[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 8, 2001
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 00-12619 CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 98-02076-CV-DLG
JOSE ANTONIO CABRERA ESPINAL,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD.,
CELEBRITY CRUISES, INC.,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
No. 00-13268
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 99-02475-CV-SH
JOSE ANTONIO CABRERA ESPINAL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD.,
CELEBRITY CRUISES, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(June 8, 2001)
Before TJOFLAT and WILSON, Circuit Judges, and RESTANI*, Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Jose Antonio Cabrera Espinal (“Cabrera Espinal”) is the plaintiff in two related
cases that have been consolidated on appeal. Addressing each temporally according
to the date filed, we will refer to the cases as Espinal I and Espinal II. For the reasons
stated below the district court’s decision in Espinal I is affirmed in part and reversed
in part, and Espinal II is affirmed.
ESPINAL I
Cabrera Espinal worked on Royal Caribbean Cruises’ (“RCC”) ships as a tip-
earning employee under a contract that commenced on December 23, 1997 and
expired on November 23, 1998. The contract provided for at-will employment to be
terminated with two weeks notice. A collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”)
governed the contract.
*
Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge, U.S. Court of International Trade, sitting by
designation.
2
The contract provided for a guaranteed minimum monthly income of $766.00
($50 in contract wages and $716 in tips). If an employee did not receive the
calculated monthly minimum in tips, RCC would provide the difference.
In February of 1998, Cabrera Espinal herniated a lumbar disc and was unable
to finish his employment contract due to his work related injury. Pursuant to the
CBA, RCC paid him sick wages from the time he became injured for 112 days in the
amount of $766 per month. Cabrera Espinal brought suit against RCC contending that
he is entitled to his average or actual monthly salary ($1500 which includes $1450 in
tips) as sick wages instead of the guaranteed minimum.
The district court agreed with Cabrera Espinal and found that he was entitled
to actual wages for the 112 days provided for in the CBA. RCC now appeals that
decision.
DISCUSSION
The sole question for review is whether the district court should have applied
general maritime law or the CBA in calculating the amount of unearned sick wages
and the length of time for which those wages are due. We review a motion granting
summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standards used by the district
court. Raney v. Vinson Guard Serv., Inc.,
120 F.3d 1192, 1196 (11th Cir. 1997).
3
Under general maritime law, seamen are entitled to bring an action for
“maintenance and cure,” a remedy available to compensate seamen who fall ill or
become injured during the their term of employment. See Flores v. Carnival Cruise
Lines,
47 F.3d 1120, 1122 (11th Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court has previously
recognized that a ship owner’s liability for maintenance and cure is among the most
pervasive and should not be defeated by narrow or restrictive distinctions. See
Vaughan v. Atkinson,
369 U.S. 527, 532 (1962). Nonetheless, the remedies provided
for in maritime law may be altered although not abrogated by collective bargaining
agreements. See Frederick v. Kirby Tankships, Inc.,
205 F.3d 1277, 1291 (11th Cir.
2000) (holding that where a CBA fixes a maintenance rate, the term should be
enforced), cert. denied, __ U.S. __,
121 S. Ct. 46 (2000). “[T]he broad labor policies
which undergird federal labor law, as well as the nature of the collective bargaining
process, require adherence to the CBA.” Id.; see also Gardiner v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc.,
786 F.2d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 1986). The reason for this is that a CBA represents a
mutual agreement encompassing a wide range of issues for which some provisions
will result in greater protection than that represented by statute while others will result
in less. Frederick,
205 F.3d at 1291; see also Lipscomb v. Foss Maritime Co.,
83 F.3d
1106, 1108-9 (9th Cir. 1996). As a result, based on the greater considerations that
result in a collective bargaining agreement, this court will enforce the provisions
4
unless contrary to the law. See Marshall v. Western Grain Co.,
838 F.2d 1165, 1168-
70 (11th Cir. 1988)(per curiam).
General maritime law guarantees seamen: “(1) maintenance, which is a living
allowance; (2) cure, which covers nursing and medical expenses; and (3) wages.”
Herbert R. Baer, Admiralty Law of the Supreme Court 6 (3d ed. 1979); see 1B
Benedict on Admiralty § 43 (7th ed. 1994). Our case law has previously held that the
wages for incapacitated seamen should be measured based on their average tip
income. See e.g., Flores,
47 F.3d at 1127; Aksoy v. Apollo Ship Chandlers, Inc.,
137
F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 1998)(per curiam).
RCC argues that the district court erred in applying our previous case law in
light of a collective bargaining agreement that explicitly states how sick pay and basic
monthly wages would be measured. It contends that prior case law used average tip
income as a measure simply because no other method of calculation existed and had
this situation been presented to those panels, they would have found the CBA
applicable.
Given this argument, we first look to whether the CBA modified general
maritime law. The CBA states:
Wages (basic monthly wage), will continue [after the seafarer leaves the
ship] on submission of satisfactory medical certificates for a maximum
of 112 (hundred and twelve) days.
5
CBA, Article 12. An attached chart also indicates what specific “basic monthly wage”
and “sick pay” are. The district court held that the CBA expressly modified the
maritime law computation of sick wages. We agree. Yet, the district court relied on
a series of cases, which calculated sick wages as wages plus average tip-income
instead of a fixed minimum, to hold that the clause modifying maritime law was
inapplicable. We find that the district court erred in finding the clause inapplicable.
The two cases that the district court relies on in support of basing sick wages
on the average tip income of the seafarer are Flores and Aksoy. Flores is easily
distinguishable because there Carnival Cruise Lines argued that it had no legal duty
to pay more than the $45-per-month salary as unearned (or sick) wages.
47 F.3d at
1122. In a case of first impression, the court held that tip income must be included in
the calculation of unearned wages.
Id. at 1127. It, then, set the rate as the average tip
income earned absent any other prevailing authority on the matter.
Id. Three years
later, the Aksoy court relied on the Flores logic to calculate unearned wages as the
average tip income plus guaranteed minimum wage because “Aksoy’s contract did not
purport to place a limit on the amount of unearned wages Aksoy was entitled to
receive. . .” Aksoy,
137 F.3d at 1306. The present case is distinguishable not only
because a plain language reading of the CBA purports to limit the amount of unearned
wages but also in the intervening period, we have adopted a view of the law that
6
requires us to rely on collective bargaining agreements’ modifications of maritime
law. See Frederick,
205 F.3d at 1291.
Therefore, we conclude that nothing in maritime law prevents the setting of sick
wages below the average tip income received. The CBA in the instant case, as is true
in any collective bargaining agreement, represents a series of trade-offs between an
employer and employees reaching a mutually satisfying agreement. Courts should be
loathe for a multitude of reasons to abrogate clauses in such contracts absent a
pressing legal reason. Furthermore, precedent in this circuit may be distinguished on
the grounds that none of the employment contracts in those cases explicitly indicated
how sick pay and basic monthly wages would be calculated. As the CBA in this case
did, we find that the district court erred in not relying on the CBA to calculate the
amount of unearned sick wages. However, because the district court correctly relied
on the CBA to calculate the length of time for which those wages should be paid, that
part of the opinion is affirmed. See Farrell v. United States,
336 U.S. 511, 520-21
(1949) (holding that a seaman’s length of voyage is the duration of employment for
which sick wages are due unless some longer term is enforceable); Nichols v. Barwick,
792 F.2d 1520, 1524 (11th Cir. 1986) (same).
ESPINAL II
7
Filed later in time than Espinal I but occurring prior to the events that led up to
that case, Cabrera Espinal appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
the RCC.
Cabrera Espinal was a tip-earning employee under a contract for Celebrity
Cruises, Inc.,1 which commenced on November 4, 1996 and expired on October 3,
1997. His contract guaranteed him income of $743 per month ($50 in wages with the
rest in tips). He could be terminated at-will and without notice.
Cabrera Espinal developed an eye injury during his period of employment but
waited until the boat returned to port at its final destination on October 1, 1997 before
receiving medical attention. Prior to the end of the voyage, Cabrera Espinal consulted
the ship’s doctor. Upon leaving the ship, he first saw a doctor in Miami and then in
his native land of Honduras where the medical attention he received resulted in a cure
on December 3, 1997.
RCC paid sick wages to Cabrera Espinal based on the guaranteed minimum for
63 days under the then applicable CBA. Cabrera Espinal again argues that he was
entitled to actual earnings of $1500 during that period. The district court granted
summary judgment to RCC stating that because Cabrera Espinal’s contract terminated
1
Royal Caribbean Cruises bought out Celebrity Cruises prior to Cabrera Espinal’s receipt
of sick wages.
8
on or about October 1, 1997, he was not entitled to receive any sick pay under either
maritime law or the CBA as of that date.
DISCUSSION
The sole question for review is whether the district court erred in granting
summary judgment to RCC by finding that Cabrera Espinal was not an employee and
thus not entitled to sick pay under the CBA or maritime law.
Cabrera Espinal contends that in light of the rule of Farrell,
336 U.S. 511,2 the
CBA’s sick period and wage provisions did not become null and void when the
employment contract expired. He further argues that because RCC paid some sick
wages, it is an implicit admission that sick wages are due.
For all the reasons stated in Espinal I, we hold that the CBA applies. Article 2
of the CBA states that an employee is covered by the agreement until the owner ceases
to be liable for wages or the date at which the employee signs off the ship. It is
undisputed that Cabrera Espinal signed off the ship on October 1, 1997, after the final
voyage was completed and two days before his employment contract expired and the
boat would leave port again. Article 12 of the CBA provides that a signed off seafarer
who lands in any port as a result of injury or sickness will continue to receive his
2
Farrell held that as a general rule a seaman’s employment term is the length of voyage
unless there is a longer term of employment enforceable.
9
wages until he has been repatriated at company expense. The seafarer will then be
paid in advance for the anticipated number of days certified by a doctor that he is
expected to be sick or injured.
The boat that Cabrera Espinal was employed on docked in Los Angeles.
Cabrera Espinal was flown at company expense to Miami, where he received an initial
examination. On October 4, 1997, he flew home to Honduras for surgery. His
surgery was completed on December 3, 1997. At the time of Cabrera Espinal’s
operation, Celebrity Cruise Lines merged with RCC. RCC contends that it was during
this confusing time when it was unclear whose CBA applied and paperwork was lost
that a disbursement for sick wages was made.
We need not decide when and under what circumstances Cabrera Espinal
received sick wages. It is more than enough to rely on the fact that a “seaman’s action
for maintenance and cure may be seen as one designed to put the sailor in the same
position as he would have been had he continued to work: . . . and he receives an
amount representing his unearned wages for the duration of his voyage or contract
period.” Flores,
47 F.3d at 1127; see also Farrell,
336 U.S. at 516 (stating that a
seaman must be in service of the ship at the time of his injury to receive maintenance
and cure). In the instant case, the final voyage was completed and only two days
were left on Cabrera Espinal’s employment contract. To find that the company owed
10
him any further obligations would contradict both contract law as embodied in the
CBA and this circuit’s interpretation of general maritime law. As a result, we affirm
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to RCC.
CONCLUSION
In Espinal I, we find that the CBA governed in its entirety the amount and
duration of sick wages to be paid. As a result, the district court’s calculation of the
amount of sick wages is REVERSED.
The application of the CBA’s 112-day sick period is AFFIRMED.
As it appears that RCC paid sick wages for 112 days based on its calculation
of the basic monthly wages, it has fulfilled its obligations to Cabrera Espinal.
In Espinal II, because we find that Cabrera Espinal was sufficiently
compensated for his term of employment and was owed no further duty at the time he
was recuperating from his eye injury, the district court’s grant of summary judgment
is AFFIRMED.
Finally, RCC complied with the CBA and no evidence of bad faith exists on its
part. See Flores,
47 F.3d at 1127. Therefore, Cabrera Espinal’s motion requesting
attorneys’ fees is DENIED.
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