Harrison v. Wille ( 1998 )


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  •                                                 PUBLISH
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 96-5190
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 94-8693-CV-WJZ
    MICHAEL HARRISON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    RICHARD P. WILLE, individually and in his
    official capacity as Sheriff of Palm Beach
    County, BENNIE GREEN, MICHAEL S. TUCKER,
    DANIEL McBRIDE, individually and in their
    official capacities of the Palm Beach County
    Sheriff’s Office,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (January 9, 1998)
    Before EDMONDSON, Circuit Judge, CLARK and WELLFORD*, Senior
    Circuit Judges.
    _______________
    C    Honorable Harry W. Wellford, Senior U.S. Judge for the
    Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
    PER CURIAM:
    Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor
    of Defendants on Section 1983 claims.             Plaintiff alleges
    violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of
    procedural due process and the Fifth Amendment. We hold
    that Plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to establish either
    of these violations,    and we affirm the grant of summary
    judgment for Defendants.
    Background
    The basic facts in this case are undisputed.
    In 1985 Plaintiff Michael Harrison was hired as a deputy of
    the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office.         During Plaintiff’s
    employment with the sheriff’s office, either Defendant Richard
    P. Wille (1977-95) or Defendant Charles McCutcheon was the
    county’s sheriff. The remaining Defendants -- Bennie Green,
    2
    Michael S. Tucker, and Daniel McBride -- were all deputies in
    the sheriff’s office.
    Beginning in 1991, items were being stolen from the
    evidence room at the sheriff’s office.    In 1994, an internal
    investigation, and a concurrent criminal investigation, were
    begun. Plaintiff was a suspect because the first of several
    thefts occurred at Plaintiff’s substation, and the receipt and
    deletion of the evidence from the records seemed to have
    occurred during Plaintiff’s times on duty.1
    On three occasions, Plaintiff, as one of several suspects,
    was asked to provide statements to investigating deputies
    about the thefts. Plaintiff appeared before an investigator each
    Items were logged into the evidence room by the deputy
    1
    on duty who would sign a receipt for the evidence. When the
    evidence was then removed, for whatever purpose, the
    evidence was deleted from the computer inventory list, and a
    “deletion log” was created.
    3
    time and was given his Garrity rights.2 Following the last
    statement, Plaintiff was placed on administrative leave with pay.
    After the three interviews, Plaintiff was given notice that a
    predisciplinary conference would be held. This notice was
    provided at least one day before the first conference. At this
    conference Plaintiff was told that another theft had occurred
    during his shift. Defendant Green also explained the charges
    against Plaintiff and summarized for Plaintiff the information
    gained so far by the internal investigation.
    At this conference, Plaintiff was given a form explaining
    his Garrity rights but was informed that no statements were
    being compelled -- he need not say anything.           Plaintiff’s
    attorney advised him that, because no statements were being
    2
    Garrity rights provide a public employee with immunity;
    and when given, protect an employee so that statements
    made for internal investigations will not be used against the
    employee in a criminal prosecution. Lefkowitz v. Turley, 
    414 U.S. 70
    , 79-80 (1973); Garrity v. New Jersey, 
    385 U.S. 493
    (1967).
    4
    compelled, Garrity immunity did not exist and that Plaintiff
    should exercise his Fifth Amendment right against self-
    incrimination.3 Plaintiff remained silent -- exercising his right
    to do so under the Fifth Amendment.
    After the predisciplinary conference, Plaintiff was
    suspended without pay.4 The sheriff’s office allows appeals
    from such disciplinary decisions to the Hearing Review Board.
    Plaintiff’s counsel filed a timely appeal, but asked that the
    appeal be postponed to allow for the completion of the ongoing
    internal and criminal investigations -- so Plaintiff would not face
    the repercussions of incriminating statements made during
    those proceedings. The appeal was postponed.
    3
    Plaintiff was accompanied by legal counsel at all points
    after his initial interview and statement.
    Articles appeared in local newspapers about the
    4
    investigation and Plaintiff’s suspension. It is based upon
    these articles that Plaintiff makes his claim that he was
    deprived of liberty (by the loss of his good reputation)
    without due process.
    5
    Before the appeal was reinitiated, Plaintiff received written
    notification of the misconduct charges against him, now nine
    (9) incidents. This notice was provided to Plaintiff on 22 August
    1994. Soon after notice of the charges, Plaintiff and his counsel
    were permitted to review the internal affairs’ investigation
    report, which then included ten (10) instances of theft.
    Plaintiff’s counsel raised two issues about the accuracy of the
    report at that time.
    In September, a second predisciplinary conference was
    held, which again resulted in Plaintiff’s silence after receiving
    no Garrity protection. In October 1994, Plaintiff was terminated.
    Again, Plaintiff’s counsel requested the appeal -- now an
    appeal of not just suspension, but termination -- before the
    Hearing Review Board be postponed until completion of the
    criminal investigation.    Review was again postponed. The
    criminal investigation was completed in February 1995 and
    resulted in no charges against Plaintiff.
    6
    In April 1995, the Hearing Review Board (now called a
    “Termination Review Board”) heard Plaintiff’s challenge to his
    termination. At that hearing, Plaintiff was provided Garrity
    protection; and he provided information in his own defense. By
    a 3-2 vote the Board sustained Plaintiff’s termination; this
    decision was ratified by the current sheriff, Defendant
    McCutcheon.
    Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants -- all members of the
    sheriff’s office involved with the investigation -- under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    .   Plaintiff alleged violations of his procedural due
    process rights and his substantive due process rights.5
    5
    Plaintiff alleged his Fifth Amendment right against self-
    incrimination had been violated by the refusal to provide
    Garrity protection at every stage of the administrative
    process. He made this claim under the guise of a
    substantive due process violation. But where a particular
    amendment “provides an explicit textual source of
    constitutional protection” against the conduct of which
    Plaintiff complains, “that Amendment, not the more
    generalized notion of ‘substantive due process,’ must be the
    guide for analyzing” the claim. Graham v. Connor, 
    490 U.S. 386
    , 395 & n.10 (1989). Thus, Plaintiff’s substantive due
    7
    The district court, in response to motions filed by all
    Defendants, granted summary judgment for Defendants on all
    claims. Plaintiff appeals that decision.
    Discussion
    I. Fifth Amendment Violation
    Plaintiff alleges that the failure to afford him Garrity
    protection at the two predisciplinary conferences violated his
    Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.     Plaintiff
    claims he was terminated for his exercise of this right. The
    record does not support that conclusion.
    The Fifth Amendment provides that no person “shall be
    compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
    process claim will be analyzed under the Fifth Amendment’s
    prohibition of compelled testimony and self-incrimination.
    8
    himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “The Amendment not only
    protects the individual against being involuntarily called as a
    witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also
    privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any
    other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the
    answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.”
    Lefkowitz v. Turley, 
    414 U.S. 70
    , 77 (1973).
    In Garrity v. New Jersey, (establishing “Garrity rights”), the
    Supreme Court held that, when public employees are given the
    choice of either forfeiting their jobs or incriminating
    themselves, the Fifth Amendment has been violated because a
    forced decision of that kind is “likely to exert such pressure
    upon an individual as to disable him from making a free and
    rational choice.” 
    385 U.S. 493
    , 497 (1967) (citation omitted). In
    Garrity, police officers subject to an internal investigation were
    told, before being questioned, that anything they said could be
    used against them and that they had a right to say nothing; but
    9
    the officers were also told that if they refused “to answer [they]
    would be subject to removal from office.” 
    Id. at 494
    . This
    conduct, the Court held, is a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
    
    Id. at 498
    .
    Later cases explained that Garrity only prohibits the
    compulsion of testimony that has not been immunized. See
    Turley, 
    414 U.S. at 82-83
    . In other words, the employee may not
    be both compelled to testify (or make a statement) and be
    required to waive his Fifth Amendment rights. Gardner v.
    Broderick, 
    392 U.S. 273
    , 276-77 (1968). An “employee’s rights
    are imperilled only by the combined risks of both compelling
    the   employee    to    answer   incriminating   questions    and
    compelling the employee to waive immunity from the use of
    those answers.” Arrington v. County of Dallas, 
    970 F.2d 1441
    ,
    1446 (5th Cir. 1992).
    The result of these prohibitions is that a public employee
    cannot be terminated solely for the exercise of his Fifth
    10
    Amendment rights. See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 
    431 U.S. 801
    , 804 (1977); Arrington, 
    970 F.2d at 1446
    ; Buckner v.
    City of Highland Park, 
    901 F.2d 491
    , 496 (6th Cir. 1990);
    Benjamin v. City of Montgomery, 
    785 F.2d 959
     (11th Cir. 1986);
    Hoover v. Knight, 
    678 F.2d 578
    , 580 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing
    Gardner, 
    392 U.S. 273
    , and Uniformed Sanitation Men v.
    Sanitation Commissioner of New York, 
    392 U.S. 280
     [1968]).
    Considered along with other evidence, however, an adverse
    inference may be drawn from an employee’s exercise of his
    Fifth Amendment right to silence. Hoover, 
    678 F.2d at
    582 &
    n.1.6
    Plaintiff argued that to show a Fifth Amendment
    6
    violation he need only show that his exercise of the right to
    remain silent was a substantial or motivating factor in his
    dismissal. This idea is not the law governing Fifth
    Amendment claims. Because Plaintiff only argues that his
    exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights was a substantial or
    motivating reason for his termination, he does not properly
    allege facts to support his action under the correct legal
    standard -- that his invocation of the Fifth Amendment was
    the sole reason for his termination.
    11
    In this case, Plaintiff was not faced with the choice to make
    a statement or to be fired. First, Plaintiff, when not given
    Garrity protection, was never compelled to make a statement.
    Second, Plaintiff cannot show (and does not contend) that he
    was terminated solely for the exercise of his Fifth Amendment
    rights.
    The termination of Plaintiff’s employment came after a
    lengthy investigation in which other evidence incriminated him.
    Plaintiff does not dispute that other evidence about the thefts,
    besides his silence, led to Plaintiff’s leave without pay and to
    his ultimate termination. Plaintiff signed the receipts for much
    of the stolen evidence, and the computer documented that
    some of the missing evidence had been deleted during
    7
    P l a i n t i f f ’ s                 s h i f t s .
    Plaintiff claims that the time and date functions of the
    7
    computers were often off by as much as two days and that
    the documented dates and times for the deletion of the
    evidence are not accurate. But Plaintiff’s counsel had an
    opportunity to point this supposed error out to investigators
    12
    To succeed in this action Plaintiff must submit sufficient
    facts upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that he was
    terminated solely because he remained silent at the
    predisciplinary conferences. Plaintiff has not met this burden.
    Plaintiff must also show that he was compelled to waive
    his Fifth Amendment rights. “The government’s mere failure to
    tender immunity cannot amount to an attempt to compel a
    waiver of immunity.” Arrington, 
    970 F.2d at 1446
    . When a
    person has “a free choice to admit, deny, or refuse to answer.
    This is full vindication of the [F]ifth [A]mendment privilege
    against self-incrimination.” Hoover, 
    678 F.2d at 581
     (citation
    omitted).
    Because Plaintiff does not present facts to show that he
    was, at the same time, both compelled to testify and forced to
    waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and
    after he reviewed the investigation report.
    13
    because Plaintiff alleges no facts that show, and does not
    contend, that he was terminated solely in response to his
    exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights, summary judgment was
    proper.
    II. Procedural Due Process
    Plaintiff also fails to establish issues of material fact about
    his procedural due process claims. “An essential principle of
    due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property ‘be
    preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to
    the nature of the case.’” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
    
    470 U.S. 532
    , 542 (1985) (citation omitted).8      Plaintiff raises
    We accept that Plaintiff did have a property interest in
    8
    his position with the sheriff’s office -- a proposition
    undisputed by Appellees.
    14
    procedural due process claims on both his property interest in
    his employment and his liberty interest in his reputation.9
    There must be “some kind of hearing” before termination
    of an employee with a protected property interest in his
    employment. Loudermill, 
    470 U.S. at 542
     (citation omitted). The
    termination of employment is a severe deprivation, although the
    interest of the sheriff’s office in terminating deputies for
    misconduct is great. See Loudermill, 
    470 U.S. at 543
     (severity
    of termination); Buckner, 
    901 F.2d at 497
     (“The government
    9
    Assuming Plaintiff had a protected liberty interest in
    this case, the only process due Plaintiff to protect his liberty
    interest was a “name clearing hearing.” Warren v. Crawford,
    
    927 F.2d 559
    , 565 (11th Cir. 1991). The hearing need not take
    place before termination or the publication of the damaging
    information. Campbell v. Pierce County, Ga., 
    741 F.2d 1342
    ,
    1345 (11th Cir. 1984). Plaintiff must have the opportunity “to
    support his allegations by argument however brief, and, if
    need be, by proof, however informal.” 
    Id.
     (citations omitted).
    Because this opportunity is not as strict as the process
    required before one can be deprived of a property interest,
    due process was satisfied by the same opportunities
    provided for notice and hearing for the termination itself --
    the predisciplinary conferences and subsequent Review
    Board Hearing.
    15
    interest in effective law enforcement is extremely high. . . .”).
    The importance of the Plaintiff’s property interest makes it
    necessary to provide some sort of pretermination hearing,
    which includes notice and an opportunity to be heard.
    A. Notice
    Notice was sufficient if it notified Plaintiff of the charges
    and was timely, whether oral or written. Loudermill, 
    470 U.S. at 546
    . Here, Plaintiff was afforded ample notice of the charges
    against him and of the evidence discovered by the investigation
    before each stage of the disciplinary process. He and his
    counsel were permitted to review the investigation report; and,
    at the first predisciplinary conference, Defendant Green told
    Plaintiff of the charges and the evidence against him --
    specifically the evidence contained in the deletion log.
    16
    B. Opportunity To Be Heard
    Plaintiff had several opportunities to be heard. All three of
    his initial statements and the two separate predisciplinary
    conferences provided Plaintiff the opportunity to present
    evidence in his defense -- to tell his side of the story. His
    choice to exercise his Fifth Amendment privileges does not
    negate the fact that the opportunity existed.10
    “Affording an employee the opportunity to respond after
    being confronted with the charges is all that pretermination due
    10
    Plaintiff argues that, to provide a
    meaningful opportunity to be heard,
    immunity must be given at every stage
    of an investigation into police
    misconduct.        This notion is not the law.
    See generally Buckner, 
    901 F.2d 491
    , 496
    (6th Cir. 1990); see also Garrity, 
    385 U.S. 493
    ; Loudermill, 
    470 U.S. 532
    .
    17
    process requires of the employer.” Buckner, 
    901 F.2d at 496
    .
    “The fact that [Plaintiff] had to choose whether to talk or to
    remain silent offends neither the [F]ifth nor the [F]ourteenth
    [A]mendment.” Gniotek v. City of Philadelphia, 
    808 F.2d 241
    ,
    245 (3d Cir. 1986).
    Before termination, a full evidentiary hearing is not
    required.   Loudermill, 
    470 U.S. at 545
    .         Nor does the
    pretermination hearing have to establish conclusively the
    propriety of the termination. 
    Id.
     Plaintiff need only be given an
    opportunity to present his side of the story. Plaintiff here had
    that opportunity on several occasions -- at both predisciplinary
    conferences and the three preceding interviews. A full post-
    termination proceeding was also held at which Plaintiff
    presented evidence in his defense.
    Conclusion
    18
    The material facts are undisputed. And, Defendants were
    entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, we affirm
    the judgment of the district court.
    AFFIRMED.
    19