United States v. Deon Delguato Roundtree , 408 F. App'x 243 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                            [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________           FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 10-10842         ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    Non-Argument Calendar      JANUARY 6, 2011
    ________________________        JOHN LEY
    CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 9:07-cr-80106-DMM-1
    UNITES STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    DEON DELGUATO ROUNDTREE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (January 6, 2011)
    Before BLACK, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Deon Delguato Roundtree appeals pro se from the denial of his 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2) motion for reduction in sentence. On appeal, Roundtree argues that
    the district court erred when it concluded that it did not have the authority to
    reduce his sentence pursuant to Amendment 706 to the Sentencing Guidelines.
    “We review de novo a district court’s conclusions about the scope of its
    legal authority under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2).” United States v. Jones, 
    548 F.3d 1366
    , 1368 (11th Cir. 2008). A district court may modify a term of imprisonment
    when a defendant was sentenced based on a sentencing range that has
    subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission. 
    18 U.S.C. § 3582
    (c)(2). A sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) is not authorized, however,
    if none of the amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines are applicable to the
    defendant. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(A). Even if an amendment applies, a
    sentence reduction is still not authorized if the amendment does not have the effect
    of lowering the defendant’s guidelines range. § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). Thus, a
    defendant who is subject to a statutory mandatory minimum sentence is not
    eligible for a sentence reduction. See United States v. Williams, 
    549 F.3d 1337
    ,
    1341–42 (11th Cir. 2008).
    On November 1, 2007, the Sentencing Commission promulgated
    Amendment 706, which amended the Drug Quantity Table in the United States
    Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(c). U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 706 (2007). The
    effect of Amendment 706 is to provide a two-level reduction in base offense levels
    2
    for certain crack cocaine offenses. See id. The Commission made this amendment
    retroactively applicable, effective as of March 3, 2008. See U.S.S.G. app. C,
    amend. 713 (listing Amendment 706 under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c) as a retroactively
    applicable amendment).
    Roundtree was sentenced on January 2, 2008, after Amendment 706 became
    effective. As he conceded, his guidelines range already incorporated the revision
    mandated by Amendment 706. It appears that Roundtree filed the motion to
    reduce his sentence following Amendment 713, not realizing or forgetting that the
    reduction had already been applied. Because his sentence already incorporated the
    revisions required, the district court had no authority under § 3582(c)(2) to modify
    his sentence. Amendment 706 did not subsequently lower his guidelines range,
    and, therefore, was inapplicable to him. Moreover, as the district court concluded,
    even if Amendment 706 was applicable to Roundtree, he was still ineligible for a
    sentence reduction because he was subject to a twenty-year mandatory minimum
    sentence. See Williams, 
    549 F.3d at
    1341–42.
    To the extent Roundtree challenges the sentencing disparity between crack
    cocaine and powder cocaine offenses as a violation of Equal Protection, this
    argument is outside the scope of a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. See United States v.
    Bravo, 
    203 F.3d 778
    , 782 (11th Cir. 2000) (declining to consider defendant’s
    3
    Eight Amendment claim because “such a collateral attack on [a] sentence” should
    be brought pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     and not § 3582(c)(2)). Nonetheless, we
    have held that the sentencing disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine
    offenses does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. See United States v. Butler,
    
    102 F.3d 1191
    , 1194–95 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that the one hundred to one
    sentencing disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine offenses does not
    violate a defendant’s equal protection rights). Accordingly, we affirm the denial
    of Roundtree’s § 3582(c)(2) motion.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-10842

Citation Numbers: 408 F. App'x 243

Judges: Anderson, Black, Per Curiam, Pryor

Filed Date: 1/6/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023