Joseph Harden v. Stan Yates , 227 F. App'x 794 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                             [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT                     FILED
    ________________________          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    April 10, 2007
    No. 06-12472                   THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                  CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 05-00139-CV-OC-10GRJ
    JOSEPH HARDEN,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    STAN YATES,
    Warden,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    _________________________
    (April 10, 2007)
    Before BLACK, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Joseph Harden, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of
    his petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under section 2241. In his petition,
    Harden argues that the sentencing court erred when it imposed a sentence greater
    than 20 years of imprisonment because the indictment failed to specify a drug
    quantity. The district court dismissed Harden’s section 2241 petition with
    prejudice because Harden failed to qualify for the savings clause provision of
    section 2255. We affirm.
    We review the denial of habeas relief de novo. Cook v. Wiley, 
    208 F.3d 1314
    , 1317 (11th Cir. 2000). “Typically, a petitioner collaterally attacks the
    validity of his federal sentence by filing a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Under
    the savings clause of [section] 2255, a prisoner may file a [section] 2241 petition if
    an otherwise available remedy under [section] 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to
    test the legality of his detention.” Sawyer v. Holder, 
    326 F.3d 1363
    , 1365 (11th
    Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). “[T]he only sentencing claims that may conceivably
    be covered by the savings clause are those based upon a retroactively applicable
    Supreme Court decision overturning circuit precedent.” Wofford v. Scott, 
    177 F.3d 1236
    , 1245 (11th Cir. 1999).
    The district court correctly dismissed Harden’s section 2241 petition because
    Harden’s claim is not based on a retroactively applicable Supreme Court decision.
    Harden argues that his sentence is fundamentally defective in the light of the
    2
    decision in United States v. Cotton, 
    535 U.S. 625
    , 
    122 S. Ct. 1781
    (2002), and that
    Cotton is retroactively applicable, but this argument fails. Cotton did not establish
    an avenue of relief but explained the standard of review to be applied on appeal to
    an objection under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
    , 
    120 S. Ct. 2348
    (2000),
    that was not preserved in the district court. Harden’s sentencing argument is
    actually based on Apprendi, which is not a retroactively applicable decision. See
    McCoy v. United States, 
    266 F.3d 1245
    , 1258 (11th Cir. 2001).
    The dismissal of Harden’s petition under section 2241 is
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-12472

Citation Numbers: 227 F. App'x 794

Judges: Black, Marcus, Per Curiam, Pryor

Filed Date: 4/10/2007

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/2/2023