Pierre Lahens v. United States , 394 F. App'x 646 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                          [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                  FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 09-13400                ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    AUGUST 27, 2010
    Non-Argument Calendar
    JOHN LEY
    ________________________
    CLERK
    D. C. Docket Nos. 08-80637-CV-KLR,
    07-80149-CR-KLR
    PIERRE LAHENS,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (August 27, 2010)
    Before BLACK, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Pierre Lahens, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
    court’s denial of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his
    sentence. We granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on the following issue
    only:1 “whether the district court erred by concluding that counsel was not
    ineffective for failing to argue at sentencing that a prior conviction as a youthful
    offender could not be used as a predicate offense to sentence the defendant as a
    career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.” Doc. 30.
    On appeal, Lahens contends that his sentencing counsel’s performance was
    deficient for failing to argue that his prior 2002 conviction, as a youthful offender,
    could not be used as a predicate offense to sentence him as a career offender under
    U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Specifically, Lahens argues that Florida state law prohibited a
    youthful offender adjudication from counting as a prior felony conviction. Lahens
    further argues that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s performance because his
    sentencing range would have been significantly less had he not been classified as a
    career offender. Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs,
    we affirm.
    1
    Lahens also contends that his counsel was ineffective for failure to object to
    inaccuracies in the PSI, to request an evidentiary hearing at sentencing, and to seek a
    below-guideline sentence. However, these arguments are outside the scope of the COA, and we
    will not consider them. Doc. 30 at 2–3; see Murray v. United States, 
    145 F.3d 1249
    , 1251 (11th
    Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (The scope of review from a district court’s denial of a § 2255 motion is
    limited to the issues specified in the COA.).
    2
    When reviewing a district court’s denial of a § 2255 motion, we review legal
    issues de novo and factual findings under a clear error standard. Thomas v. United
    States, 
    572 F.3d 1300
    , 1303 (11th Cir. 2009). “A claim of ineffective assistance of
    counsel is a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo.” Gordon v.
    United States, 
    518 F.3d 1291
    , 1296 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
    The Sixth Amendment gives criminal defendants the right to effective
    assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 685–86, 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 2063 (1984). This constitutional right includes the right to effective
    assistance of counsel at sentencing. Jones v. United States, 
    224 F.3d 1251
    , 1259
    (11th Cir. 2000). To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
    defendant must demonstrate both (1) that his counsel’s performance was deficient,
    i.e., the performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2)
    that he suffered prejudice as a result of that deficient performance. Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at
    687–88, 692, 
    104 S. Ct. at 2064, 2067
    . We need not “address both
    components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.”
    
    Id. at 697
    , 
    104 S. Ct. at 2069
    . “[T]he failure to raise nonmeritorious issues does
    not constitute ineffective assistance.” Bolender v. Singletary, 
    16 F.3d 1547
    , 1573
    (11th Cir. 1994).
    3
    A district court may enhance a defendant’s sentence as a career offender
    under § 4B1.1 if:
    (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the
    defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the
    instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of
    violence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the
    defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a
    crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.
    U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).
    As used in § 4B1.1(a), the term “prior felony conviction” is defined as:
    a prior adult federal or state conviction for an offense
    punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one
    year, regardless of whether such offense is specifically
    designated as a felony and regardless of the actual sentence
    imposed. A conviction for an offense committed at age
    eighteen or older is an adult conviction. A conviction for an
    offense committed prior to age eighteen is an adult conviction if
    it is classified as an adult conviction under the laws of the
    jurisdiction in which the defendant was convicted . . . .
    U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, cmt. n.1.
    We have held that “prior youthful offender convictions under state law may be
    used as predicate offenses to classify an adult defendant as a career offender under
    § 4B1.1 if the defendant’s youthful offense resulted in an adult conviction and a
    sentence of more than one year and one month.” United States v. Wilkes, 
    464 F.3d 1240
    , 1242 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
    Lahens failed to satisfy the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of
    4
    counsel. The record shows that Lehens has two prior felonies that qualify as
    predicate offenses under § 4B1.1(a)—his 2002 youthful offender conviction for
    possession of cocaine with intent to sell and his 2004 conviction for aggravated
    fleeing or attempting to elude. The district court properly determined that the 2002
    youthful offender conviction satisfied the requirements for a “prior felony
    conviction” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a) because Lahens had already reached the age
    of 18 when he committed the offense, and he was sentenced to 2 years of
    imprisonment. See Wilkes, 
    464 F.3d at 1242
    . Because Lahens’ 2002 youthful
    offender conviction was properly considered as a predicate felony under § 4B1.1,
    Lahens was not prejudiced nor was his counsel’s performance deficient for failure
    to raise this nonmeritorious argument. Accordingly, we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
    5