United States v. Hector Cantu , 227 F. App'x 783 ( 2007 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 4, 2007
No. 06-14194 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00037-CR-WS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HECTOR CANTU,
a.k.a. Hector Cantu-Montalvo,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(April 4, 2007)
Before ANDERSON, BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Hector Cantu (“Hector”) appeals his conviction for illegal re-entry into the
United States after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). On
appeal, Hector argues that he was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He
argues that the arresting officer, John Cason (“Cason”), had no reasonable,
individualized suspicion that Hector was engaged in criminal activity when Cason
requested identification from Cantu, who was a passenger in a commercial truck
being driven by his brother, Arnaldo Cantu (“Arnaldo”).
Background
Hector Cantu was arrested after Loxely Alabama police officer Cason
stopped the commercial truck, in which he was a passenger, on Interstate 10 for
swerving over the white fog line. When Cason stopped the truck, the driver,
Arnaldo, met him outside the truck. Cason requested Arnaldo’s driver’s license,
insurance information, logbook, cargo documentation, and the passenger’s driver’s
license. Arnaldo provided all the information except the passenger’s identification.
Cason then peered into the cargo hold, and radio Arnaldo’s information into his
dispatcher. After inspecting Arnaldo’s paperwork, Cason testified that he became
suspicious because of “down time” in Atlanta, a known destination city for the
narcotic trade. However, there was no problem with the logbook or Arnaldo’s
driver’s license, insurance, or Arnaldo’s ability to drive.
Cason was aware of a federal regulation that prevented commercial vehicles
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from carrying unauthorized riders. Cason also was aware that he had no authority
to take action on violations of these federal regulations. Cason requested
Arnaldo’s written authorization by the motor carrier allowing the passenger.
Arnaldo admitted that he had no such authorization, and Cason went to the vehicle
to question Hector. He asked Hector for identification and where he was
employed. Hector had no state issue identification, and offered only a Sam’s Club
Card. Cason found this suspicious, and ran the identification information Hector
had provided orally through local dispatch. After further questioning Arnaldo,
Cason contacted a Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement dispatcher
and requested information on both Hector and Arnaldo. He learned that Hector
was in the country illegally. At this point, the traffic stop had lasted about 27
minutes.
After a contested evidentiary hearing, Hector Cantu entered a conditional
guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress. The district court sentenced Cantu to 41 months in prison to be followed
by three-years of supervised release if he is not deported.
Standard of Review
“A district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question
of law and fact.” United States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 1237, 1240 (11th Cir. 1999).
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We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and review the district
court’s application of the law to those facts de novo. Id. These factual findings
include the district court’s credibility determinations, which are conclusive “unless
the judge credits exceedingly improbably testimony.” United States v. Ramirez-
Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original)(quoting United
States v. Cardona-Rivera, 904 F.2d 1149, 1152 (7th Cir.1990)). “[W]hen
considering a ruling on a motion to suppress, all facts are construed in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party below.” United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d
1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000).
Discussion
Hector Cantu argues that Cason seized him in violation of the Fourth
Amendment because there was no reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in
criminal activity. The Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable
search and seizure “extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles.”
United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S. Ct. 744, 750, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740(2002). For brief investigatory stops, the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the
police officer has a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity “may be afoot.” Id.(citations omitted) When determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, we
consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the police officer
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had a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting legal wrongdoing. Id. at
273. “The individual challenging the search has the burdens of proof and
persuasion.” United States v. Cooper, 133 F.3d 1394, 1398 (11th Cir. 1998).
Cason’s investigation of the traffic stop must be “‘reasonably related in
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.’”
United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102, 1106 (11th Cir. 2003)(quoting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968)). A traffic
stop must be of “limited duration” and “may not last any longer than necessary to
process the traffic violation unless there is articulable suspicion of other illegal
activity.” Id. (citation omitted). However, once effectuating a legal stop, an
officer has “the duty to investigate suspicious circumstances that then [come] to his
attention.” United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir. 1991) (citation
omitted). The officer can lawfully ask questions, even questions not strictly related
to the traffic stop, while waiting for a computer check of registration or examining
a driver’s license so long as it does not “prolong[] beyond the time reasonably
required to complete that mission.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.
Ct. 834, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842 (2005). Furthermore, an officer can lengthen the
detention if he has reasonable suspicion of illegal activity other than the traffic
violation, or if the detention has become a consensual encounter. United States v.
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Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215, 1220 (11th Cir. 1999).
Cason observed a traffic violation, for which he could legitimately stop the
van. The van crossed the white line, and Cason had the duty to further investigate
whether the driver was impaired. Thus, Cason was justified in stopping the
vehicle, and examining the log book to determine how long the driver had been
driving. Furthermore, Cason testified that it was unusual for professional drivers
to have unauthorized passengers, and he knew that there was a federal regulation
prohibiting such passengers. Since Cason had a duty to investigate suspicious
circumstances that come to his attention after the initial stop and was permitted to
rely on his experience, he did not act unreasonably in questioning the Cantus about
Hector’s identity and his authorization to be in the truck. Cason then ran standard
dispatch checks of both Cantus’ identities. The entire encounter lasted
approximately 27 minutes before Cason learned of Hector’s status as a person
illegally inside the United States. Cason did not prolong the encounter beyond
what it took to investigate the traffic stop, and asking questions about other
suspicious circumstances that he observed during the traffic stop did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.
Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties briefs, we find no
error in the district court’s denial of Hector Cantu’s motion to suppress.
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Accordingly, we affirm Cantu’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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