Saiquing Chin v. U.S. Attorney General , 141 F. App'x 904 ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 24, 2005
No. 04-15936 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
BIA No. A96-440-085
SAIQING CHIN,
Petitioner,
versus
U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
________________________
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(August 24, 2005)
Before ANDERSON, HULL and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Saiqing Chin petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
order affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision denying her petition for
asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration Nationality Act
(“INA”) and the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhumane, and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”).1 Substantial
evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Chin failed to demonstrate eligibility
for asylum or withholding of removal. Accordingly, Chin’s petition is DENIED.
I. Background
Chin was born in 1982 in Fuzhou City, China. She testified that in April
2001, her parents borrowed approximately $10,000 from a local official in order to
open a business. The business failed, and Chin’s parents were unable to repay the
debt. Chin testified that the official offered to forgive the debt if Chin married his
son. Chin objected to the proposal, both because she did not want to be a “piece
of merchandise” and because the official’s son was “mentally retarded.” Despite
Chin’s objections, her parents accepted the official’s offer and arranged the
marriage.
In April 2002, Chin ran away from her parents to the home of another
relative. After about a week, her mother, accompanied by four village cadres,
1
Because Chin’s removal proceedings commenced after April 1, 1997, the
effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (Sept. 30, 1996) (“IIRIRA”), this case is governed by the
permanent provisions of the INA, as amended by IIRIRA.
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came and took her home. Chin ran away again in June 2002, this time to her
sister’s home in Fuzcheng City. She stayed there for about two weeks, until her
mother sent the cadres to take her home again.
Chin ran away to the city of Quanzhou in September 2002. She rented a
room and found work with the help of a smuggler, known as a “snakehead.” She
remained in Quanzhou for three months. She testified that her parents borrowed
$25,000 to pay half of the snakehead’s fee for smuggling Chin to the United
States, and that the remainder of the fee would be paid over time, in part from
monies that Chin earned working in the United States.
Upon leaving Quanzhou, Chin traveled first to Thailand. She stayed in
Thailand for about three months, then flew to Nepal, where she stayed for a week.
From Nepal, she flew to India, where she stayed for another week before flying to
Germany, changing planes and heading to Atlanta.
Once in Atlanta, Chin attempted to enter the United States under a visa
waiver pilot program using a Singapore passport that was not her own. When
immigration authorities in Atlanta questioned Chin about the passport, she
admitted that she was a resident of China and stated that she wished to file for
asylum.
On April 24, 2003, Chin submitted her application for asylum and
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withholding of removal, citing past persecution and a fear of future persecution by
local officials on account of her political opinion against arranged marriages. At
her hearing, Chin argued that the local officials had persecuted her by attempting
to force her into an arranged marriage and by returning her to her family when she
ran away. She also claimed that she feared future persecution because her family
owed a substantial amount of money and she thought she might be forced to go
through with the arranged marriage. Finally, she claimed that she would face
torture if returned to China because she left the country illegally.
The IJ denied Chin’s petition, finding that Chin’s claim was personal in
nature and that she was an economic rather than political refugee. The IJ also
found Chin’s story regarding her parents’ debt and resulting agreement to the
arranged marriage “highly suspect” in light of the parents’ ability and willingness
to obtain the funds to pay the snakehead. The IJ went on to hold that, even if her
claims were accepted as true, Chin could not establish refugee status under the
INA because she could not establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of
future persecution. Finally, the IJ held that Chin did not qualify for withholding of
removal under the CAT because Chin could not demonstrate that she was likely to
be persecuted or tortured upon being returned to China. In support of this holding,
the IJ noted that first-time returnees to China generally suffer only a fine. The
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Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the IJ’s decision without issuing an
opinion.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
The IJ’s factual determinations are reviewed under the substantial evidence
test, and we “must affirm the [IJ]’s decision if it is supported by reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence on the record as a whole.” Najjar v. Ashcroft,
257 F.3d 1262, 1283-84 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted). In other
words, we reverse the agency’s decision only if “the evidence presented by [the
petitioner] was such that a reasonable factfinder would have to conclude that the
requisite fear of persecution existed.” I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacharias, 502 U.S. 478,
481, 112 S. Ct. 812, 815 (1992). When the Board of Immigration Appeals affirms
an IJ’s order without opinion, the IJ's decision constitutes the final agency
determination subject to review by this court. Forgue v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d
1282, 1285 n.2 (11th Cir. 2005).
B. Asylum
An alien who arrives in, or is present in, the United States may apply for
asylum. INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). The Attorney General has
discretion to grant asylum if the alien meets the INA’s definition of a “refugee.” 8
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U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). A “refugee” is defined as
any person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or,
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (emphasis added). The asylum
applicant carries the burden of proving statutory “refugee” status. See Al Najjar,
257 F.3d at 1284.
To establish asylum eligibility, the petitioner must, with specific and
credible evidence, “establish (1) past persecution on account of her political
opinion or any other protected ground, or (2) a ‘well-founded fear’ that her
political opinion or any other protected ground will cause future persecution.”
Sepulveda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1230-31 (11th Cir. 2005). If the
petitioners demonstrate past persecution, they are presumed to have a well-
founded fear of future persecution unless the government can rebut this
presumption by showing a fundamental change in circumstances in the country or
the ability to avoid future persecution by relocating within the country. Antipova
v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 257 F.3d 1262, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004). If the petitioners cannot
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show past persecution, then they must demonstrate a well-founded fear of future
persecution that is both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. See Al
Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1289. The subjective component can be proved “by the
applicant’s credible testimony that he or she genuinely fears persecution,” while
the objective component “can be fulfilled either by establishing past persecution or
that he or she has a good reason to fear future persecution.” Id. (internal quotation
omitted). Although the INA does not expressly define “persecution” for purposes
of qualifying as a “refugee,” we have stated that “persecution is an extreme
concept, requiring more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or
intimidation.” Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231 (internal quotations omitted).
In order to establish the necessary causal connection between the political
opinion and the feared persecution, the petitioner must present “specific, detailed
facts showing a good reason to fear that he or she will be singled out for
persecution on account of such an opinion.” Id. (internal quotation omitted)
(emphasis in original). Furthermore, we have approved of a “country-wide
requirement” in which a refugee must first pursue an “internal resettlement
alternative” in their own country, or establish that this is not possible, before
seeking asylum here. Mazariegos v. Office of U.S. Att’y Gen., 241 F.3d 1320,
1326-27 (11th Cir. 2001). Thus, in addition to establishing a "well-founded fear"
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of persecution, the alien must also establish that the persecution could not be
avoided by relocating within their country.
In this case, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that Chin did not
suffer past persecution on account of her political opinion. Chin sets forth only
two incidents in which the government allegedly persecuted her, and both of these
incidents occurred when local officials, either accompanied by her mother or
acting upon her mother’s request, found Chin and took her home after she had run
away to avoid an arranged marriage. It is not at all clear that this conduct rises to
the level of persecution, nor is there any evidence of a causal link between the
conduct and any political opinion, real or imputed, on the part of Chin.
Additionally, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that Chin failed
to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. We agree with the IJ that
Chin’s claimed fear of being forced to enter an arranged marriage to satisfy her
parents’ $10,000 debt is undermined by the fact that her parents were willing and
able to obtain $25,000 to help Chin reach the United States, and that even if that
were not the case, it is unlikely that the Chinese government would force Chin to
enter and remain in an arranged marriage in order to satisfy her parents’ debt. We
also agree that Chin’s concerns about the arranged marriage, even if legitimate, are
not likely to persist country-wide. This is particularly so given Chin’s testimony
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that she lived and worked unmolested in Quanzhou for three months prior to her
departure for the United States.
With respect to Chin’s claim that she will be persecuted for illegally
leaving China, the country reports cited in the IJ’s opinion provide substantial
support for the IJ’s finding that first time returnees to China are generally only
subjected to fines, not persecution or torture. Because Chin cannot demonstrate
past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution, her petition for
asylum was properly denied.
B. Withholding of Removal
An alien is entitled to withholding of removal under the INA if she can
show that her life or freedom would be threatened on account of her race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1232. When attempting to make this showing, the alien
bears the burden of demonstrating that it is “more likely than not” that she will be
persecuted or tortured upon being returned to her country. Id. Because this is a
more stringent standard, “an applicant [who] is unable to meet the ‘well-founded
fear’ standard for asylum . . . is generally precluded from qualifying for either
asylum or withholding of deportation.” Id. at 1232-33 (internal quotation
omitted). Since Chin has failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded
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fear of persecution sufficient to support her asylum claim, as discussed above, it
logically follows that she cannot establish eligibility for withholding of removal
under the heightened standard of the INA and the CAT.
Upon review of the record, and having considered the briefs of the parties,
we discern no reversible error. Based on the foregoing, we deny the petition.
PETITION DENIED.
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