United States v. Washington , 151 F.3d 1354 ( 1998 )

PUBLISH
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 97-2146
FILED
--------------- U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
D. C. Docket No. 96-111-CR-J-99(S) ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
08/28/98
THOMAS K. KAHN
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CLERK
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILLIE WASHINGTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida
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(August 28, 1998)
Before COX and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge.
RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge:
In this warrantless search of passengers traveling on an interstate bus, the government
relies upon the consent of the searched passengers to obviate the need for a warrant. After the
district court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence obtained during the search, the
defendant was convicted at a bench trial of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The only issue before us is whether the consent given by the defendant for
the search was uncoerced and legally voluntary. We hold that it was not and vacate the
conviction. In the discussion of this case, we parallel our opinion in a similar a case heard by a
different panel, United States v. Guapi, 144 F.3d 1393 (11th Cir. 1998).
The federal agents conducting this search did not inform the passengers that they were
not required to consent to the search. Although we reject the notion of a per se rule requiring
bus passengers to be informed of their constitutional rights, the facts and circumstances of this
search required some indication to passengers that their cooperation was voluntary rather than
mandatory. Because no such indication was provided, and because a reasonable person traveling
on this bus would not have felt free to ignore the search request, we hold that this search was
unconstitutional.
For purposes of this appeal, we accept the findings of fact in the magistrate judge’s
report, and we interpret the record in the light most favorable to the government. At 6:50 on the
morning of August 5, 1996, two federal agents boarded a Greyhound bus making a scheduled
stop in Jacksonville, Florida. The bus was scheduled to depart at 7:00, and the driver was still in
the bus station. Special Agent Bruce Dean Savell of the Drug Enforcement Administration went
to the rear of the bus, and Agent James Andrew Perkins of the United States Border Patrol stood
at the front of the bus. Both agents were casually dressed, and their weapons were concealed in
fanny packs. Agent Perkins held his credentials and his badge over his head and made the
following announcement:
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. My partner and I are both federal agents
with the United States Department of Justice. No one is under arrest or anything
like that, we’re just conducting a routine bus check. When we get to you, if we
could please see your bus ticket, some photo identification if you have some with
you, please, and if you would please identify which bag[] is yours on the bus we’d
appreciate it and we’ll be out of your way just as quick as we can.
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Agent Perkins joined Agent Savell at the rear of the bus and they began making their way
forward, questioning passengers and asking them if they were carrying “drugs, weapons, large
sums of money or firearms.” The agents were careful to stand behind each passenger and not
block the aisles of the bus as they conducted their sweep. The record is unclear if any
passengers other than the defendant were actually searched.
Willie Washington was sitting in the rear half of the bus on the driver’s side. He was
sitting in a window seat, and the aisle seat next to him was vacant. When Agent Perkins reached
him, Washington handed Agent Perkins a one-way ticket from Miami to Bamberg, South
Carolina, and a Georgia driver’s license. When Agent Perkins asked the defendant where he
lived, the defendant informed him that he lived in Miami. Washington also informed the agents
that he was not carrying any contraband with him. When Agent Perkins asked the defendant to
identify his luggage, Washington indicated a maroon bag on his lap. Agent Perkins asked
Washington if he could search the maroon bag, and Washington told him that it was alright and
handed him the maroon bag.
As he handed the maroon bag to Agent Perkins, Washington reached over and retrieved a
white plastic bag from the floor and placed this bag on his lap. He hunched over his lap and
began moving his left hand under the plastic bag. Agent Perkins was suspicious of
Washington’s behavior. He asked Washington if Agent Savell could search the maroon bag, and
when the defendant consented, he handed the maroon bag to Agent Savell, who was standing
behind Agent Perkins. Agent Perkins asked Washington what was in the white plastic bag.
Washington told him that it contained potato chips and a soda. Agent Perkins asked for consent
to search the white plastic bag, and Washington handed it to him. Washington continued to
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crouch over, covering his lap as he gave Agent Perkins the white plastic bag. Agent Perkins then
noticed a tubular bulge extending underneath Washington’s pants beyond the normal length of a
pants pocket. Agent Perkins asked Washington if he could search his person, and Washington
consented. Agent Perkins felt the bulge underneath Washington’s pants and found the bulge to
be consistent with previous seizures of cocaine and heroin he had made. He also noticed other
similar bulges concealed underneath Washington’s pants. At this point, Agent Perkins placed
Washington under arrest and escorted him off the bus. After conducting a more thorough search
outside the bus, Agent Savell discovered $3,500 worth of powder cocaine in six tubular packages
concealed in a homemade “apron” Washington wore underneath his pants.
In Florida v. Bostick, the Supreme Court reversed a Florida Supreme Court decision
which adopted a per se rule prohibiting police from randomly boarding buses and questioning
passengers as a means of drug interdiction. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991). The
Supreme Court had previously held that the Fourth Amendment permits officers to approach
individuals at random in airport lobbies and other public places to ask questions and to request
consent to search their luggage, so long as a reasonable person would understand that he or she
could refuse to cooperate. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502 (1983); United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). In Bostick, the Court simply held that the rule applies
equally to police encounters that take place on buses. It rejected the “free to leave” rubric that
has been articulated for street encounters because a passenger may well not want to leave the bus
because he or she wants to go when the bus goes, so that factors other than the police encounter
would dilute the application of the “free to leave” determination. It held that the appropriate
inquiry is whether under “all the circumstances surrounding the encounter . . . the police conduct
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would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the
officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” Id. at 439 (1991). It held that the
fact the encounter is in the cramped confines of a bus is but one factor to be taken into
consideration, rather than the sole consideration given by the Florida court.
In Bostick, the Supreme Court found two facts “particularly worth noting. First, the
police specifically advised Bostick that he had the right to refuse consent. . . . Second, at no time
did the officers threaten Bostick with a gun.” Bostick, 501 U.S. at 432. In this case, although
Agent Perkins did not threaten Washington with a gun, he also did not inform Washington that
he had a right to refuse consent. In both of our reported bus search cases prior to Quapi, the
police officers involved also specifically informed individual passengers that they had a right to
refuse any search and that cooperation with law enforcement efforts was voluntary. United States
v. Fields, 909 F.2d 470, 472 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Hammock, 860 F.2d 390, 392
(11th Cir. 1988).
The Supreme Court has steadfastly rejected the notion of imposing per se rules on police
officers conducting warrantless searches. See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 421 (1996);
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435-37 (1991). The Court has specifically rejected the notion that police
officers must always inform citizens of their right to refuse when seeking permission to conduct
a warrantless consent search. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973). It is
enough that the circumstances themselves would indicate that the search can proceed only if
consent is given. Looking at the circumstances of this case, we feel that a reasonable person in
the defendant’s position would not have felt free to disregard Agent Perkins’ requests without
some positive indication that consent could have been refused.
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The Constitution does not permit police officers, without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion, to restrain the liberty of American citizens. The well-established test is that if, by
physical force or show of authority, a reasonable citizen would not believe that he is free to
ignore police questioning and go about his business, he has been unconstitutionally seized.
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (“Only when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen
may we conclude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.”). There is no doubt in this case that the
encounter began with a “show of authority,” because Agent Perkins held his badge above his
head and identified himself as a federal agent. He announced what he wanted the passengers to
do, and what he was going to do. Absent some positive indication that they were free not to
cooperate, it is doubtful a passenger would think he or she had the choice to ignore the police
presence. Most citizens, we hope, believe that it is their duty to cooperate with the police.
Unlike the searches in Robinette and Schneckloth, in this case the agents conducting the
search stated no legitimate reason to detain any passengers on the bus. In both Robinette and
Schneckloth, police obtained consent to search a vehicle only after lawfully detaining the
occupants pursuant to a traffic stop. See Robinette, 117 S. Ct. at 421; Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at
220.
It seems obvious to us that if police officers genuinely want to ensure that their
encounters with bus passengers remain absolutely voluntary, they can simply say so. Without
such notice in this case, we do not feel a reasonable person would have felt able to decline the
agents’ requests.
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At the suppression hearing, the defendant here testified that “in a way I was like about a
citizen, like respect the police. If they ask you for something, order, I was following they order,
just being a citizen, respecting the law.” While we understand that the test is objective, a
reasonable person sitting in the defendant’s position should feel the same way. This search,
conducted in the cramped quarters of an interstate bus, was consciously designed to take full
advantage of a coercive environment. A federal agent boarded a bus, held a badge over his head,
and asked to see the defendant’s ticket and identification. Then the agent asked to search the
defendant’s belongings and person. Under these circumstances, the typical bus passenger would
not feel free to refuse the requests, but would consider these “requests” to be orders backed by
the full force of the United States government. Therefore, we hold that this search violated the
Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
BLACK, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
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In my view, the majority opinion establishes a per se rule that authorities must notify bus
passengers of the right to refuse consent before questioning those passengers and asking for
consent to search luggage. The Supreme Court has consistently rejected per se rules in the
Fourth Amendment context. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996),
and Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991). In Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439-40,
111 S. Ct. at 2389, the Supreme Court noted that Fourth Amendment challenges are judged by
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter and accordingly determined that the
Florida Supreme Court erred by adopting a per se rule that searches are unconstitutional solely
because they take place within the confines of a bus. In Robinette, the Court rejected a per se
rule that officers must inform a lawfully seized defendant of his right to refuse before asking for
consent to search his vehicle as antithetical to the “traditional contextual approach.” Robinette,
519 U.S. at __, 117 S. Ct. at 421. Although it acknowledges the Supreme Court’s admonition
against per se rules, I suggest the majority opinion conflicts with that principle.
The majority draws a parallel between this case and United States v. Guapi, 144 F.3d
1393 (11th Cir. 1998), another bus search case. In that case, the bus driver informed the
passengers, as the bus made a scheduled stop, that they would be required to exit the bus
temporarily. Before the passengers could do so, two officers boarded the bus. One of the
officers was in uniform. The uniformed officer announced that they wished to check on-board
cargo for contraband and announced to the passengers that he would like for them to open their
on-board luggage for visual inspection. The uniformed officer began conducting the searches
from the front of the bus. The officer blocked the aisle as he conducted the searches, so
passengers who had not been searched did not have a clear path to exit the bus. While the
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uniformed officer conducted the searches, the second officer remained at the front of the bus.
The Guapi Court determined that a reasonable person in the position of the defendant in that case
would not feel free to refuse consent to search his luggage. The Court accordingly held that the
search was conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment. I agree with the Guapi Court’s
conclusion. The totality of the circumstances in that case created the impression that a passenger
would be prevented from exiting the bus until he complied with the officers’ request to search
his luggage.
This case presents facts that are very different from those in Guapi. In this case, the
officers conducted the search from the back of the bus moving forward, thereby leaving the aisle
free for ingress and egress. Neither of the officers was in uniform. Both officers remained
behind the passengers as they questioned them. There was no law enforcement officer at the
front of the bus. Furthermore, the officers asked each passenger only for his ticket and
identification; both of those items were returned immediately to the passenger after inspection.
The officers asked Washington individually for consent to search his luggage; there was no
instruction for all passengers to open their luggage and no indication that compliance was a
requirement for egress from the bus.
Short of telling the passengers of the right to refuse consent, it is difficult to conceive of
any actions these officers could have taken to make this search any more reasonable. With this
case as precedent, it is not clear that there will ever be any set of circumstances under which this
Court can uphold a bus search if the officers do not inform the passengers of the right to refuse
consent. In my view, the majority opinion makes notification of the right to refuse consent a
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requirement for a valid bus search. Although this may be a good policy, it departs from the
spirit, if not the letter, of Bostick and Robinette. For this reason, I respectfully dissent.
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