Stephens v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. , 149 F. App'x 908 ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
September 9, 2005
No. 05-11098
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-03094-CV-JTC-1
LISA KAY STEPHENS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY.,
STATE FARM MUTUAL INSURANCE CO.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(September 9, 2005)
Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Lisa Kay Stephens, proceeding pro se, appeals (1) the district court’s denial
of her motion to remand her action to state court, and (2) the district court’s grant
of State Farm Fire and Casualty Company and State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company’s (collectively “State Farm”) motion to dismiss based on the
finding that her claims were barred by collateral estoppel. Stephens filed the
instant complaint in the Superior Court of Rockdale County, Georgia (“Rockdale
Superior Court”) against State Farm, alleging that, during discovery for a previous
action, State Farm had fraudulently and in bad faith failed to disclose a liability
policy that provided coverage for Stephens’s automobile accident.
On appeal, Stephens first argues that the district court erred by refusing to
grant her motion to remand. Specifically, Stephens asserts that (1) because she and
State Farm both were citizens of Georgia, and her complaint alleged the violation
of Georgia statutes, this case properly was filed in the Rockdale Superior Court;
and (2) State Farm’s notice of removal was not timely filed because State Farm
failed to file page 3 of her complaint or a copy of Exhibit “A” to her complaint
within 30 days of receiving service of her complaint. She also contends that State
Farm was in default because it failed to file an answer to her complaint in either
Rockdale Superior Court or the district court.
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We review the district court’s “denial of a motion to remand de novo.”
Behlen v. Merrill Lynch, 311 F.3d 1087, 1090 (11th Cir. 2002). A defendant may
remove to federal court a civil action brought in state court, provided that the
federal court has original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
Original jurisdiction may be based upon diversity of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332. Diversity jurisdiction exists where the suit is between citizens of different
states, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Id. For purposes of
§ 1332, a corporation is a citizen of any state by which it has been incorporated and
of the state where it has its principal place of business. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c)(1). A defendant seeking to remove a civil action from a state court must
file a notice of removal in the United States district court for the district and
division within which such action is pending, containing a short and plain
statement of the grounds for removal and a copy of all process, pleadings, and
orders served upon it relating to the underlying action. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). “The
notice of removal . . . shall be filed within thirty days after receipt by the
defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading setting
forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or within
thirty days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading
has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant,
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whichever period is shorter.” 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).
Because the district court had original diversity jurisdiction over the instant
action, and State Farm timely filed its notice of removal, the district court did not
err by denying Stephens’s motion to remand the instant action to the Rockdale
Superior Court. State Farm, under § 1332(c)(1), was a citizen of Illinois because it
was incorporated under the laws of Illinois and had its principal place of business
there. Thus, the district court had diversity jurisdiction because State Farm and
Stephens were citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeded
$75,000. Additionally, although Stephens contended that State Farm’s notice of
removal was not timely filed under § 1446 because State Farm did not file page 3
of her complaint and failed to file a copy of Exhibit “A” to her complaint within 30
days of receiving service of her complaint, this will not defeat removal. State Farm
filed its initial notice of removal on October 10, 2003, within thirty days of
receiving service of Stephens’s complaint, these documents had no bearing on the
district court’s jurisdiction, and this Court has held that although a party failed to
file all the necessary papers with the district court under § 1446, removal was
proper. Covington v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 251 F.2d 903, 932-33 (5 th Cir. 1958).1
1
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981)(en banc), this
Court adopted as binding precedent all of the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down
prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981.
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Stephens’s argument that State Farm is in default for failing to file an answer
to her complaint is without merit. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 81(c), State Farm had five
days, after filing the petition for removal on October 10, 2003, within which to
either “answer or present the other defenses or objections available.” Due to the
intervening Columbus Day holiday and weekends, State Farm had until October
20 th to file its response to Stephens’s complaint. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a) (stating that, in
calculating a time period of less than 11 days, a party need not count legal holidays
or weekends). State Farm filed its motion to dismiss on October 20, 2003.
Therefore, Stephens is not entitled to a default judgment.
Stephens also appears to argue that, because her complaint involved new
issues of “bad faith” that had never been heard by any court, the district court erred
by finding that her claims were barred by collateral estoppel. “We review the
district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss de novo.” Shields v. Bellsouth
Advertising and Pub. Co., Inc., 228 F.3d 1284, 1288 (11th Cir. 2000). We also
review de novo the district court’s determination that a claim is barred on the basis
of collateral estoppel. E.E.O.C. v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280, 1285
(11th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. March 23, 2005) (No. 04-1292). A
federal court “give[s] preclusive effect to the judgment of a state court provided
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that two conditions are met: first, that the courts of the state from which the
judgment emerged would do so themselves; and second, that the litigants had a
‘full and fair opportunity’ to litigate their claims and the prior state proceedings
otherwise satisfied ‘the applicable requirements of due process.’” Shields, 228
F.3d at 1288.
In considering whether to give preclusive effect to a state court judgment,
the district court must apply state law. Vazquez v. Metropolitan Dade County, 968
F.2d 1101, 1106 (11th Cir. 1992). Under Georgia law:
[c]ollateral estoppel precludes the re-adjudication of an issue that has
previously been litigated and adjudicated on the merits in another
action between the same parties or their privies. . . . [U]nlike res
judicata, collateral estoppel does not require identity of the claim – so
long as the issue was determined in the previous action and there is
identity of the parties, that issue may not be re-litigated, even as part
of a different claim.
General Elec. Capital Computer Servs. v. Gwinnett County Bd. of Tax Assessors,
523 S.E.2d 651, 653 (Ga. App. 1999).
The district court did not err by granting State Farm’s motion to dismiss
based on the finding that Stephens’s claims were barred by collateral estoppel. In
the instant action, Stephens claimed that during discovery for a previous action
State Farm had fraudulently and in bad faith failed to disclose a liability policy
issued to its insured that provided coverage for her automobile accident and would
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satisfy a judgment that the state court had granted her. In the previous action that
Stephens filed against the insured, the Rockdale Superior Court determined that the
only applicable insurance coverage for the van involved in Stephens’s car accident
was the $50,000 individual policy issued to Hudson, the driver of the van. The
Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the state court’s findings. In a motion to set
aside the judgment by the Rockdale Superior Court on the grounds of mistake or
fraud, Stephens claimed that State Farm and the insured had failed to disclose the
$500,000 liability policy issued to the insured. The Rockdale Superior Court
denied Stephens’s motion, finding that the documents on which Stephens’s claim
was predicated were produced in prior discovery. Because State Farm was in
privity with its insured, it was entitled to the benefit of those rulings. See
American States Ins. Co. v. Walker, 477 S.E.2d 360, 362 (Ga. App. 1996) (holding
that with respect to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the insurer stands in the
shoes of the insured as to the identity of parties or privies). Accordingly, because
the issue that Stephens raised in the instant action already had been adjudicated on
the merits in a previous action between Stephens and a privy to State Farm, her
action is barred by collateral estoppel.
Because the issue that Stephens raised in the instant action already had been
adjudicated on the merits in a previous action between Stephens and a privy to
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State Farm, the district court did not err by granting State Farm’s motion to dismiss
based on the finding that Stephens’s claims were barred by the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.2
2
Stephens’s motion to file a supplemental reply brief is denied.
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