Grace Lewis v. YMCA , 208 F.3d 1303 ( 2000 )

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APR 13 2000
THOMAS K. KAHN
No. 99-12255 CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 98-01799-CV-BU
GRACE LEWIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
YOUNG MEN’S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION, a corporation,
Defendant,
YOUNG MEN’S CHRISTIAN ASSOCIATION,
SOUTHSIDE BRANCH, a corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(April 13, 2000)
Before BIRCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
The principal issue in this case is whether 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B),
adopted by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, overrules the application of Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), to mixed-motive retaliation claims
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). In Price Waterhouse
the Supreme Court held that an employer would not be liable for sex discrimination
under Title VII if it could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
made the same disputed employment decision even in the absence of the alleged
discrimination. Subsequently Congress passed § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), which provides
that although an employer may limit plaintiff’s remedies in a mixed-motive case
involving race, color, religion, sex or national origin discrimination, it may no longer
foreclose liability absolutely in those cases. This is a retaliation case under the age
discrimination statute, a type of discrimination not specifically covered by § 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B). We hold that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) does not apply to mixed-
motive retaliation claims under the ADEA, and that the decision in Price Waterhouse
and our subsequent decisions require that the summary judgment for the defendant be
affirmed. See Lewis v. YMCA, 53 F.Supp.2d 1253, 1263 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
The facts, which are recited in detail by the district court, see 53 F.Supp.2d at
1255-57, are summarized as follows: Plaintiff was employed as an aerobics instructor
by the YMCA beginning approximately in April 1988. After she was taken off the
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aerobics schedule in August 1995 for alleged misconduct, she filed a lawsuit claiming
that she had been discriminated against because of her age. Her case was dismissed
in April 1997. In November 1997, plaintiff applied and was turned down for
employment at a different YMCA branch.
Plaintiff filed another lawsuit in the district court, claiming that the YMCA had
failed to hire her in retaliation for her previous age discrimination lawsuit, in violation
of the retaliation clause of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d).1 The YMCA moved for
summary judgment, arguing that, in relevant part, even if the failure to hire plaintiff
had been partially retaliatory, under the doctrine of Price Waterhouse as applied to
ADEA retaliation claims, an employer can escape liability by establishing that it
would have made the same employment decision even absent a retaliatory motive.
The YMCA presented evidence that plaintiff would have been turned down in any
event because of her previous misconduct. In response, plaintiff contended that the
Price Waterhouse defense as applied to ADEA retaliation claims had been overruled
1
29 U.S.C. § 623(d) states:
It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or
applicants for employment, for an employment agency to discriminate against any
individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any member thereof or
applicant for membership, because such individual, member or applicant for
membership has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or because
such individual, member or applicant for membership has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation
under this chapter.
3
by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), enacted by § 107(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991). Alternatively, plaintiff argued that
even if Price Waterhouse applied, the YMCA failed to show that she would not have
been hired in the absence of a retaliatory motive. The district court granted summary
judgment, on the ground that § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) was inapplicable and the YMCA had
established a Price Waterhouse defense. See 53 F.Supp.2d at 1262-63.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Harris v.
Board of Educ., 105 F.3d 591, 595 (11th Cir. 1997).
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989), the Supreme Court
held that an employer would not be liable for sex discrimination under Title VII if it
could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same
disputed employment decision even in the absence of the alleged discrimination. In
later cases, this circuit and others extended the holdings of Title VII cases to
discrimination cases brought under other statutes, including the ADEA. See, e.g.,
Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 594 (11th Cir. 1987). Prior to the
passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1991, therefore, Price Waterhouse governed the
treatment of mixed-motive cases involving ADEA retaliation.
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To determine whether § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) overruled the holding of Price
Waterhouse as applied to ADEA retaliation claims, we start, as always, with the
language of the statute:
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation
under section 2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent
demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the
same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating
factor, the court-
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief
(except as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney’s fees and
costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the
pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title;
and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order
requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion,
or payment, described in subparagraph (A).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, an
unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also
motivated the practice.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). With respect to mixed-motive cases involving the types of
discrimination listed in § 2000e-2(m)--race, color, religion, sex and national origin--
§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) by its terms clearly rolls back the holding of Price Waterhouse.
An employer may limit plaintiff’s remedies, but may no longer foreclose liability
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absolutely, by showing that it would have taken the same disputed action in the
absence of discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Retaliation prohibited by the ADEA under 29 U.S.C. § 623(d), however, is not
among the unlawful employment practices listed in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). That
omission is significant because § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) applies by its terms only to
“claim[s] in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this
title.”
In two previous cases, we addressed whether § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) applied to
discrimination claims based upon unlawful employment practices not listed in §
2000e-2(m). In Mabra v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 176 F.3d 1357, 1357-
58 (11th Cir. 1999) and Harris v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ., 99 F.3d 1078, 1084 n.5,
1085 (11th Cir. 1996), we decided that § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) did not apply to
discrimination claims brought under § 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983, respectively,
based on the lack of reference to those sections in § 2000e-2(m). We noted in Mabra
that other parts of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 explicitly amended § 1981, which
suggested that its omission in § 2000e-2(m) was intentional, not inadvertent. See
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quotation omitted) (“Where
Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
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another section of the same [a]ct, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”).
Similarly, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 makes reference to the ADEA in other
sections, see, e.g., § 1152, but not to ADEA retaliation claims in § 2000e-2(m).
Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), therefore, does not change the treatment of mixed-motive
cases of retaliation under the ADEA.
Since § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) is inapplicable, this case is analyzed under Price
Waterhouse. There was no error in the district court’s conclusion that the YMCA
would not have hired plaintiff even in the absence of discrimination. As the district
court explained in detail, plaintiff’s submission of a false certification and her taking
of the personnel file without permission would have led the YMCA to deny her
employment in any event. See Lewis v. YMCA, 53 F.Supp.2d at 1262-63.
AFFIRMED.
2
§ 115 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 states that:
Section 7(e) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29
U.S.C. 626(e)) is amended-
(1) by striking paragraph (2);
(2) by striking the paragraph designation in paragraph (1);
(3) by striking “Sections 6 and” and inserting “Section”; and
(4) by adding at the end the following:
“If a charge filed with the Commission under this Act is dismissed or the
proceedings of the Commission are otherwise terminated by the Commission, the
Commission shall notify the person aggrieved. A civil action may be brought under
this section by a person defined in section 11(a) against the respondent named in the
charge within 90 days after the date of the receipt of such notice.”.
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