Jorg Bober v. Safe Guard Services, LLC ( 2021 )


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  • USCA11 Case: 21-11529    Date Filed: 10/15/2021   Page: 1 of 4
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 21-11529
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ____________________
    JORG BOBER,
    Dr.,
    FIRST COAST PODIATRIC SURGERY
    AND WOUND CARE, LLC,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    versus
    SAFE GUARD SERVICES, LLC,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    USCA11 Case: 21-11529         Date Filed: 10/15/2021     Page: 2 of 4
    2                       Opinion of the Court                 21-11529
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cv-01093-BJD-PDB
    ____________________
    Before BRANCH, LUCK, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    The question in this appeal is whether a medical practice’s
    lawsuit against a federal contractor arises under the Medicare Act.
    See 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (h). The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
    (CMS), the federal agency that runs Medicare, contracted Safe
    Guard Services, LLC, to audit Dr. Jorg Bober’s podiatry practice for
    potential fraud. Bober and his practice sued Safe Guard for its con-
    duct during that audit, including its decision to suspend Medicare
    reimbursements and its treatment of Bober’s appeal of that deci-
    sion. Specifically, Bober brought five causes of action: (i) tortious
    interference with business relationships; (ii) defamation; (iii) negli-
    gence; (iv) negligent hiring, retention, training, and supervision;
    and (v) violations of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices
    Act.
    Under 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (h), the courts are stripped of subject
    matter jurisdiction over claims “arising under” the Medicare Act.
    Dial v. Healthspring of Ala., Inc., 
    541 F.3d 1044
     (11th Cir. 2008).
    Instead, claimants must exhaust administrative remedies before
    USCA11 Case: 21-11529         Date Filed: 10/15/2021    Page: 3 of 4
    21-11529               Opinion of the Court                         3
    seeking judicial review. 
    Id.
     (citing Heckler v. Ringer, 
    466 U.S. 602
    ,
    614 (1984)). The district court dismissed Bober’s claims without
    prejudice under the Medicare Act because Bober did not exhaust
    available administrative remedies before seeking relief in federal
    court. 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g).
    We agree that Bober’s claims arise under the Medicare Act
    and, because he did not exhaust administrative remedies, we affirm
    the district court. We review a district court’s dismissal for lack of
    jurisdiction de novo. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. U.S., EPA, 
    105 F.3d 599
    , 602 (11th Cir. 1997). We must construe the “arising un-
    der” language broadly. Heckler, 
    466 U.S. at 615
    . A claim arises un-
    der the Medicare Act when it is “inextricably intertwined” with the
    Medicare Act or where “both the standing and the substantive basis
    for presentation” is the Medicare Act. 
    Id. at 615, 624
    . Accordingly,
    “[a] claim may arise under the Medicare Act even though, as
    pleaded, it also arises under some other law.” Midland Psychiatric
    Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 
    145 F.3d 1000
    , 1004 (8th Cir. 1998)
    (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 
    422 U.S. 749
    , 760-61 (1975)).
    Bober argues that his claims “are wholly independent of ei-
    ther reimbursements or eligibility,” and thus do not arise under the
    Act. We disagree. As the district court explained, Bober’s claims
    arise under the Medicare Act because “[b]ut for the Medicare Act,
    [Safe Guard] would not have performed the investigatory functions
    complained of.” Bober’s claims are based entirely on the work that
    Safe Guard performed on behalf of CMS—auditing past Medicare
    payments, suspending future payments, addressing Bober’s appeal
    USCA11 Case: 21-11529         Date Filed: 10/15/2021    Page: 4 of 4
    4                      Opinion of the Court                 21-11529
    of the suspension, and the like. Accordingly, we agree with the dis-
    trict court that Bober’s claims arise under the Medicare Act and
    that he was required to administratively exhaust his claims before
    seeking judicial relief. Heckler, 
    466 U.S. at 615
    . Because he did not
    administratively exhaust his claims, the district court correctly dis-
    missed his complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
    AFFIRMED.