Alonzo Austin v. City of Tuskegee , 335 F. App'x 856 ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 30, 2009
No. 08-14912 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00754-CV-T-E
ALONZO AUSTIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF TUSKEGEE, AL,
JOHNNY FORD, Mayor,
ALBERT BULLS, III, Municipal Court Judge,
LESTER PATRICK, Police Chief,
R. KEITH THOMAS, Prosecutor,
in their individual and official capacity,
et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
_________________________
(June 30, 2009)
Before BARKETT, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Alonzo Austin, proceeding without the benefit of
counsel, appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment on his
§ 1983 claim that his constitutional rights were violated by an allegedly
illegitimate traffic stop and conviction for driving 55 mph in a 45 mph zone. On
appeal, Austin argues that there was a “jury question” as to whether he was
actually speeding which entitled him to a jury trial and that therefore his conviction
and “the $120.00 in fines imposed upon him by the Municipal Court Judge . . . for
allegedly speeding” violated his right to due process. Accordingly, Austin asserts
that his conviction is invalid and seeks the recovery of the $120.00 fine as
damages.
Reviewing this § 1983 claim de novo and viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to Austin, Cruz v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 428 F.3d 1379, 1382
(11th Cir. 2005), we conclude that it is barred by the United States Supreme
Court’s ruling in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The Supreme Court
held in Heck that
[T]o recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or
imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed
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on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28
U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a
conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not
cognizable under § 1983.
Id. at 486-87. Thus, a plaintiff in a civil suit alleging facts which challenge the
fundamental legality of a conviction cannot bring an action under § 1983 without
proving that the subject conviction has been invalidated. In this case, a judgment
in favor of Austin would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction for
speeding. See Abusaid v. Hillsborough County Bd. of County Com’rs, 405 F.3d
1298, 1315 (11th Cir. 2005). Hence, Austin’s claims are not cognizable under
§ 1983 because his speeding conviction has not been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged, invalidated by a tribunal, or questioned by a writ of habeas corpus.
AFFIRM.
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