Orestano v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration , 252 F. App'x 962 ( 2007 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCTOBER 31, 2007
No. 07-12325 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-02354-CV-T-27-EAJ
MARIE ORESTANO,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(October 31, 2007)
Before TJOFLAT, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Marie Orestano appeals the order affirming the Commissioner’s denial of
disability insurance benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and Supplemental Security
Income, 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). On appeal, Orestano argues that substantial
evidence does not support the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) finding that
she was not disabled, and that the ALJ erred in relying on the testimony of a
vocational expert.
We review a social security case to determine whether the Commissioner’s
decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal
standards were applied. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997).
We “may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our
judgment for that of the Secretary.” Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th
Cir. 1990).
A claimant bears the burden to prove that she is disabled, within the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th
Cir.1999). Where, as in this case, a claimant is not involved in a substantial
gainful work activity and has established a severe impairment that prevents her
from performing her past relevant work, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to
demonstrate that there are a significant number of jobs in the national economy
that the claimant can perform. Jones, 190 F.3d at 1228. The ALJ must articulate
specific jobs that the claimant is able to perform, and this finding must be
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supported by substantial evidence, not mere intuition or conjecture. See Allen v.
Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1200, 1201 (11th Cir. 1989).
Here, the ALJ found that Orestano was capable of performing a significant,
but not a full, range of sedentary work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567 and
416.967. The judge found that Orestano’s “ability to perform all or substantially
all of the requirements of sedentary work was impeded by additional exertional
and/or non-exertional limitations.” Therefore, the testimony of a vocational expert
was used “to help determine whether or not there [were] a significant number of
jobs in the national economy that the claimant could perform given her residual
functional capacity and other vocational factors.” We find that the ALJ did not err
in applying the correct legal standards and that his decision was supported by
substantial evidence.
AFFIRMED.
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