Williams v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections , 395 F. App'x 524 ( 2010 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 09-12850 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
AUGUST 9, 2010
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 06-00350-CV-J-32TEM
GARY KENNETH WILLIAMS,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(August 9, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, BLACK and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Gary Kenneth Williams, a Florida state prisoner serving a 30-year sentence
following his conviction for aggravated battery upon an elderly victim, appeals the
district court’s denial of his pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas petition. The
district court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) as to Williams’ claim the
inculpatory evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his conviction
because that evidence was based solely on the victim’s prior inconsistent
statements (insufficient-evidence claim). This Court then expanded the COA to
include Williams’ claim his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the
State’s use of those prior inconsistent statements (ineffective-assistance claim).
After, review, we affirm the district court.1
I.
Williams first contends the district court erred in denying his
insufficient-evidence claim because, without the victim’s prior inconsistent
statements, the State could not have proven the elements of the offense. Williams
1
We note the State, on appeal, has changed its position on exhaustion as to the
insufficient-evidence claim. Specifically, while the State conceded exhaustion in the district
court, it now asserts that exhaustion is incomplete. Despite the State’s arguments, however, we
will examine the merits of Williams’ insufficient-evidence claim. The district court ruled on the
merits of the claim and exhaustion is not jurisdictional. See Mauk v. Lanier, 484 F.3d 1352,
1357 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting the exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional). As the district
court did not examine the exhaustion issue because of the State’s apparent concession or waiver
of the issue, we decline to examine the exhaustion issue for the first time on appeal.
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asserts Supreme Court precedent holds a conviction based solely on such evidence
violates due process.
When considering a district court’s denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition, we
review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal
determinations de novo. Owen v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 568 F.3d 894, 907 (11th
Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1141 (2010). We will not grant habeas relief on
a state prisoner’s claim that was denied on the merits in state court unless the state
court decision: “‘(1) . . . was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States; or (2) . . . was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’” Putman v. Head,
268 F.3d 1223, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
Jackson v. Virginia, 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979), provides the federal due process
benchmark for evidentiary sufficiency in criminal cases. See Green v. Nelson, 595
F.3d 1245, 1252-53 (11th Cir. 2010). “[T]he relevant question is whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 99 S. Ct. at 2789.
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A conviction for aggravated battery upon an elderly victim under
§ 784.08(2)(A), Fla. Stat., requires proof the defendant intended to cause the
elderly victim great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent
disfigurement. See §§ 784.045(1)(a), 784.08, Fla. Stat.; Beard v. State, 842 So. 2d
174, 175-76 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). Intent “must be determined by surrounding
circumstances.” Beard, 842 So. 2d at 176.
The district court did not err in denying Williams’ insufficient-evidence
claim. Notably, even assuming prior inconsistent statements, standing alone, are
insufficient to sustain a criminal conviction,2 Williams’ conviction did not rest
solely on such evidence. In particular, the State introduced two admissions by
Williams that he had struck the victim. These admissions, along with evidence of
the victim’s injuries, the victim’s vulnerable age, and other surrounding
circumstances, sufficiently established each element of Williams’ offense.
2
We note that neither Jackson nor the other two Supreme Court cases cited by Williams
provide that prior inconsistent statements are insufficient to sustain a criminal conviction. See
Jackson, 99 S. Ct. at 2792 (holding the circumstantial evidence in the record supported a finding
of intent to kill); Fiore v. White, 121 S. Ct. 712, 713-14 (2001) (holding the petitioner’s
conviction for operating a hazardous waste facility without a permit violated due process
because the prosecution presented no evidence of failure to possess a permit); Bridges v. Wixon,
65 S. Ct. 1443, 1452 (1945) (holding only that a court may not admit hearsay for substantive, as
opposed to impeachment, purposes).
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II.
Williams next asserts the district court erred in denying his
ineffective-assistance claim. He asserts his trial attorney’s failure to object to the
State’s use of the victim’s prior inconsistent statements as the only substantive
evidence of guilt amounted to deficient performance. Further, according to
Williams, this deficient performance was prejudicial because his conviction rested
solely on those prior inconsistent statements.
An ineffective-assistance claim presents a mixed question of law and fact
which we review de novo. Williams v. Allen, 598 F.3d 778, 788 (11th Cir. 2010).
To succeed on an ineffective-assistance claim, the petitioner must show his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was violated because (1) his attorney’s performance
was deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland
v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2070 (1984). The first prong requires the
petitioner to show, “considering all the circumstances,” his attorney’s
“representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id. at 2064-
65. Judicial review of an attorney’s performance “must be highly deferential,” and
the court must “eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight” and evaluate the
attorney’s performance from that attorney’s perspective at the time the challenged
conduct occurred. Id. at 2065. To meet the second prong, the petitioner must
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“affirmatively prove prejudice.” Id. at 2067. The petitioner “must show that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 2068.
The district court did not err in denying Williams’ ineffective-assistance
claim. Specifically, Williams’ trial attorney was not deficient for failing to object
to the State’s use of the victim’s prior inconsistent statements as the only
substantive evidence of guilt. As discussed in issue one, there was other evidence
that sufficiently established Williams’ guilt, and such an objection would have
been meritless. Further, even assuming deficient performance, Williams suffered
no prejudice because the totality of the evidence before the jury renders it
reasonably improbable that, without the prior inconsistent statements, the jury
would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.
AFFIRMED.
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