United States v. Anthony Tyrone Jones , 544 F. App'x 862 ( 2013 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-16570
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:12-cr-00030-MEF-WC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ANTHONY TYRONE JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
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(November 15, 2013)
Before HULL, MARCUS and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Anthony Tyrone Jones appeals the 96-month sentence imposed by the
district court upon his plea of guilty. Jones argues, and the government agrees, that
the court erred when it refused to sentence Jones to 92 months, as both parties had
intended under the plea agreement. We agree that the district court clearly erred in
its interpretation of the agreement, and grant Jones the relief he seeks: specific
performance.
I.
In February 2012, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charging Jones
with three drug felonies. After initially pleading not guilty, Jones and the
government negotiated a plea agreement. As part of the plea agreement, the
government and Jones agreed that “the appropriate sentence for the offense to
which [Jones] is pleading guilty is the bottom end of the applicable Guideline
range.” Pursuant to this agreement, Jones pleaded guilty.
The district court accepted the plea agreement and noted that it intended to
follow its terms. Jones was determined to have a Guidelines range of 92–115
months. Rather than sentencing Jones to the lowest sentence under the Guidelines,
however, the district court imposed a sentence of 96 months. Jones objected to the
imposition of a sentence higher than 92 months because it was inconsistent with
his understanding of the plea agreement. The district court recognized on the
record that the imposed sentence “may have deviated from a binding plea
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agreement,” but nevertheless declined to modify the sentence. The district court
insisted that the terms of the agreement allowed for a sentence higher than 92
months because the agreement said “the bottom end of the guideline range” rather
than “the bottom of the guideline range.”
II.
A plea agreement “is, in essence, a contract between the Government and a
criminal defendant.” United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1168 (11th Cir.
1999). Whether a binding plea agreement has been breached is a question of law
that we review de novo. United States v. Al-Arian, 514 F.3d 1184, 1191 (11th Cir.
2008). “However, the district court’s factual findings regarding the scope of the
agreement will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous.” Id.
In resolving a dispute over the meaning of terms in a plea agreement, we
apply an objective standard to determine whether the alleged violation of the
agreement is inconsistent with what the defendant reasonably understood when he
entered his plea. United States v. Copeland, 381 F.3d 1101, 1105 (11th Cir. 2004).
We do not accept a “hyper-technical reading” or a “rigidly literal approach in the
construction of the language.” United States v. Jeffries, 908 F.2d 1520, 1523 (11th
Cir. 1990) (quotation marks omitted). We also view the agreement against the
background of the negotiations, and do not interpret it in a way that directly
contradicts any oral understandings. Id. Finally, to the extent there are any
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ambiguities in the agreement, we consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent
and, if necessary, construe the ambiguity against the government. Id.; see also
Copeland, 381 F.3d at 1105–06.
III.
We must first decide whether “the bottom end of the guideline range” is
ambiguous. See Copeland, 381 F.3d at 1106. We conclude that it is not, and that
it was clear error for the district court to sentence Jones inconsistent with the
unambiguous meaning of the accepted plea agreement’s sentencing provision.
While we have not addressed this precise question in a published opinion,
this Court has previously interpreted the phrase “sentence at the low end of the
applicable guideline range”—a phrase similar to that used in Jones’s agreement—
to unambiguously mean “the lowest number of months of imprisonment designated
in the sentencing table.” United States v. Worden, 172 F. App’x 981, 983 (11th
Cir. 2006); see also United States v. Parker, 280 F. App’x 899, 901 (11th Cir.
2008) (“[T]he ‘low end’ of the Guidelines sentence range is simply the lowest
possible sentence within that range.”). 1 The plain meaning of the terms supports
this interpretation. As is relevant, “bottom” means “the lowest part or place.”
Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 134 (10th ed. 2000). We agree with the
1
This interpretation is also consistent with the way in which this Court uses the phrase, albeit in
cases that do not squarely address the interpretation of a plea agreement’s terms. See, e.g.,
United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir. 2005) (characterizing “the most lenient
sentence” in the applicable range as “a sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range”).
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Worden panel that the objective meaning of “end” as modified by a term such as
“bottom” is clear: the bottom point of the applicable advisory Guideline range.
Even if the phrase were ambiguous, both Jones and the government agree
that they intended Jones to be sentenced to the lowest number in the applicable
Guideline range. In light of the evidence of the parties’ intent before the district
court at the sentence hearing, the court clearly erred when it imposed a sentence
contrary to that unified intent. See Copeland, 381 F.3d at 1105–06 (noting that we
look to the parties’ intent in construing an ambiguous plea agreement); United
States v. Yesil, 991 F.2d 1527, 1532–33 (11th Cir. 1992) (reversing where the
district court failed to follow the terms of the plea agreement); see also United
States v. Vallejo, 463 F. App’x 849, 852 (11th Cir. 2012) (noting that, if a plea
agreement was ambiguous, it would be error for a court to impose a sentence
contrary to the intent of the parties to the agreement because the defendant “would
not have reasonably understood . . . that the Court was going to override the terms
of the plea agreement it had already accepted”).
When a court accepts a plea agreement, but then denies the defendant the
benefit of that agreement, the defendant is entitled to specific performance or the
opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. Yesil, 991 F.2d at 1532–33 (defining the
appropriate remedies when a court violates the terms of a plea agreement it has
already accepted). Here, the government urges us to remand so that Jones may
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withdraw his plea if he so chooses. Jones, on the other hand, asks for specific
performance of the benefit for which he bargained—a sentence of 92 months.
We agree that specific performance is appropriate here. This Court
generally enforces the specific terms of a plea agreement in the face of a violation
so long as the defendant “entered into his plea agreement freely and intelligently,
and adhered to his part of the bargain.” United States v. Boatner, 966 F.2d 1575,
1580 (11th Cir. 1992). Jones entered his plea voluntarily and intelligently, and he
has already performed his obligations under the plea agreement.
For these reasons, we VACATE and REMAND with instructions that Jones
be resentenced to 92 months in keeping with the terms of the agreement he and the
government negotiated.
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