Marcus Anderson v. Brown Industries , 614 F. App'x 415 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-13037
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:11-cv-00225-HLM
MARCUS ANDERSON,
Plaintiff-
Counter Defendant-
Appellant,
versus
BROWN INDUSTRIES,
Defendant-
Counter Claimant-
Appellee,
MARTY WALKER, et al.,
Defendants-
Counter Claimants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(June 8, 2015)
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Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Marcus Anderson, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals
following the district court’s denial of his post-trial motions for judgment as a
matter of law, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b), and new trial, under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a), after the jury returned a verdict in favor of
Brown Industries (Brown) on Anderson’s hostile work environment claims,
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, and
42 U.S.C. § 1981. Anderson raises several issues on appeal, which we address in
turn. After review, we affirm the district court.
I. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to amend complaint
Anderson first appeals the district court’s denial of his untimely motion to
amend his complaint to add a retaliatory hostile work environment claim. In
Gowski v. Peake, this Court recognized for the first time a cause of action for
retaliatory hostile work environment. 682 F.3d 1299, 1311-12 (11th Cir. 2012).
We noted that every other circuit had previously recognized such a claim, and that
it was consistent with Title VII’s text and remedial goal, congressional intent, and
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s own interpretation of Title VII.
Id.2
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A party seeking to amend his complaint, after having previously amended
it as of right, may do so only with the opposing party’s written consent or leave of
court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Rule 15 instructs that such leave should be freely
given when justice so requires. Id. Where the motion for leave to amend is filed
after the scheduling order’s deadline for such motions, however, the party must
show good cause why leave to amend should be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4);
Smith v. Sch. Bd. of Orange Cnty., 487 F.3d 1361, 1366 (11th Cir. 2007).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Anderson’s
untimely motion for leave to amend the complaint to add a retaliatory hostile work
environment claim. See Smith, 487 F.3d at 1366 (reviewing the denial of a motion
for leave to amend a complaint for abuse of discretion). Anderson filed his motion
approximately eight months after the scheduling order’s deadline for motions to
amend the pleadings, and did not provide any justification for his untimely request.
As the district court noted, Gowski was decided nearly six months before Anderson
filed his motion for leave to amend, during which time Anderson had ample
opportunity to discover and raise that issue. See Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury
Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1232 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating in order to satisfy
Rule 16’s good cause standard, the party must show diligence in pursuing his
claims). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Anderson’s motion.
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B. Judicial Estoppel
Anderson appeals the denial of his post-trial motions for judgment as a
matter of law and new trial for several reasons. First, Anderson contends the
district court improperly applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel to bar him from
asserting that Josh Cox, his alleged harasser, was not his supervisor, and that the
Faragher-Ellerth 1 affirmative defense was therefore inapplicable. Anderson
asserts his change in position regarding Cox’s supervisory status resulted from an
intervening change in controlling law, namely, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Vance v. Ball State University, 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013), which held that, for
purposes of the Faragher-Ellerth defense, a supervisor is someone with the
authority to take tangible employment actions against the plaintiff. Additionally,
Anderson asserts the necessary elements of judicial estoppel were not met.
The purpose of judicial estoppel is to protect the integrity of the judicial
process by preventing parties from taking inconsistent positions according to the
exigencies of the moment. Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d 1269, 1273
(11th Cir. 2010) (citing New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001)). In
New Hampshire v. Maine, the Supreme Court identified three factors that generally
inform when judicial estoppel may be invoked: (1) whether the present position is
1
The Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense is derived from the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), and Burlington Indus. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
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clearly inconsistent with the prior position; (2) whether the party persuaded the
court to accept the earlier position, such that acceptance of the inconsistent position
would create a perception that the court was misled; and (3) whether the party
advancing the inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an
unfair detriment on the opposing party. 532 U.S. at 750-51.
We employ a two-factor inquiry, requiring a showing that (1) the allegedly
inconsistent positions were made under oath in a prior proceeding, and (2) the
inconsistencies were calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system.
Robinson, 595 F.3d at 1273. We have held that our two-factor approach is
consistent with the principles announced in New Hampshire v. Maine. Burnes v.
Pemco Aeroplex, 291 F.3d 1282, 1285-86 (11th Cir. 2002). To show that a party
intended to make a mockery of the judicial system, we require that the
contradicting positions be intentional, not merely inadvertent. Robinson, 595 F.3d
at 1275.
As an initial matter, we have not addressed the question of whether judicial
estoppel is appropriate when the party alleges that its change in position is based
on an intervening change in controlling law. However, we need not decide that
issue here because Vance does not constitute an intervening change in controlling
law for purposes of this case. Vance was decided on June 24, 2013, nine months
prior to the commencement of trial in this case on March 24, 2014. Thus, both
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(1) Anderson’s representations that Cox was his supervisor in his trial testimony
and proposed jury instructions and (2) his current position that Cox was not his
supervisor, post-dated the Supreme Court’s decision in Vance. Accordingly,
Anderson’s change in position did not result from an intervening change in the
law, and his argument that judicial estoppel was inappropriate on that basis lacks
merit.
Moreover, Anderson does not prevail on his alternative argument that the
necessary elements of judicial estoppel were not met. Under the Supreme Court’s
three-factor approach, judicial estoppel was appropriate because Anderson’s
position at trial was clearly inconsistent with his position in his post-trial motions,
Anderson convinced the court to accept his earlier position, and Anderson would
derive an unfair benefit from being allowed to contest the jury’s verdict on a
ground that was available to him at trial, but that he merely failed to raise.
Likewise, under our two-factor inquiry, judicial estoppel was appropriate because
Anderson’s prior inconsistent position was made under oath, and it can be inferred
from the record that Anderson’s assertion of contradictory positions was
intentional, rather than inadvertent. Anderson failed to raise the Vance issue until
after the jury returned a verdict in Brown’s favor, despite the fact that Vance was
issued long before trial commenced and Anderson had raised other challenges to
the applicability of the Faragher-Ellerth defense. Accordingly, the district court
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did not abuse its discretion in applying judicial estoppel, and we affirm the denial
of Anderson’s post-trial motions on this ground. See Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1287(reviewing the applicability of judicial estoppel, an equitable doctrine invoked at
the court’s discretion, for abuse of discretion).
C. Jury instructions
Anderson asserts that district court erred in concluding he waived any
objection to the Faragher-Ellerth jury instruction because he objected to the
instruction, albeit on different grounds, in his pre-deliberation motion for directed
verdict. Anderson asserts this earlier objection was sufficient to preserve his post-
verdict challenge to Cox’s supervisory status, and Brown was not entitled to the
Faragher-Ellerth instruction as a matter of law because Cox was not a supervisor.
When a party fails to object to a jury instruction prior to jury deliberations,
that party waives its right to challenge the instruction on appeal, unless the party
made its position clear to the court previously and further objection would be
futile, or it is necessary to correct a fundamental error. Parker v. Scrap Metal
Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1018 (11th Cir. 2004).
The district court correctly concluded that Anderson waived any challenge
to the jury instruction regarding Cox’s supervisor status because Anderson
repeatedly testified that Cox was his supervisor, included a jury instruction to that
effect in his proposed jury instructions, and did not object to the district court’s
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instruction that he alleged that Cox was his supervisor. Accordingly, because
Anderson waived any objection to the instruction regarding Cox’s supervisor
status, and, as discussed above, is estopped from arguing that Cox was not his
supervisor, he cannot challenge the Faragher-Ellerth instruction on that basis.
D. Supervisor Status
Finally, Anderson contends that the district court erred in denying his post-
trial motions because there was insufficient evidence to support a jury finding that
Cox was his supervisor. Anderson asserts that no evidence at trial showed that
Cox was empowered to take tangible employment actions against him, and that the
court could not rely on his testimony to support its determination that there was
sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Cox was his supervisor.
As discussed above, the district court correctly concluded that Anderson was
judicially estopped from asserting that Cox was not his supervisor and waived any
challenge to the jury instruction regarding Cox’s supervisory status. Further,
Anderson invited the jury to conclude that Cox was his supervisor through his
testimony and proposed jury instructions, and should not now be allowed to
complain that the jury may have accepted his invitation in rendering its verdict.
See Pensacola Motor Sales, Inc. v. Eastern Shore Toyota, LLC, 684 F.3d 1211,
1231 (11th Cir. 2012) (“A party that invites an error cannot complain when its
invitation is accepted.”). To permit such a challenge would essentially allow
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Anderson to unfairly benefit from providing insufficient support for his own
position at trial and punish Brown for failing to provide evidence in support of a
position it never asserted. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of
Anderson’s post-trial motions. Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d 1278,
1287 (11th Cir. 2011) (reviewing for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for
new trial, and reviewing de novo the denial of a Rule 50(b) renewed motion for
judgment as a matter of law, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party).
II. CONCLUSION
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Anderson’s
untimely motion to amend because he failed to show good cause. Additionally, the
district court did not err in denying Anderson’s post-trial motions because
Anderson was estopped from challenging Cox’s supervisory status. Accordingly,
we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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