United States v. Chuck Wayne Boyd , 574 F. App'x 878 ( 2014 )


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  •            Case: 13-13799   Date Filed: 07/31/2014   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 13-13799
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-20914-WPD-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    CHUCK WAYNE BOYD,
    a.k.a. Dred,
    a.k.a. Jamaican,
    a.k.a. Bumble Bee,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (July 31, 2014)
    Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 13-13799     Date Filed: 07/31/2014   Page: 2 of 5
    Chuck Wayne Boyd appeals his total sentence of 300 months’
    imprisonment, imposed after he pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess
    with intent to distribute cocaine, crack cocaine, and marijuana, and one count of
    conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine. Boyd
    saw Julius Wade, a codefendant and a cooperating government witness, during an
    attorney visit at the jail where both men were incarcerated. It is undisputed that
    Boyd told Wade to “change [Wade’s] life,” and Boyd allegedly then said to Wade:
    “I got something for you for trying to rush out there to them hos.” On appeal,
    Boyd argues that the district court erred in applying a two-level enhancement for
    obstruction of justice based on these two statements.
    We review the district court’s findings of fact underlying an obstruction-of-
    justice enhancement for clear error, and the district court’s application of the
    factual findings to the sentencing guidelines are reviewed de novo. United States
    v. Doe, 
    661 F.3d 550
    , 565 (11th Cir. 2011). Under the clear-error standard, we
    “must affirm the district court unless review of the entire record leaves us with the
    definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v.
    McPhee, 
    336 F.3d 1269
    , 1275 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    We will not reverse the district court’s plausible fact findings even if we would
    have decided the case differently. 
    Id. Additionally, we
    give substantial deference
    to a district court’s credibility determinations. 
    Id. 2 Case:
    13-13799     Date Filed: 07/31/2014    Page: 3 of 5
    The Sentencing Guidelines provide a two-level enhancement for obstruction
    of justice if “the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to
    obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation,
    prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
    The enhancement is appropriate where the district court finds that the defendant
    “threaten[ed], intimidate[ed], or otherwise unlawfully influenc[ed] a co-defendant,
    witness, or juror, directly or indirectly, or attempt[ed] to do so.” 
    Id., cmt. n.
    4(A).
    In United States v. Rubio, we held that an obstruction-of-justice enhancement was
    appropriate based on the defendant’s assault on a witness after trial, rejecting
    Rubio’s argument that because the assault occurred after trial, it could not impact
    the prosecution of his case. 
    317 F.3d 1240
    , 1244–45 (11th Cir. 2003).
    On appeal, Boyd argues that the district court erred in imposing the
    obstruction-of-justice enhancement because the government failed to meet its
    burden of proving that the enhancement applied through reliable and specific
    evidence, and failed to show that Boyd acted with the purpose of obstructing
    justice. Any finding that Boyd’s statement to Wade—specifically, that Boyd had
    “something” for Wade—was intended as a threat against Wade or Wade’s family
    was based on speculation. Also, because Boyd made the statement several months
    after Wade had been debriefed and about a month after pleading guilty, Boyd’s
    3
    Case: 13-13799       Date Filed: 07/31/2014       Page: 4 of 5
    statements could not have been made in an attempt to influence Wade’s testimony
    or to obstruct justice.
    In response, the government argues that Boyd did not object to the
    application of the obstruction-of-justice enhancement on the ground that the
    district court erred in construing his remarks against Wade as a threat, and instead,
    argued before the district court that he had not threatened Wade at all and that,
    even if he did, he did not do so with the intent to obstruct justice. Further, having
    heard the differing accounts of the encounter between Boyd and Wade, the district
    court found that Boyd threatened Wade in retaliation for Wade’s cooperation with
    the government, and in light of the entire record Boyd has not shown that this
    determination was clear error. The obstruction-of-justice enhancement applies to
    the actual or attempted obstruction with respect to investigation, prosecution, or
    sentencing, see U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. , cmt. n. 4(A), and at the time Boyd confronted
    Wade, Boyd did not know whether Wade’s testimony would be used against him at
    sentencing. It is irrelevant whether Boyd’s statement actually obstructed justice,
    and the record fully supports the district court’s findings.
    Upon review, we find that the district court did not err in applying the
    obstruction-of-justice enhancement. 1 The district court found that both statements
    1
    As a preliminary matter, Boyd adequately presented the various grounds for his
    objection to the obstruction-of-justice enhancement to the district court to preserve the entire
    claim for appeal. The government argues that Boyd failed to specifically argue that his statement
    4
    Case: 13-13799        Date Filed: 07/31/2014       Page: 5 of 5
    were intended as threats against Wade, concluding that Wade’s testimony was
    believable and that another witness’s testimony, which indicated that Boyd did not
    intend to threaten Wade and that Boyd never made the second statement, was not
    credible. Here, there were two potentially permissible views of the evidence, and
    the district court’s determination, after hearing both Wade’s and Bradshaw’s
    testimonies firsthand, to adopt Wade’s version of events cannot be clearly
    erroneous. See 
    McPhee, 336 F.3d at 1275
    .
    Boyd’s argument regarding the timing of his statements to Wade is also
    unavailing. By its plain language, the obstruction-of-justice enhancement applies
    to any threats made against a witness during any stage of the proceedings,
    including sentencing. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 & cmt. n.4(A). Although Boyd had
    already entered into a plea agreement with the government at the time of the
    comments, he had not yet been sentenced, and the threat made against Wade could
    still have obstructed justice by impacting Boyd’s sentencing. See 
    Rubio, 317 F.3d at 1244
    –45. Accordingly, we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
    to Wade was too ambiguous to constitute a threat. However, the district court’s findings indicate
    that it clearly understood and specifically rejected Boyd’s alternative position that, regardless of
    what was said, Boyd did not intend to threaten Wade. See United States v. Siegel, 
    153 F.3d 1256
    , 1262–63 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that the district court’s response to an objection
    demonstrated that it was aware of defense counsel’s contention underlying the objection, such
    that the issue was properly preserved for appeal).
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-13799

Citation Numbers: 574 F. App'x 878

Judges: Anderson, Per Curiam, Tjoflat, Wilson

Filed Date: 7/31/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/31/2023