Donald H. Kimball v. Better Business Bureau of West Florida , 613 F. App'x 821 ( 2015 )


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  •              Case: 13-15286    Date Filed: 06/02/2015   Page: 1 of 9
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 13-15286
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 4:13-cv-00171-HLM
    DONALD H. KIMBALL,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU OF WEST FLORIDA,
    BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU OF METRO ATLANTA,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (June 2, 2015)
    Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Donald Kimball appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint for
    failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Kimball filed the instant
    complaint against the Better Business Bureaus of West Florida (“WFL”) and
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    Atlanta (“ATL”) (collectively, the “BBBs”) in Paulding County, Georgia Superior
    Court, raising state law claims of libel, slander, defamation per se, breach of
    contract, and civil conspiracy. WFL removed the complaint to federal district
    court, claiming that Kimball had fraudulently joined ATL to defeat complete
    diversity and, thereby, evade federal diversity jurisdiction.       The district court
    agreed, applied the fraudulent joinder doctrine, and held that it possessed diversity
    jurisdiction over Kimball’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). On
    appeal, Kimball argues that he did not fraudulently join ATL because he had viable
    state law claims against it based on the role it played in the conduct giving rise to
    his claims. After careful review, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.
    We review subject matter jurisdiction de novo.          Triggs v. John Crump
    Toyota, Inc., 
    154 F.3d 1284
    , 1287 (11th Cir. 1998). The district courts have
    original jurisdiction over “all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds
    the sum or value of $75,000 . . . and is between . . . citizens of different States.” 28
    U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). “A civil case filed in state court may be removed by the
    defendant to federal court if the case could have been brought originally in federal
    court.” 
    Triggs, 154 F.3d at 1287
    ; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). If a case is
    removed to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction, the federal district court
    must remand the case back to state court if complete diversity between the parties
    does not exist. Stillwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
    663 F.3d 1329
    , 1332 (11th Cir. 2011).
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    Under the fraudulent joinder doctrine, however, when a plaintiff names a
    non-diverse defendant solely to defeat federal diversity jurisdiction, the district
    court must ignore the presence of the non-diverse defendant and deny any motion
    to remand the case to state court. Id.; see also Florence v. Crescent Res., LLC, 
    484 F.3d 1293
    , 1297 (11th Cir. 2007). The fraudulent joinder doctrine applies when
    “(1) there is no possibility the plaintiff could establish a cause of action against the
    resident [i.e., non-diverse] defendant; or (2) the plaintiff has fraudulently pled
    jurisdictional facts to bring the resident defendant into state court.” 
    Stillwell, 663 F.3d at 1332
    (quotation omitted). The removing party must prove the fraudulent
    joinder doctrine’s applicability by clear and convincing evidence. 
    Id. To assess
    whether a plaintiff may establish a claim against a non-diverse
    defendant, the court must evaluate factual allegations in the light most favorable to
    the plaintiff. 
    Id. at 1333.
    The court should not weigh the merits of the plaintiff’s
    claims beyond determining whether they are arguable under state law, and should
    resolve uncertainties about state substantive law in the plaintiff’s favor. 
    Id. If there
    is even a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a
    claim against any of the non-diverse defendants, then the joinder was proper and
    the federal court must remand the case to the state court. 
    Id. Notably, the
    standard for assessing fraudulent joinder differs from the one
    used for Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss: Rule 12(b)(6)’s “plausibility standard
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    asks [federal courts] for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
    unlawfully.”   
    Id. (quotation omitted).
        However, “[n]othing in our precedents
    concerning fraudulent joinder requires anything more than conclusory allegations
    or a certain level of factual specificity” to show the possibility of a viable state
    claim. 
    Id. at 1334.
    “All that is required are allegations sufficient to establish even
    a possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of action
    against any one of the resident defendants.” 
    Id. (quotation omitted).
    Further, to
    determine whether a state court would find that the complaint states a cause of
    action, federal courts “necessarily look to the pleading standards applicable in state
    court, not the plausibility pleading standards prevailing in federal court.” 
    Id. Georgia courts
    employ a “notice pleading standard,” under which a plaintiff
    may plead conclusions, and those conclusions “‘may be considered in determining
    whether a complaint sufficiently states a claim for relief.’” 
    Id. (quoting Guthrie
    v.
    Monumental Props., Inc., 
    232 S.E.2d 369
    , 371 (Ga. Ct. App. 1977)). Georgia
    courts will not grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
    unless (1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the
    claimant would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts
    asserted in support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant
    could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the
    complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought.
    Sherman v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Assessors, 
    701 S.E.2d 472
    , 474 (Ga. 2010)
    (quotations omitted); see also 
    Stillwell, 663 F.3d at 1334
    n.3 (citing Sherman, 701
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    of 9 S.E.2d at 474
    ). In Georgia, a complaint need not set forth all of the elements of a
    cause of action as long as, within the framework of the complaint, evidence may be
    introduced to sustain a grant of relief to the plaintiff. Scott v. Scott, 
    716 S.E.2d 809
    , 811 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011). “The true test [under Georgia’s pleading standard]
    is whether the pleading gives fair notice and states the elements of the claim
    plainly and succinctly, and not whether as an abstract matter it states conclusions
    or facts.” 
    Stillwell, 663 F.3d at 1334
    (quotation omitted). Moreover, Georgia
    courts construe pro se complaints liberally and will dismiss a pro se plaintiff’s
    “claims only if [he] cannot prove any facts that would entitle him to relief.” Seay
    v. Roberts, 
    620 S.E.2d 417
    , 418 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
    The elements of a Georgia breach-of-contract claim are the “subject matter
    of the contract, consideration, and mutual assent by all parties to all contract
    terms.” Broughton v. Johnson, 
    545 S.E.2d 370
    , 371 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (citing
    O.C.G.A. § 13-3-1). “The elements of a right to recover for a breach of contract
    are the breach and the resultant damages to the party who has the right to complain
    about the contract being broken.” Budget Rent-a-Car of Atlanta, Inc. v. Webb, 
    469 S.E.2d 712
    , 713 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (quotation omitted).
    Under Georgia law, libel is “a false and malicious defamation of another,
    expressed in print, writing, pictures, or signs, tending to injure the reputation of the
    person and exposing him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule.” O.C.G.A. § 51-
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    5-1(a).   In Georgia, a viable cause of action for defamation, including libel,
    “consists of (1) a false and defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff; (2) an
    unprivileged communication to a third party; (3) fault by the defendant amounting
    at least to negligence; and (4) special harm or the actionability of the statement
    irrespective of special harm.” See Saye v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 
    670 S.E.2d 818
    , 821 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (quotation omitted). A plaintiff must also prove that
    the statement was published. See O.C.G.A. § 51-5-1(b); see also 
    Saye, 670 S.E.2d at 821
    . Publication means communicating the defamatory statement to anyone
    other than the person being defamed; however, there is an exception for
    “intracorporate, or between members of unincorporated groups or associations, and
    heard by one who, because of his/her duty or authority has reason to receive
    information.” 
    Saye, 670 S.E.2d at 823
    (quotation and alterations omitted). In
    Georgia, moreover, “an individual may have a cause of action for defamatory
    statements made about a company when it is known that he is the owner of the
    company and his name is a component part of the company name.” WMH, Inc. v.
    Thomas, 392 S.E.3d 539, 544 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990), rev’d in part on other grounds,
    
    398 S.E.2d 196
    (Ga. 1990).
    In Georgia, a civil conspiracy occurs when two or more persons combine
    either to do some act which is a tort, or else to do some lawful act by
    methods which constitute a tort. Where it is sought to impose civil liability
    for a conspiracy, the conspiracy of itself furnishes no cause of action. The
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    gist of the action, if a cause of action exists, is not the conspiracy alleged,
    but the tort committed against the plaintiff and the resulting damage.
    Savannah Coll. of Art & Design, Inc. v. Sch. of Visual Arts of Savannah Inc., 
    464 S.E.2d 895
    , 896 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995) (quotations omitted).
    A thorough review of Kimball’s complaint reveals a viable breach of
    contract claim against ATL under Georgia’s easier pleading standards. In the
    complaint, Kimball alleged that: (1) a contract existed between himself
    individually and ATL; (2) the contract contained the necessary elements, including
    consideration and a mutual agreement to terms (i.e., Kimball received his
    membership, which generated revenue for ATL, in exchange for a promise to
    report accurately); (3) ATL breached the contract (i.e. the promise to report
    accurately) by issuing a false report concerning the LLC; and (4) his business was
    damaged by ATL’s allegedly false report (i.e., once WFL posted a fraudulent F
    rating and ATL republished the F rating, Kimball noticed a decline in the number
    of calls turning into sales following those events). The fact that these allegations
    were conclusory or contained factual gaps does not matter for purposes of
    Georgia’s notice pleading standards, since Kimball could conceivably have
    introduced evidence within the framework of his complaint establishing that he
    was entitled to relief. Moreover, Kimball’s statement that he did not request relief
    for his breach of contract claim is not fatal to his claim. Construed liberally, this
    statement conveyed that he did not seek monetary damages for the breach of
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    contract claim; however, he still sought other general relief that could conceivably
    have related to this claim. For instance, Kimball asked that the BBBs, including
    ATL, retract the allegedly false report and post an apology for one year.
    Kimball’s complaint likewise contains a possible claim for libel against
    ATL. Kimball alleged that WFL published a fraudulent F rating of the LLC on its
    website, which harmed his business reputation, and WFL refused to remove the
    rating even after Kimball pointed out that no complaints had been filed against his
    business and the rating was, therefore, unwarranted. He also alleged that ATL
    republished that same unwarranted rating. Again, while Kimball’s complaint may
    have gaps with respect to this claim, it is possible that, within the framework of the
    complaint, he could produce evidence showing he is entitled to relief. Indeed, he
    may be able to show that (1) the rating was unwarranted; (2) ATL’s republication
    of the allegedly unwarranted F rating amounted to negligence or ATL was aware
    that the rating was unwarranted; and (3) one or more specific business deals fell
    through as a result of the allegedly fraudulent rating, showing damages.
    Furthermore, the complaint, construed liberally, contains sufficient
    allegations for libel against ATL in particular: Kimball alleged (1) early in the
    complaint, that the F rating was fraudulent and that ATL republished the fraudulent
    rating on its website, and (2) later in the complaint, that Claim 1 (the libel claim)
    incorporated by reference all previous allegations. As for the BBBs’ argument that
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    Kimball lacked standing to bring a defamation claim on behalf of the LLC,
    Georgia law does not conclusively preclude this claim. Since Kimball’s company
    name was comprised of his initials, he may have a cause of action for defamation
    under Georgia law.
    What’s more, Kimball’s complaint states a possible civil conspiracy claim
    against ATL under Georgia’s notice pleading standard.             Kimball specifically
    alleged that WFL “enlist[ed]” ATL into a conspiracy to substitute ATL’s A+ rating
    with the fraudulent F rating. Although Kimball’s complaint does not identify an
    underlying tort for the conspiracy, construed liberally, it alleges a conspiracy to
    commit libel. As we’ve noted, Kimball might be able to introduce evidence
    showing that ATL knew of the allegedly defamatory nature of the F rating, but
    agreed to publish it nonetheless.
    In short, because ATL has not established that Kimball could not possibly
    introduce evidence within the framework of his complaint sufficient to warrant a
    grant of the relief sought in state court, Kimball had viable claims under Georgia
    law against ATL. As a result, the district court erred in applying the fraudulent
    joinder doctrine to determine that it had diversity jurisdiction. Accordingly, we
    vacate the district court’s dismissal of Kimball’s complaint and remand the case
    with instructions that the district court remand Kimball’s complaint to state court.
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
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