United States v. Melissa Skinner , 131 F. App'x 650 ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
April 18, 2005
No. 04-14311
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 01-00011-CR-4-002
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MELISSA SKINNER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
_________________________
(April 18, 2005)
Before BIRCH, BARKETT and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Melissa Skinner pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possess with
intent to distribute more than 50 grams of methamphetamine and more than 500
grams of a substance containing methamphetamine, a violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a), (b)(1)(A)(viii), and 846. She appeals her 120-month sentence, arguing
that the district court erred when it disqualified her from the benefit of the safety-
valve provision in U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 by finding that she possessed a firearm in
connection with the offense. For the reasons set forth more fully below, we affirm.
Skinner signed a factual statement with her plea containing the following
information. A confidential informant made several purchases of
methamphetamine from Skinner’s codefendant and co-conspirator, Tracy Cotrell,
and Skinner was present at each transaction, discussing the quality of the drugs,
looking for surveillance cameras, and counting proceeds from at least one
transaction. On February 12, 2001, Skinner carried a Smith & Wesson .357
revolver and 22 rounds of ammunition into a motel room, where Cotrell sold the
weapon contemporaneous to a drug transaction. Both Cotrell and Skinner were
arrested on March 15, 2001, and admitted to their participation in
methamphetamine dealing. After conducting a Rule 11 hearing, the district court
accepted Skinner’s guilty plea.
The pre-sentence investigation report (“PSI”) calculated a base offense level
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of 32, finding that the offense involved at least 50 but less than 150 grams of
methamphetamine, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(4). A two-level enhancement was added
for possession of a dangerous weapon pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). Finally,
Skinner received both a two-level minor-role reduction and a three-level reduction
for acceptance of responsibility, for a total offense level of 29, U.S.S.G.
§§ 3B1.2(b), 3E1.1(a), (b). Notably, the PSI found that Skinner did not qualify for
a two-level reduction under § 2D1.1(b)(6) because she did not meet the criteria for
the safety-valve provision in § 5C1.2.1 Specifically, the PSI found that Skinner
knowingly possessed and transported a firearm that Cotrell later sold, in
conjunction with a drug transaction, to an individual believed to be a drug dealer,
disqualifying her from the benefits of § 5C1.2.
Skinner objected to the PSI’s safety-valve finding, arguing that the firearm
transaction was separate from the drug offense, and thus, should not be considered
in determining her eligibility under that section. To address her objection, the
government called Detective Ed Cook, who worked undercover in the drug and
1
U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 allows the court to impose a sentence without regard to the statutory
minimum if the defendant meets the following criteria: (1) has not more than one criminal history
point; (2) did not use violence, threats of violence, or possess a firearm or other dangerous weapon
in connection with the offense; (3) the offense did not result in death or serious bodily injury to
anyone; (4) the defendant was not a leader or supervisor; and (5) the defendant truthfully provided
all information and evidence to the government relevant to the offense. In addition, the defendant
receives a two-level reduction in the offense level determined under § 2D1.1. See § 2D1.1(b)(6) (“If
the defendant meets the criteria . . . of § 5C1.2 . . . decrease by 2 levels).
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firearm transaction, to present testimony in support of its position that the firearm
was connected with the drug offense. Cook testified that he worked undercover
while investigating Skinner and Cotrell, and discovered through a confidential
informant that Cotrell might be willing to sell a couple of handguns. On February
4, 2001, during a drug transaction with Skinner and Cotrell, Cook discussed
purchasing a .357 revolver from Cotrell. Cook advised Cotrell that he could not
purchase a weapon legally, wanted a firearm for protection, and “also talked about
using it while hunting.” Cook arranged for Cotrell to bring the firearm to their
next meeting, which was on February 12.
On February 12, Cotrell and Skinner met with Cook at a motel, where
Cotrell handed Cook suspected methamphetamine. At the same meeting, Skinner
produced a gun case out of a backpack that she carried into the room and handed it
to Cotrell, who then handed it over to Cook. The case contained a Smith &
Wesson .357 and a partial box of shells. Cook then purchased the weapon and
ammunition, as well as four ounces of methamphetamine. Cook further testified
that Cotrell, not Skinner, consummated the sale of the gun, and that Skinner never
used the firearm. He also stated that Skinner could not have handed him the gun
directly from where she was sitting.
Next, the government called Drug Enforcement Agent Poore, who was in
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charge of the DEA’s investigation of Skinner and Cotrell. He testified that Skinner
and Cotrell consented to a search of their mobile home, where agents recovered
two firearms: a J.C. Higgins, Model 20, .12 gauge shotgun in a workroom and an
Arminius .22 caliber eight-shot revolver, discovered in a dresser drawer that
contained both men’s and women’s clothing. Loose ammunition was also found in
various locations.
Neither the government nor Skinner presented further evidence, and the
court heard argument from Skinner as to why she should be afforded the benefit of
the safety-valve provisions in § 5C1.2. Skinner argued that the gun sale and the
drug transaction were completely separate incidents, and the gun should not be
considered under subsection § 5C1.2 as being possessed “in connection with” the
drug offense. She further argued that, while the gun purchaser may have intended
to use the gun to protect himself during drug dealings, Cotrell was responsible for
the sale, not Skinner. Skinner argued that she was “a puppy” and a drug addict
who was a tool in Cotrell’s crimes. Finally, Skinner argued that, while she
possessed the weapon that eventually was sold, it was for a short period of time
and not part of the conspiracy to sell methamphetamine.
The government argued that Eleventh Circuit precedent placed the burden
on the defendant to prove that the safety valve applies, and that Skinner clearly
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possessed the firearm in question and assisted in giving that firearm and
ammunition to a person she knew or believed to be a drug dealer. It further argued
that Skinner knew that Cook could not obtain a gun legally, that he wanted it for
protection, and that she knew, based on the previous week’s dealings, that the gun
was going to be sold along with the drugs. Finally, the government argued that it
did not have to prove that the firearm facilitated the drug deal, but merely that
Skinner possessed the firearm, and Skinner had to prove that the connection
between the firearm and the drug deal was clearly improbable, which she had not
done.
The court overruled Skinner’s objection, and found that the issue was
whether Skinner possessed the firearm or induced another person to do so. (Id. at
27). It noted that, in resolving the issue in question under § 5C1.2, other circuits
had applied the light standard under guidelines section 2D1.1(b)(1), providing an
enhancement if “a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed.” (Id. at
28). The court found it was “very clear that having a .357 handgun in one’s hand
at the time of a drug transaction with ammunition right there meets” the standard
for an enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1), and, therefore, Skinner did not qualify
for a safety-valve reduction under § 5C1.2. (Id.).
However, the court further stated that its ruling did not rest on the standards
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of § 2D1.1(b)(1) and § 5C1.2 being the same, and made additional findings that
Skinner knew that Cook wanted a firearm for protection and could not obtain a
firearm legally, knew that she was possessing a weapon with ammunition at the
time she entered the motel room to consummate a drug transaction, and knew that
the weapon was going to be sold at the moment she handed the weapon to Cotrell.
Based on those findings, the court found that “it was clear . . . that they were
selling a firearm to a person believed to be a drug dealer at the time of the drug
transaction. By whatever standard measure, that constitutes possession of a
firearm by Ms. Skinner in connection with the drug transaction.” It went on to
note that § 5C1.2 only requires possession, not use of the firearm, and that even if
use were required, the firearm “was used to facilitate a relationship in a transaction
with the drug customer.”
Based on the foregoing, the court found that Skinner’s PSI was accurate, and
sentenced her to the statutory minimum of 120 months’ imprisonment, with
judgment entered on August 17, 2001. On August 2, 2002, Skinner filed a pro se
motion to vacate, set aside, or correct her federal sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
She argued that her counsel had been ineffective by failing to file a notice of
appeal regarding downward departure issues.
Upon review, the district court granted Skinner’s motion, vacated the
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original judgment, and re-imposed an amended judgment with the exact same
sentence, thus reopening the period for Skinner to file an appeal.
On appeal, Skinner argues that the district court erred by failing to consider
her “intent” when it decided that she possessed a firearm “in connection with” a
drug offense, thereby disqualifying her from receiving the benefits of the safety-
valve provisions in § 5C1.2. Specifically, Skinner argues that the district court did
not examine why she possessed the gun, and instead improperly attributed
Cotrell’s intent to her in making its findings. Skinner admits that her argument
may be foreclosed by this Court’s precedent, which holds that an individual’s
purpose in possessing a firearm is irrelevant, but submits that this precedent is
contrary to the requirements of the guidelines, the United States Code, and the
position of 10 other circuit courts.
We review for clear error the district court’s factual findings that the
defendant failed to meet his burden of proving that she qualified for a safety-valve
reduction. See also United States v. Cruz, 106 F.3d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1997).
Legal interpretations of the guidelines are reviewed de novo. United States v.
Johnson, 375 F.3d 1300, 1301 (11th Cir. 2004).
The “safety-valve” provision found in U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 permits a court to
sentence a defendant within the applicable guidelines range and without regard to
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the statutory minimum sentences set out in 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 844, 846, 960, or
963, if the court finds that the defendant meets all of the criteria set forth in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5). Among those criteria, and the one relevant on appeal, is
that the defendant “did not use violence or credible threats of violence or possess a
firearm or other dangerous weapon (or induce another participant to do so) in
connection with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(2) (emphasis supplied). The
term “defendant” limits the accountability of the defendant to “his own conduct
and conduct that he aided or abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or
wilfully caused.” Id., comment. n.4. The burden is on the defendant to prove she
meets the eligibility requirements under § 5C1.2. Cruz, 106 F.3d at 1557.
The guidelines do not define what is required to prove that a firearm was
possessed “in connection with” the offense for purposes of § 5C1.2, and we do not
appear to have explicitly addressed the question. In United States v. Young,
however, we held that the phrase “in connection with” in U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.4(b)(3)(A) (armed career criminal) required only that the defendant possess
a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence to warrant application of
the enhancement. United States v. Young, 115 F.3d 834, 837-38 (11th Cir. 1997).
In doing so, we rejected the rationale of other circuits that required the government
to prove that the firearm served a purpose related to the crime, i.e., that the weapon
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facilitated the commission of the offense. Id. at 838; see, e.g., United States v.
Wyatt, 102 F.3d 241, 247 (7th Cir. 1996) (comparing “in connection with” to “in
relation to” and concluding that “in connection with” requires that a firearm serve
some purpose to the felonious conduct before an enhancement is warranted under
§ 2K2.1(b)(5)).
In a slightly different context, we were “unable to discern any principled
reason why we should follow a path of reasoning different from that marked by our
decision in [Young], when attempting to arrive at the construction that should be
accorded the same ‘in connection with’ phrase found in § 2B5.1(b)(3),” requiring
an enhancement for a defendant who possessed a firearm in connection with a
counterfeit currency offense. United States v. Matos-Rodriguez, 188 F.3d 1300,
1308 (11th Cir. 1999). Thus, we reaffirmed our decision in Young and again
rejected the view of other circuits holding that the language “in connection with”
required something more than mere use or possession. Id. at 1308-09.
Likewise, in United States v. Rhind, we reiterated that the ordinary and
natural meaning of the phrase “in connection with” does not require proof of
facilitation, this time interpreting U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5).2 United States v. Rhind,
289 F.3d 690, 695 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, while we have not explicitly ruled on
2
Providing for a four-level enhancement if the defendant used or possessed any firearm or
ammunition in connection with another felony offense.
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the meaning of the phrase “in connection with” in the context of § 5C1.2, it seems
counterintuitive and inconsistent to afford the same phrase a different meaning
solely because the guidelines section is different from the sections at issue in
previous cases, especially where § 5C1.2 is silent on the definition.
Furthermore, as we have noted, in some instances the test for whether a
firearm was possessed “in connection with” another offense doesn’t matter, as the
evidence would support a district court’s finding under either a “facilitation” or
“mere possession” approach. See United States v. Gainey, 111 F.3d 834, 837 (11th
Cir. 1997) (declining to adopt an interpretation of “in connection with” as used in §
4B1.4(b)(3)(A) and finding that the district court did not clearly err under any of
the prevailing interpretations). Here, Skinner had to prove that she was eligible for
the benefits of § 5C1.2 by proving that her possession of the weapon had no
connection with the drug offense. See Cruz, 106 F.3d at 1557. To meet her
burden, Skinner purports to rely on the testimony of Cook during the sentencing
hearing.
Based on Cook’s testimony, it was not clear error for the district court to
find that Skinner possessed a firearm in connection with the drug offense. Cook
testified that Skinner was present at a February 4, 2001, drug sale, where Cook
discussed purchasing a .357 revolver from Cotrell. Because she was present at that
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meeting, the inference drawn by the district court was that Skinner knew that Cook
could not purchase a gun legally and that he wanted the firearm for, among other
things, protection. Furthermore, she knew that Cotrell and Cook had arranged for
the .357 to be brought to their next meeting on February 12. At the February 12
meeting, Skinner carried a backpack and produced a .357 revolver with
ammunition from that backpack and handed it to Cotrell, who was seated next to
Cook at the time.
Skinner offered no testimony of her own to explain any of the events on
February 4 and February 12, and thus, it cannot be said that the district court
clearly erred by finding that Skinner knew that Cook wanted a firearm for
protection and could not obtain a firearm legally, knew that she was possessing a
weapon with ammunition at the time she entered the motel room to consummate a
drug transaction, and knew that the weapon was going to be sold at the moment she
handed the weapon to Cotrell. This is true even if the district court erred by
equating Skinner’s burden of proof under § 5C1.2 to § 2D1.1(b)(1). See, e.g.,
United States v. Bolka, 355 F.3d 909, 914-15 (6th Cir. 2004) (persuasively
explaining that application of § 2D1.1(b)(1) does not foreclose a safety-valve
reduction under § 5C1.2, but that the district court’s refusal to apply one was
harmless where the defendant failed to demonstrate entitlement to it, in any event).
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As we have acknowledged “a similar fact pattern may on occasion give rise
to two reasonable and different constructions. . . . As the Supreme Court has
recognized, a trial court’s choice between ‘two permissible views of the evidence’
is the very essence of the clear error standard of review.” United States v. De
Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 942 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Skinner failed to offer any
evidence to meet her burden of proof, and the testimony she relies upon reasonably
supports the district court’s conclusion that she possessed a firearm “in connection
with” the offense, whether such a finding required “mere possession” (which even
she admits she had) or “facilitation.” The district court reasonably could have
concluded that the firearm sold facilitated a relationship with a known drug dealer,
or, at the very least, a known buyer, thus constituting an overt act in furtherance of
the conspiracy to distribute drugs. As such, the district court did not clearly err by
denying Skinner the benefit of a safety-valve reduction under § 5C1.2. Lastly, to
the extent Skinner argues that the court should have considered her intent, the plain
language of § 5C1.2, does not require any proof of intent, only possession of the
firearm “in connection with” the offense.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err
by finding that Skinner possessed a firearm in connection with the offense and,
therefore, did not err by denying Skinner the benefit of the safety-valve provisions
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of U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. We, therefore, affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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