Members First Federal v. Members First Credit ( 2001 )


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  •                                                                                     [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S.                        FILED
    COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    MAR 12 2001
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    No. 00-10658                          CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 98-00004-CV-3-LAC
    MEMBERS FIRST FEDERAL CREDIT
    UNION, LOUISVILLE, KY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    Cross-Appellee,
    Versus
    MEMBERS FIRST CREDIT UNION OF
    FLORIDA,
    Defendant-Appellee,
    Cross-Appellant.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Florida
    (March 12, 2001)
    Before TJOFLAT, BARKETT and POLITZ*, Circuit Judges.
    ___________________________________________
    *Honorable Henry A. Politz, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    PER CURIAM:
    Members First Federal Credit Union (“MFFCU”) appeals the district court’s
    denial of its motion for attorney’s fees; Members First Credit Union of Florida
    (“MFCUF”) cross-appeals the district court’s (1) denial of its motion to modify
    injunction and (2) award of costs and attorney’s fees incurred by MFFCU in opposing
    MFCUF’s motion to modify injunction. We find no merit in the cross-appeal and
    accordingly affirm. See 11th Cir. R. 36-1. We find merit, however, in MFFCU’s
    appeal.
    The district court denied MFFCU’s motion for attorney’s fees on the ground
    that the motion was not filed within 30 days of the entry of judgment as required by
    N.D. Fla. R. 54.1. Judgment was entered on September 30, 1999. On October 12,
    1999, MFFCU moved the court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 to alter or amend the
    judgment. The court denied the motion on November 10, 1999, and MFFCU filed its
    motion for attorney’s fees 13 days later.
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 (d)(2)(B) states that “[u]nless otherwise provided by statute
    or order of the court, [a motion for attorney’s fees] must be filed and served no later
    than 14 days after entry of judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 83 authorizes the district courts
    to adopt local rules governing practice and procedure; included within such
    authorization are rules “establishing timeliness standards for the filing of claims for
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    attorney’s fees.” Zaklama, M.D. v. Mount Sinai Med. Ctr., 
    906 F.2d 645
    , 647 (11th
    Cir. 1990), quoting White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Sec., 
    455 U.S. 445
    , 454, 
    102 S. Ct. 1162
    , 1168, 
    71 L. Ed. 2d 325
     (1982). Drawing on this authority,
    the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida adopted a rule
    providing that “a motion for award of attorney’s fees . . . shall be filed and served
    within the time specified in the scheduling order. . . .” N.D. Fla. R. 54.1. The
    scheduling order in the instant case allowed a motion for attorney’s fees to be filed
    “within 30 days after judgment.”
    A timely Rule 59 motion to alter or amend judgment operates to suspend the
    finality of the district court’s judgment “pending the court’s further determination
    whether the judgment should be modified so as to alter its adjudication of the rights
    of the parties.” Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 
    434 U.S. 257
    , 267, 
    98 S. Ct. 556
    , 
    54 L. Ed. 2d 521
     (1978), quoting Dep’t of Banking v. Pink, 
    317 U.S. 264
    , 266, 
    63 S. Ct. 233
    , 234, 
    87 L. Ed. 254
     (1942). Because the finality of a judgment is effectively
    postponed by the timely filing of a motion under Rule 59, we conclude that MFFCU’s
    motion, filed within 30 days of the entry of final judgment as permitted by N.D. Fla.
    R. 54.1, was timely. The district court therefore erred in rejecting the motion as
    untimely. We consequently vacate its ruling and remand the case with the instruction
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    that the court consider the motion on its merits. We of course intimate no view as to
    the outcome the court should reach.
    AFFIRMED, in part, VACATED, in part, and REMANDED.
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