familiarity
    with the facts. The district court’s opinion correctly recites the facts in the light
    most favorable to Stephens. (DE 163:5-7). We recite only those necessary to
    decide this appeal.
    Lin stopped Stephens for riding his bicycle on the wrong (left) side of the
    road. When Stephens saw the lights of Lin’s patrol car, he crossed the road (to the
    right side) in front of Lin’s patrol car. Stephens dismounted his bicycle in a yard
    when he heard the patrol car’s siren blast. Stephens had been talking to someone
    on his cell phone, and it was in his right hand as he approached Lin. Stephens
    1
    Stephens contends that we do not have interlocutory jurisdiction because the district
    court denied Lin’s motion solely on the basis of the existence of genuine issues of material fact.
    While the district court based its order on facts and inferences resolved in Stephens’s favor, the
    district court analyzed whether Lin, on those facts, had violated a clearly established
    constitutional right (DE163:14-19). These are “core qualified immunity” legal issues that we
    may review on an interlocutory appeal. Cottrell v. Caldwell, 
    85 F.3d 1480
    , 1484 (11th Cir.
    1996). We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
    2
    Case: 15-10396     Date Filed: 08/11/2015   Page: 3 of 4
    asked Lin why he was being stopped. Lin did not respond. Lin told Stephens to
    raise his hands above his head; Stephens did. His cell phone was still in his right
    hand, and his left hand was empty. With his hands still up and the cell phone still
    in his right hand, Stephens began to pivot to his right. Lin then shot Stephens four
    times, rendering Stephens a paraplegic.
    II. Standard of Review
    We review de novo a district court’s denial of a defendant’s motion for
    summary judgment based on qualified immunity. We resolve all genuine factual
    issues in favor of the plaintiff, and then determine on the basis of those facts
    whether the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. Durruthy v. Pastor, 
    351 F.3d 1080
    , 1084 (11th Cir. 2003).
    III. Discussion
    Where, as here, the district court has detailed the facts upon which it has
    relied, and we find support for those findings in the summary judgment record, we
    accept those facts as the basis for reviewing the summary judgment order. Cook v.
    Gwinnett Cnty. Sch. Dist., 
    414 F.3d 1313
    , 1315 n.4 (11th Cir. 2005).
    The qualified immunity defense requires the party seeking its protection
    (Lin) to prove that he was exercising discretionary authority at the time of the
    challenged incident. That is not contested. The burden, therefore, is on Stephens
    to prove that he suffered a constitutional violation and that the constitutional right
    3
    Case: 15-10396        Date Filed: 08/11/2015       Page: 4 of 4
    violated was clearly established when the challenged incident occurred. Toland v.
    Cotton, __ U.S. __, 
    134 S. Ct. 1861
    , 1865 – 66 (2014).
    The district court correctly concluded that a reasonable jury “could find that
    Deputy Lin violated [Stephens’s] constitutional rights by employing excessive
    force.” DE 163:16.2 The district court then correctly concluded that the violated
    right was clearly established by governing case law.                   We agree with those
    conclusions.
    IV. Conclusion
    We affirm the district court’s denial of summary judgment to Deputy Adams
    Lin on his qualified immunity defense.
    AFFIRMED.
    2
    Lin does not contend that shooting Stephens’s under the facts Stephens alleges did not
    constitute a violation of Stephens’s clearly established constitutional rights. He contends that he
    is entitled to qualified immunity under his version of the facts. This contention is without merit
    because it ignores the case law governing summary judgment analysis of qualified immunity.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-10396

Citation Numbers: 612 F. App'x 581

Filed Date: 8/11/2015

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023