Salvador Magluta v. F.P. Sam Samples , 256 F.3d 1282 ( 2001 )

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 13, 2001
No. 00-12540 THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 94-02700-CV-ODE-1
SALVADOR MAGLUTA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
F.P. SAM SAMPLES, MICHAEL W. GARRETT,
FRED STOCK, MICHAEL BELL, JOEL KNOWLES, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(July 13, 2001)
Before CARNES, COX and NOONAN*, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
*
Honorable John T. Noonan, Jr., U.S. Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
I. BACKGROUND
In April 1991, Salvador Magluta was indicted in the Southern District of
Florida on various charges involving cocaine trafficking. The United States Marshals
Service apprehended Magluta in October 1991 and placed him in federal custody.
Following his arrest, Magluta was held in three different federal facilities — first in
Miami, then in Talledega, and later in Atlanta — before reaching trial in 1996. He
was acquitted.
Magluta filed this Bivens1 action in 1994 during his pretrial detention at the
United States Penitentiary in Atlanta. The complaint asserts a variety of constitutional
claims relating to the conditions of his confinement against fourteen federal officials.
The defendants filed a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss. The ten non-resident defendants
sought dismissal on Rule 12(b)(2) grounds asserting lack of personal jurisdiction; the
four Georgia residents sought dismissal on 12(b)(6) grounds, asserting failure to state
a claim and, alternatively, qualified immunity. The district court dismissed the ten
non-resident defendants, concluding that they were not subject to the jurisdiction of
the court. We previously affirmed that dismissal.
1
See Bivins v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971).
2
Four defendants remain: F.P. Sam Samples, Michael W. Garrett, Fred Stock,
and Michael Bell. Samples and Garrett are alleged to have been the Regional Director
and Deputy Regional Director, respectively, of the Bureau of Prisons (Southeast
Regional Office). Stock and Bell are alleged to have been the Warden and Associate
Warden, respectively, at the United States Penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia.
All of Magluta’s claims relate to the conditions of his confinement as a pretrial
detainee. The centerpiece of his complaint, and his brief on appeal, is his Fifth
Amendment due process claim. The complaint alleges that he was placed in solitary
confinement — the “hole” — through a series of detention orders at four different
federal prisons, including Atlanta, for cumulatively more than 721 days. Magluta
alleges this lengthy and harsh pretrial detention was solely for the purpose of
punishment or retribution, was not justified by any legitimate institutional concerns,
and was imposed by various detention orders without notice, a hearing, or meaningful
review. This, Magluta alleges, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.
The district court dismissed all claims against the four resident defendants
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), concluding that the complaint failed to state a
claim.
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II. ISSUES ON APPEAL
Magluta’s brief on appeal argues that the complaint alleges five viable
constitutional claims with sufficient particularity to survive 12(b)(6) dismissal.
Magluta’s brief characterizes the claims as follows. Count One is the Fifth
Amendment due process claim based upon Magluta’s lengthy and harsh pretrial
detention. Count Two alleges a due process and Eighth Amendment claim based upon
the deliberate indifference prison officials demonstrated to Magluta’s serious medical
needs and the conditions of his pretrial detention. Count Four alleges a violation of
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Count Five asserts a due process
claim based upon the totality of the circumstances of Magluta’s pretrial detention.
Count Six is said to be based upon the First Amendment right of access to the courts,
and alleges that the conditions of Magluta’s confinement were imposed in retaliation
for his having filed lawsuits challenging the conditions of his confinement.
The defendants argue that the district court correctly concluded that the
complaint fails to state a claim and, alternatively, that they are entitled to qualified
immunity because the rights asserted were not clearly established.2
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
2
The district court did not address the issue of qualified immunity, apparently
finding it unnecessary to do so because of its conclusion that the complaint failed to state a
claim.
4
We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim, and a complaint may
not be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) “unless it appears beyond doubt that
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 102 (1957).
IV. DISCUSSION
Our first task is to determine whether “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
can prove no set of facts in support of his claim[s] which would entitle him to relief.”
Id. In making this decision we must respect the rule that heightened specificity is
required in civil rights actions against public officials who may be entitled to qualified
immunity. See Oladeinde v. City of Birmingham, 963 F.2d 1481, 1485 (11th Cir.
1992); GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1367 (11th Cir. 1998).
In this case our task is a daunting one.
The complaint is a quintessential “shotgun” pleading of the kind we have
condemned repeatedly, beginning at least as early as 1991. It is in no sense the “short
and plain statement of the claim” required by Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). It is fifty-eight pages long. It names fourteen
defendants, and all defendants are charged in each count. The complaint is replete
with allegations that “the defendants” engaged in certain conduct, making no
distinction among the fourteen defendants charged, though geographic and temporal
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realities make plain that all of the defendants could not have participated in every act
complained of. Each count incorporates by reference the allegations made in a section
entitled “General Factual Allegations” — which comprises 146 numbered paragraphs
— while also incorporating the allegations of any count or counts that precede it. The
result is that each count is replete with factual allegations that could not possibly be
material to that specific count, and that any allegations that are material are buried
beneath innumerable pages of rambling irrelevancies. This type of pleading
completely disregards Rule 10(b)’s requirement that discrete claims should be plead
in separate counts, see Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Tr., 77 F.3d 364, 366-67 (11th Cir.
1996), and is the type of complaint that we have criticized time and again. See, e.g.,
BMC Indus., Inc. v. Barth Indus., Inc., 160 F.3d 1322, 1326-27 n.6 (11th Cir. 1998);
GJR Invs., Inc., 132 F.3d at 1368; Pelletier v. Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1518-19 (11th
Cir. 1991).3
In the past when faced with complaints like this one, we have vacated
judgments and remanded with instructions that the district court require plaintiffs to
replead their claims. See Cesnik v. Edgewood Baptist Church, 88 F.3d 902, 910 (11th
Cir. 1996). That is the appropriate disposition here.
3
We have held that district courts confronted by such complaints have the inherent
authority to demand repleader sua sponte. See Johnson Enters. of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL
Group, Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1332 n.94 (11th Cir. 1998); Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079,
1083 n.6 (11th Cir. 1996).
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We are unwilling to address and decide serious constitutional issues on the basis
of this complaint. We could perhaps decide whether some of these claims were
subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), leaving for another day a decision about
other claims following repleading on remand. Piecemeal adjudication of that kind,
however, does not promote judicial efficiency. And the toleration of complaints such
as this one “does great disservice to the administration of civil justice.” Johnson
Enters. of Jacksonville, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 162 F.3d 1290, 1332 (11th Cir.
1998).
We express no opinion on the merits of Magluta’s constitutional claims beyond
saying that we suspect that Magluta’s Fifth Amendment due process claim, if alleged
with sufficient specificity, might not be subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). We
also suspect (but need not decide) that this complaint lacks the requisite specificity.
For all of these reasons, we vacate the judgment dismissing the action and
remand. On remand the district court should enter an order striking the complaint and
require a repleading of all claims in a complaint that respects the requirements of Rule
8 and the heightened pleading requirement for cases such as this one.
VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
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