John Ruddin Brown v. Lisa Johnson , 199 F. App'x 876 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
October 10, 2006
No. 06-11501 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-00071-CV-6
JOHN RUDDIN BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LISA JOHNSON,
DOCTOR PRESNELL,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
_________________________
(October 10, 2006)
Before MARCUS, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
John Ruddin Brown, a Georgia prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma
pauperis, appeals the denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction. He argues
that the district court abused its discretion by finding, without holding an
evidentiary hearing, that prison officials were complying with an extant injunction
to provide Brown adequate medical care. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Brown suffers from HIV, Hepatitis C, and a skin disorder. In 2003, Brown
filed an action against his doctor and the Medical Administrator for the Georgia
State Prison for their alleged deliberate indifference to Brown’s serious medical
needs. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After this Court reinstated Brown’s complaint following
its dismissal, see Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2004), the district
court entered a preliminary injunction that required prison officials to provide
Brown with “proper medical treatment for his HIV, Heptatis C, and skin disorder.”
The district court enjoined the prison officials to (1) transport Brown to Augusta
State Medical Prison to be seen by Dr. Presnell; (2) provide Brown with his
prescribed HIV and Hepatitis C medications, Benadryl and Dove soap for his skin
condition, and any other necessary medicine; and (3) provide Brown with any
other care or treatments recommended by specialists or other physicians.
In June 2005, Brown filed a motion for a second preliminary injunction that
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requested the same relief as his first motion for an injunction. Brown accused the
prison officials of continuing to deny proper medication and treatment, and the
prison officials responded that they were in compliance with the extant injunction.
The prison officials filed an affidavit by Dr. Tommy Lee Jones who averred that
his clinic provided holistic care for Brown and that Brown received all the
medication he had been prescribed. The prison officials also submitted Brown’s
medical records, which corroborated Jones’s affidavit. The district court denied
Brown’s motion for an injunction. Over the next few months, Brown continued to
move for more preliminary injunctions based upon his earlier contentions that the
defendants were not complying with the preliminary injunction entered by the
district court.
On February 1, 2006, the district court denied Brown’s third motion for an
injunction, which had been filed on January 28, 2006. Brown renewed his motion
for a preliminary injunction the same day and, later that month, filed a notice of
appeal. Because Brown mailed his notice of appeal before the district court could
deny his February 1, 2006 motion, we consider his appeal to be from the denial of
his January 28, 2006 motion.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Two standards of review are relevant to this appeal. First, we review a
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denial of a preliminary injunction for an abuse of discretion. See Sierra Club v.
Georgia Power Co., 180 F.3d 1309, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999). Second, we review our
subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316,
1319 (11th Cir. 2001).
III. DISCUSSION
Brown argues that the district court erred when it denied his motion without
granting Brown an evidentiary hearing. We disagree. Whether we construe
Brown’s motion as a motion for a successive preliminary injunction or as a motion
to hold the defendants in contempt, Brown’s appeal fails.
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Brown’s motion
for a preliminary injunction to enforce an earlier injunction. “[T]he proper method
of enforcing [an injunction] is not a ‘motion to enforce’ or similar plea for the
court to ‘do something’ about a violation of the [injunction].” Thomason v.
Russell Corp. 132 F.3d 632, 634 n.4 (11th Cir. 1998). “Precedent dictates that a
plaintiff seeking to obtain the defendant's compliance with the provisions of an
injunctive order move the court to issue an order requiring the defendant to show
cause why he should not be held in contempt and sanctioned for his
noncompliance.” Wyatt v. Rogers 92 F.3d 1074, 1078 n.8 (11th Cir. 1996).
Even if we were to construe Brown’s pro se motion for a preliminary
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injunction liberally, see Jackson v. Reese, 608 F.3d 159, 160 (11th Cir. 1979), and
treat it as a motion for the district court to order that prison officials show cause as
to why they should not be held in civil contempt, Brown’s appeal would fail
because we would lack jurisdiction to review it. Our jurisdiction extends to
appeals from a limited class of interlocutory orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292, but that
class does not include an order denying a motion for civil contempt. “[T]he denial
of a motion for civil contempt may only be appealed after the conclusion of the
principal action rather than in its course.” New York State Urban Development
Corp. v. VSL Corp., 738 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1984). Cf. Combs v. Ryan's Coal
Co., Inc., 785 F.2d 970, 976 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Generally a finding of civil
contempt is not reviewable on interlocutory appeal.”).
IV. CONCLUSION
The denial of Brown’s motion is AFFIRMED.
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