[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FEB 12 2001
No. 98-5915
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 90-06036-CR-JAG
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GABRIEL ALVARO SCAFF MARTINEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(February 12, 2001)
Before BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges, and DOWD*, District Judge.
_______________________
*Honorable David D. Dowd, Jr., U.S. District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio,
sitting by designation.
WILSON, Circuit Judge:
Gabriel Scaff Martinez appeals the district court’s denial of his Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure 41(e) (“Rule 41(e)”) motion for return of property.
Martinez’s appeal raises an issue of first impression in our Circuit: Can a district
court exercise equitable jurisdiction over a Rule 41(e) motion filed after criminal
proceedings have ended? Our answer is “yes.” Because the district court
erroneously denied Martinez’s motion without contemplating exercising equitable
jurisdiction, we vacate the district court’s order and remand for further
proceedings.
I. BACKGROUND
The United States government confiscated Gabriel Scaff Martinez’s car and
gun, along with some miscellaneous personal effects, when it arrested him for a
federal drug-related offense in 1990. The government charged Martinez with six
separate federal crimes, and a jury found him guilty of five of the six counts in
1992. The district court then sentenced Martinez to 295 months of imprisonment
to be followed by five years of supervised release. We affirmed Martinez’s
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conviction and sentence in 1995. See United States v. Lozano-Ceron,
47 F.3d 429
(11th Cir. 1995) (Table).
Three years later, and eight years after his conviction, Martinez filed a Rule
41(e) motion for the return of his property.1 In his Rule 41(e) motion, Martinez
requested that the government return his car, gun, and personal effects, which he
valued in the aggregate at $10,000. The government responded to Martinez’s
motion by stating that it had properly seized the car as property used in connection
with illegal drug activity, and that at any rate it had appropriately returned the car
to the financing company that held title. The government further maintained that it
had returned Martinez’s personal effects to Juan Botero, a representative of
Martinez’s counsel, and that the DEA permissibly retained Martinez’s gun after
introducing it as evidence at trial.
The government offered several legal reasons why the district court should
not order the government to return Martinez’s property. Most important for
purposes of this appeal, the government argued that the district court could not
exercise equitable jurisdiction over Martinez’s motion. A magistrate judge
considered Martinez’s motion, and recommended denying Martinez’s Rule 41(e)
1
In the interim, Martinez filed a pro se motion under
28 U.S.C. § 2255, which is not
relevant to our inquiry, although it may factor into the district court’s statute of limitations
analysis on remand.
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motion “for the reasons set forth in the Government’s response filed October 28,
1998.” The district court accepted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, thereby
denying Martinez’s Rule 41(e) motion. Martinez now appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
We review de novo a district court’s determination that it lacks the authority
to exercise equitable jurisdiction, as this is purely a question of law. See, e.g.,
Capital Factors, Inc. v. Empire For Him, Inc.,
1 F.3d 1156, 1159 (11th Cir. 1993)
(per curiam) (reviewing de novo the scope of a bankruptcy court’s equitable
powers).
Rule 41(e) provides that a “person aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure or by the deprivation of property may move the district court for the district
in which the property was seized for the return of the property on the ground that
such person is entitled to lawful possession of the property.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
41(e). The procedural posture of Martinez’s Rule 41(e) motion is somewhat
unusual, because Martinez filed his Rule 41(e) motion after the criminal
proceedings against him had been concluded. The novel question presented by this
unusual circumstance is whether the district court had jurisdiction to consider
Martinez’s motion, even though all criminal proceedings against Martinez had
ended.
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We have never addressed this exact issue. We have, however, suggested
that equitable relief may be available in a context similar to a Rule 41(e) motion.
See, e.g., United States v. Eubanks,
169 F.3d 672, 674 (11th Cir. 1999) (per
curiam) (affirming the dismissal of a Rule 41(e) motion for return of property
while stating that exercise of equitable discretion to review agency forfeiture
decisions may be appropriate “under limited circumstances”); In re $67,470.00,
901 F.2d 1540, 1545 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that equitable jurisdiction “might be
appropriate when a petitioner’s failure to properly seek legal relief resulted from
errors of procedure and form or the government’s own misconduct . . . .”); United
States v. Castro,
883 F.2d 1018, 1020 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (“Although
granting Defendant's Rule 41(e) Motion may be inappropriate here, this Court is
not without the power to fashion a remedy under its inherent equitable authority.”).
Additionally, while we are without precise guidance from within our circuit,
caselaw from several other circuits does shed light on the issue before us. Six
other circuits have explicitly stated that district courts can assert jurisdiction to
entertain Rule 41(e) motions made after the termination of criminal proceedings
against the defendant. These circuits have treated such motions as civil
proceedings for equitable relief. See United States v. Chambers,
192 F.3d 374, 376
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(3d Cir. 1999) (stating that a Rule 41(e) motion made after criminal proceedings
end “is treated as a civil proceeding for equitable relief.”); United States v. Solis,
108 F.3d 722, 722 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[A] post-conviction Rule 41(e) motion will be
treated as a civil equitable proceeding for the return of the property in question.”);
Thompson v. Covington,
47 F.3d 974, 975 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“Post-
conviction filings for the return of property seized in connection with a criminal
case are treated as civil equitable actions, and the district court where the claimant
was tried has subject-matter jurisdiction ancillary to its criminal jurisdiction to hear
the equitable action.”); Rufu v. United States,
20 F.3d 63, 65 (2d Cir. 1994) (per
curiam) (citations omitted) (“The district court where a defendant is tried has
ancillary jurisdiction to decide the defendant’s post-trial motion for return of seized
property. If made after the termination of criminal proceedings against the
defendant . . . such a motion should be treated as a civil complaint for equitable
relief.”); United States v. Duncan,
918 F.2d 647, 654 (6th Cir. 1990) (quotation
marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original) (“Because the defendant’s
motion was made after the trial concluded . . . the request for return of the seized
property is [essentially] a civil equitable proceeding, notwithstanding the fact that
the motion was styled under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e).”); United States v. Martinson,
809 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1987) (“A district court has jurisdiction to entertain
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motions to return property seized by the government when there are no criminal
proceedings pending against the movant. Such motions are treated as civil
equitable proceedings even if styled as being pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e).”).
Aligning ourselves with the other circuits that have considered this issue, we
hold that, under the facts of this case, the district court could have asserted
equitable jurisdiction over Martinez’s motion for return of his property. In light of
our holding, the district court’s apparent assumption that it could not exercise
equitable jurisdiction over Martinez’s motion was wrong; we therefore vacate its
decision, and remand for further proceedings.2
VACATED AND REMANDED.
2
The “decision to exercise equitable jurisdiction is highly discretionary and must be
exercised with caution and restraint. . . . [J]urisdiction is appropriate only when the petitioner’s
conduct and the merits of his petition require judicial review to prevent manifest injustice.”
Eubanks,
169 F.3d at 674 (citations omitted). The district court, having decided equitable
jurisdiction was not available to it, did not develop a factual record necessary to determine
whether to exercise equitable jurisdiction over Martinez’s Rule 41(e) motion. Due to the dearth
of a factual record, and the absence of an analysis of those facts, we will not say whether the
district court should have exercised jurisdiction in this case, without first permitting the district
court an opportunity to make the determination. This obviously precludes our review of whether
it would have been appropriate for the district court to exercise equitable jurisdiction.
We also decline to analyze two other arguments presented by the parties: first, that
Martinez’s Rule 41(e) motion was time-barred because Martinez filed his Rule 41(e) motion
eight years after the seizure of property; and second, that Martinez may be entitled to monetary
restitution in lieu of the property (i.e., Martinez’s car, gun, and personal effects) disposed of by
the government. These issues are not ripe for our review, as the district court’s decision on
whether to exercise equitable jurisdiction, and the factual determinations accompanying that
decision, will bear on resolution of these issues.
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