Disciplinary Counsel v. Ford (Slip Opinion) , 2021 Ohio 3661 ( 2021 )


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  • [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as
    Disciplinary Counsel v. Ford, Slip Opinion No. 
    2021-Ohio-3661
    .]
    NOTICE
    This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
    advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
    promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
    South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
    formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
    the opinion is published.
    SLIP OPINION NO. 
    2021-OHIO-3661
    DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. FORD.
    [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
    may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Ford, Slip Opinion No.
    
    2021-Ohio-3661
    .]
    Attorneys—Misconduct—Indefinite suspension imposed to run concurrently with
    prior indefinite suspension on attorney who continued to practice law and
    committed multiple violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct while
    under a disciplinary suspension—Conditions on reinstatement.
    (No. 2021-0441—Submitted June 16, 2021—Decided October 20, 2021.)
    ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme
    Court, No. 2020-058.
    __________________
    Per Curiam.
    {¶ 1} Respondent, Elizabeth Lorraine Ford, of Cincinnati, Ohio, Attorney
    Registration No. 0068502, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1997.
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    {¶ 2} On December 2, 2005, we suspended Ford’s license for about 13
    months after she failed to register as an attorney for the 2005-2007 biennium. See
    In re Attorney Registration Suspension of Ford, 
    107 Ohio St.3d 1431
    , 2005-Ohio-
    6408, 
    838 N.E.2d 671
    ; In re Reinstatement of Ford, 
    113 Ohio St.3d 1425
    , 2007-
    Ohio-1313, 
    863 N.E.2d 644
    . On November 1, 2019, we suspended her for failing
    to register for the 2019-2021 biennium. See In re Attorney Registration Suspension
    of Ford, 
    157 Ohio St.3d 1472
    , 
    2019-Ohio-4529
    , 
    134 N.E.3d 183
    . And on March
    19, 2020, we indefinitely suspended her for professional misconduct that included
    dishonesty, failing to reasonably communicate with clients in four matters, failing
    to deposit unearned fees into a client trust account, and failing to cooperate in the
    ensuing disciplinary investigations. See Disciplinary Counsel v. Ford, 
    159 Ohio St.3d 558
    , 
    2020-Ohio-998
    , 
    152 N.E.3d 256
    . Ford’s November 2019 and March
    2020 suspensions remain in effect.
    {¶ 3} In a September 2020 complaint, relator, disciplinary counsel, alleged
    that both before and after Ford’s November 2019 attorney-registration suspension,
    she committed professional misconduct in three other client matters.             Ford
    stipulated to all but one of the charges, which the parties agreed to dismiss, and the
    parties jointly recommended that Ford serve another indefinite suspension to run
    concurrently with her March 2020 indefinite suspension. After a hearing before a
    three-member panel of the Board of Professional Conduct, the board issued a report
    finding that Ford had engaged in the stipulated misconduct and recommending that
    we impose an indefinite suspension to run consecutively to the suspension we
    imposed in March 2020 and that we impose conditions on her reinstatement.
    {¶ 4} Based on our independent review of the record, we adopt the board’s
    findings of misconduct and recommended sanction, but as initially recommended
    by the parties, we conclude that Ford’s second indefinite suspension shall run
    concurrently with her first.
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    January Term, 2021
    Misconduct
    The Goldfuss matter
    {¶ 5} On July 26, 2019, Mary April Goldfuss retained Ford to file an
    emergency custody action. Ford did not have a client trust account and therefore
    did not deposit any portion of Goldfuss’s advanced fee into a trust account. After
    Goldfuss sent Ford two unanswered text messages seeking information about her
    case, Ford sent Goldfuss a text message on August 20, implying that she had filed
    the custody action. Specifically, Ford’s message stated that she would “follow-up
    on our hearing date” while she was at the courthouse, that service may take longer
    because of the circumstances in the matter, and that she was “trying to get it set on
    the expedited docket.” Ford, however, had not filed anything on Goldfuss’s behalf.
    {¶ 6} Over the next month, Goldfuss sent Ford multiple text messages
    seeking an update and expressing frustrations with Ford’s failure to communicate.
    But those messages went unanswered. Goldfuss then sent a letter by certified mail
    and an email to Ford seeking a refund. The letter was returned as “unclaimed,” and
    Ford did not reply to Goldfuss’s email. Nor did Ford ever file anything on
    Goldfuss’s behalf. Goldfuss filed a grievance, and although Ford initially requested
    an extension of time to respond to the grievance, she ultimately failed to submit a
    written response to relator.    Ford also failed to appear for a February 2020
    deposition in the disciplinary matter. In April 2020, about eight months after
    Goldfuss had terminated Ford’s representation, Ford refunded Goldfuss’s money.
    {¶ 7} Based on this conduct, the parties stipulated and the board found that
    Ford violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3 (requiring a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence
    in representing a client), 1.4(a)(3) (requiring a lawyer to keep a client reasonably
    informed about the status of a matter), 1.4(a)(4) (requiring a lawyer to comply as
    soon as practicable with reasonable requests for information from a client), 1.15(c)
    (requiring a lawyer to deposit advanced legal fees and expenses into a client trust
    account), 1.16(e) (requiring a lawyer to promptly refund any unearned fee upon the
    3
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    lawyer’s withdrawal from employment), 8.1(b) (prohibiting a lawyer from
    knowingly failing to respond to a demand for information by a disciplinary
    authority during an investigation), and 8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging
    in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation).
    The Streckfuss matter
    {¶ 8} In 2018, Jeffrey Streckfuss retained Ford to assist him in reinstating
    his parenting time, which had been suspended after he failed to comply with a court
    order requiring him to complete medical and mental-health assessments. In July
    2019, Ford filed the motion to reinstate Streckfuss’s parenting time; the motion
    stated that Streckfuss had obtained the requisite health assessments. Ford, however,
    failed to otherwise prosecute the motion.
    {¶ 9} The court scheduled a hearing for December 5, 2019, on Streckfuss’s
    motion and on a motion for contempt filed by Streckfuss’s ex-wife. Although we
    had imposed Ford’s attorney-registration suspension on November 1, 2019, she
    failed to notify the court of her suspension or withdraw as Streckfuss’s counsel.
    The night before the hearing, Ford sent Streckfuss a text message informing him of
    her suspension and that she was out of state due to a death in her family. In the text
    message, Ford advised Streckfuss to attend the hearing on his own and on how to
    request reinstatement of his parenting time. Ford further informed Streckfuss that
    obtaining a new judge was no longer possible so if the judge requested to interview
    his children, he should agree to it. With respect to the contempt motion, Ford
    advised Streckfuss to request more time in order to secure counsel and obtain more
    information and discovery, and she suggested that he “blame” Ford by indicating
    that she was out of state due to a family emergency and would no longer be involved
    in the case. Ford further stated that she and Streckfuss could strategize when she
    returned.
    {¶ 10} As instructed by Ford, Streckfuss appeared for the December 5
    hearing and informed a magistrate that Ford was out of state due to a death in her
    4
    January Term, 2021
    family. The magistrate continued the hearing on the contempt motion but denied
    Streckfuss’s motion to reinstate his parenting time; neither Ford nor Streckfuss had
    submitted evidence indicating that Streckfuss had completed the necessary health
    assessments. Streckfuss thereafter sent Ford several messages seeking copies of
    his assessments, but she did not respond to his messages.
    {¶ 11} After discovering that Ford’s license was suspended, the magistrate
    filed a grievance. Relator requested that Ford submit a written response to the
    grievance, but she failed to do so. She also failed to appear for a deposition.
    {¶ 12} Based on this conduct, the parties stipulated and the board found that
    Ford violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4), 1.16(a)(1) (requiring a lawyer
    to withdraw from representation if the representation will result in a violation of
    the Rules of Professional Conduct), 5.5(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from practicing
    law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that
    jurisdiction), and 8.1(b).
    The Monroe matter
    {¶ 13} In May 2019, Walter Monroe retained Ford to represent him in a
    divorce proceeding and provided her with his original paperwork relevant to the
    matter. Ford did not deposit any portion of Monroe’s advanced $3,000 fee into a
    client trust account. Monroe and Ford thereafter agreed to hold off filing the
    divorce complaint.
    {¶ 14} In early December 2019, Monroe sent Ford text messages requesting
    that she file the complaint. Ford failed to respond, and Monroe discovered that we
    had suspended her license and that she had a disciplinary matter already pending
    against her. He thereafter sent her multiple messages requesting a refund of his
    $3,000 and that she return his paperwork. Ford did not respond; nor did she refund
    his money or return his documents. Monroe filed a grievance, and Ford again failed
    to respond to relator’s inquiries.
    5
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    {¶ 15} Based on this conduct, the parties stipulated and the board found that
    Ford violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(4), 1.15(c), 1.16(d) (requiring a lawyer to
    promptly deliver client papers and property upon termination of representation),
    1.16(e), and 8.1(b). Ford also stipulated that she owes Monroe $3,000 in restitution.
    {¶ 16} We agree with the board’s findings of misconduct.
    Sanction
    {¶ 17} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider all
    relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the
    aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13), and the sanctions
    imposed in similar cases.
    {¶ 18} As for aggravating factors, the board found that Ford has a prior
    disciplinary record and had a dishonest or selfish motive, engaged in a pattern of
    misconduct, committed multiple offenses, failed to initially cooperate in the
    disciplinary investigations, and failed to make restitution.       See Gov.Bar R.
    V(13)(B)(1) through (5) and (9). The board found only one mitigating factor: after
    the filing of relator’s formal complaint, Ford made full and free disclosures and had
    a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings.        See Gov.Bar R.
    V(13)(C)(4).    Although Ford testified about her mental-health struggles and
    submitted information from her treating medical professionals, the board found—
    and we agree—that she failed to submit sufficient evidence establishing the
    existence of a qualifying mental disorder under Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(7).
    {¶ 19} In crafting a recommended sanction, the board noted that Ford’s
    misconduct here was similar to the misconduct that resulted in her March 2020
    indefinite suspension and had occurred during the same approximate time period—
    except that in this matter, Ford also violated Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(a). The board
    acknowledged that disbarment is the presumed sanction for an attorney who
    continued to practice while suspended, but it concluded that Ford’s particular
    misconduct here was not so egregious as to warrant the ultimate sanction of
    6
    January Term, 2021
    permanent disbarment. The board therefore recommended that we issue another
    indefinite suspension to run consecutively with her prior indefinite suspension and
    impose conditions on her reinstatement.
    {¶ 20} We agree that an indefinite suspension is appropriate. Although we
    have held that the presumptive sanction for continuing to practice law while
    suspended is disbarment, we have also “clarified that an indefinite suspension is
    more appropriate for attorneys who continued to practice law after we had
    suspended their licenses for continuing-legal-education and registration
    violations.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Sarver, 
    163 Ohio St.3d 371
    , 
    2020-Ohio-5478
    ,
    
    170 N.E.3d 799
    , ¶ 45; see also Disciplinary Counsel v. Freeman, 
    126 Ohio St.3d 389
    , 
    2010-Ohio-3824
    , 
    934 N.E.2d 328
    , ¶ 14 (“we have routinely imposed indefinite
    suspensions for attorneys who continued to practice law after we have suspended
    their licenses for [continuing-legal-education] and registration violations”). Here,
    Ford admitted that she violated Prof.Cond.R. 5.5(a) by giving legal advice to
    Streckfuss after her November 1, 2019 attorney-registration suspension.
    {¶ 21} We also conclude that, as jointly recommended by the parties, Ford’s
    indefinite suspension shall run concurrently with the indefinite suspension that we
    imposed in March 2020. Although each disciplinary case is an independent action,
    “relatively contemporaneous ethical infractions prosecuted separately do not
    necessarily justify a harsher sanction.” Dayton Bar Assn. v. Scaccia, 
    143 Ohio St.3d 144
    , 
    2015-Ohio-2487
    , 
    34 N.E.3d 919
    , ¶ 17. Therefore, when appropriate, we
    have imposed a suspension to run concurrently with a prior sanction if the
    misconduct in both cases occurred over essentially the same time period. See, e.g.,
    id.; Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Scott-Chestang, 
    113 Ohio St.3d 310
    , 2007-Ohio-
    1956, 
    865 N.E.2d 48
    . As acknowledged by the board, Ford’s misconduct here and
    in her prior case was cumulative, having occurred over a continuation of the same
    general period of time.
    7
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    {¶ 22} Further, to support the imposition of a consecutive indefinite
    suspension, the board mostly cited cases in which the attorneys failed to participate
    in the second disciplinary matter, resulting in default proceedings. See, e.g.,
    Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. King, 
    109 Ohio St.3d 95
    , 
    2006-Ohio-1932
    , 
    846 N.E.2d 37
    ; Dayton Bar Assn. v. Siehl, 
    135 Ohio St.3d 261
    , 
    2013-Ohio-735
    , 
    985 N.E.2d 1274
    ; Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Church, 
    116 Ohio St.3d 563
    , 
    2008-Ohio-81
    , 
    880 N.E.2d 917
    .     But here, after the filing of relator’s formal complaint, Ford
    cooperated in the disciplinary process, and the matter resulted in a fully stipulated
    case.
    Conclusion
    {¶ 23} For the reasons explained above, Elizabeth Lorraine Ford is
    indefinitely suspended from the practice of law in Ohio. The suspension shall run
    concurrently with the indefinite suspension imposed on March 19, 2020, in
    Disciplinary Counsel v. Ford, 
    159 Ohio St.3d 558
    , 
    2020-Ohio-998
    , 
    152 N.E.3d 256
    . In addition to the requirements of Gov.Bar R. V(25), Ford’s reinstatement
    shall be conditioned on submission of proof that she has (1) made restitution to
    Walter Monroe in the amount of $3,000, (2) undergone an evaluation by the Ohio
    Lawyers Assistance Program and complied with any treatment or counseling
    recommendations resulting from the evaluation, and (3) obtained a written opinion
    from a qualified healthcare professional that she is capable of returning to the
    competent, ethical, and professional practice of law. Costs are taxed to Ford.
    Judgment accordingly.
    KENNEDY, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.
    O’CONNOR, C.J., concurs in part and dissents in part and would impose a
    permanent disbarment.
    FISCHER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with an opinion.
    _________________
    FISCHER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
    8
    January Term, 2021
    {¶ 24} I agree with the majority opinion’s adoption of the Board of
    Professional Conduct’s findings of misconduct committed by respondent, Elizabeth
    Lorraine Ford, and I concur in the decision to indefinitely suspend her from the
    practice of law. I disagree, however, with the majority opinion’s conclusion that
    an indefinite suspension to run concurrently with Ford’s prior indefinite suspension
    is warranted in this case. Rather, I agree with the board that Ford’s sanction for her
    misconduct should be an indefinite suspension that would run, in effect,
    consecutively to the indefinite suspension that we imposed on March 19, 2020, with
    her second indefinite suspension beginning on the date of this opinion. Therefore,
    I must respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
    An indefinite suspension to run consecutively to Ford’s previous indefinite
    suspension is the appropriate sanction for her misconduct
    {¶ 25} Based on Ford’s cumulative misconduct—practicing law while
    under suspension after failing to register for the 2019-2021 biennium and numerous
    violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct—the board determined that Ford
    should be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law, with conditions, and that
    the suspension should run consecutively to the indefinite suspension that this court
    imposed on March 19, 2020. While this court is the ultimate arbiter of attorney
    discipline and we are always free to exercise our independent judgment as to
    evidentiary weight and applicable law, see Disciplinary Counsel v. Kelly, 
    121 Ohio St.3d 39
    , 
    2009-Ohio-317
    , 
    901 N.E.2d 798
    , ¶ 11, I believe this court should adopt
    the board’s recommended sanction in this case.
    {¶ 26} “The primary purpose of the disciplinary process is to protect the
    public from lawyers who are unworthy of the trust and confidence essential to the
    attorney-client relationship and to allow us to ascertain the lawyer’s fitness to
    practice law.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Sabroff, 
    123 Ohio St.3d 182
    , 2009-Ohio-
    4205, 
    915 N.E.2d 307
    , ¶ 20. The court considers all relevant factors, including the
    ethical duties violated, the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R.
    9
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    V(13), and the sanctions adopted in similar cases when deciding the appropriate
    sanction for attorney misconduct. Disciplinary Counsel v. Sarver, 
    163 Ohio St.3d 371
    , 
    2020-Ohio-5478
    , 
    170 N.E.3d 799
    , ¶ 27; Dayton Bar Assn. v. Sullivan, 
    158 Ohio St.3d 423
    , 
    2020-Ohio-124
    , 
    144 N.E.3d 401
    , ¶ 28.
    {¶ 27} The presumptive sanction for continuing to practice law while under
    suspension is disbarment. Sarver at ¶ 28; Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoskins, 
    150 Ohio St.3d 41
    , 
    2017-Ohio-2924
    , 
    78 N.E.3d 845
    , ¶ 27. However, “an indefinite
    suspension is more appropriate for attorneys who continued to practice law after
    we had suspended their licenses for continuing-legal-education and registration
    violations as well as for those who continued to practice law during suspensions for
    less egregious forms of misconduct.” Sarver at ¶ 45.
    {¶ 28} Indefinite suspension, at the very least, is an appropriate sanction in
    this case because Ford practiced law while under suspension for failing to register
    for the 2019-2021 biennium, see Disciplinary Counsel v. Ford, 
    159 Ohio St.3d 558
    ,
    
    2020-Ohio-998
    , 
    152 N.E.3d 256
    , ¶ 1. However, we must determine whether Ford’s
    indefinite suspension in this case should run consecutively with or concurrently to
    the indefinite suspension that we imposed in March 2020.
    {¶ 29} While “relatively contemporaneous ethical infractions prosecuted
    separately do not necessarily justify a harsher sanction,” Dayton Bar Assn. v.
    Scaccia, 
    143 Ohio St.3d 144
    , 
    2015-Ohio-2487
    , 
    34 N.E.3d 919
    , ¶ 17, sometimes
    consecutive sanctions can be necessary “ ‘to ensure a lawyer’s rehabilitation and
    thereby protect the public from additional misconduct,’ ” 
    id.,
     quoting Disciplinary
    Counsel v. Young, 113 Ohio St.3d. 36, 
    2007-Ohio-975
    , 
    862 N.E.2d 504
    , ¶ 32.
    When considering whether to impose an indefinite suspension concurrently with or
    consecutively to a previously imposed indefinite suspension, this court has looked
    at several factors, including the time frame of the violations, the attorney’s
    cooperation in the disciplinary process, and the seriousness of the misconduct. See
    Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. King, 
    109 Ohio St.3d 95
    , 
    2006-Ohio-1932
    , 
    846 N.E.2d 10
    January Term, 2021
    37, ¶ 9 (a consecutive indefinite suspension was appropriate when the attorney
    failed to cooperate in the disciplinary process and committed serious violations of
    the Rules of Professional Conduct); Young at ¶ 31-34 (a consecutive indefinite
    suspension was appropriate when the combination of the attorney’s abandonment
    of his duties to his incompetent ward and his prior disciplinary record outweighed
    evidence of good character and cooperation in the disciplinary process); Cuyahoga
    Cty. Bar Assn. v. Scott-Chestang, 
    113 Ohio St.3d 310
    , 
    2007-Ohio-1956
    , 
    865 N.E.2d 48
    , ¶ 4, 9-10 (“Scott-Chestang II”) (a concurrent indefinite suspension was imposed
    on an attorney whose misconduct occurred within the same time frame as the
    misconduct that resulted in a prior indefinite suspension). Given the serious
    violations that Ford committed prior to the temporary suspension imposed in
    November 2019 and during the temporary suspension, all while disciplinary
    matters were pending, I believe the indefinite suspensions should run
    consecutively.
    {¶ 30} In Ford’s most recent disciplinary case, decided in March 2020, this
    court found that, between 2016 and 2018, Ford violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.4(a)(4),
    1.15(c), 1.16(d), 8.1(b), and 8.4(c), and Gov.Bar R. V(9)(G). Ford at ¶ 5, 12, 17,
    19, 22. As a result of Ford’s misconduct, we determined that an indefinite
    suspension was the appropriate sanction to protect the public. Ford at ¶ 29.
    {¶ 31} In this matter, we find that Ford committed similar violations
    relating to client matters. She violated Prof.Cond.R. 1.3, 1.4(a)(3), 1.4(a)(4),
    1.15(c), 1.16(e), and 8.1(b) on more than one occasion and also violated
    Prof.Cond.R. 1.16(a), 1.16(d), 5.5(a), and 8.4(c), all between 2018 and 2020.
    Though Ford’s actions demonstrate a long pattern of misconduct, I do not believe
    we can reasonably find that these violations were committed contemporaneously
    with her other violations.   In Scott-Chestang II, the court determined that a
    concurrent indefinite suspension was appropriate because new violations in 2003
    occurred during the same time frame as the attorney’s previous violations, which
    11
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    had occurred between 2000 and 2003. Scott-Chestang II, at ¶ 4, 9-10; see also
    Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Scott-Chestang, 
    109 Ohio St.3d 405
    , 
    2006-Ohio-2711
    ,
    
    848 N.E.2d 507
    , ¶ 3-26. In contrast, the time frames in Ford’s two disciplinary
    cases do not demonstrate contemporaneous violations but rather a continuing
    pattern of client neglect, a failure to communicate, and dishonest behavior, with the
    instances in this case occurring over a two-year time frame subsequent to the time
    frame in the first case.    Therefore, concurrent indefinite suspensions are not
    supported, because these violations did not occur within the same time frame.
    {¶ 32} Furthermore, while Ford somewhat cooperated in the disciplinary
    process, her misconduct was very serious—she ignored her clients who had time-
    sensitive cases, like emergency-custody actions and motions for parenting time, and
    she lied to those clients about the status of their cases, all while wrongfully keeping
    some funds paid for services that she never rendered. Ford’s violations occurred in
    matters relating to family law, and Ford was entrusted by one client to aid in
    asserting one of the most fundamental liberty interests—the right to parent one’s
    child. See In re Murray, 
    52 Ohio St.3d 155
    , 157, 
    556 N.E.2d 1169
     (1990) (parents
    have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their
    child, and the right to raise one’s child is an essential and basic civil right). Ford
    abandoned her vulnerable clients in their times of need, displayed a dishonest and
    selfish motive, and added insult to injury to one client when she failed to make
    restitution. While Ford’s misconduct is not as egregious as that in Young, the
    misconduct is serious enough to warrant a consecutive indefinite suspension to
    protect the public.
    {¶ 33} A consecutive indefinite suspension will certainly help better protect
    the public; the additional time may also help Ford get the support that she needs.
    While unable to consider Ford’s mental health as a mitigating factor due to her
    failure to provide sufficient evidence of her condition, the record does indicate that
    Ford’s mental-health concerns and serious stressors may have contributed to her
    12
    January Term, 2021
    misconduct. The board recommended and this court adopted as a condition of its
    sanction that Ford undergo an evaluation by the Ohio Lawyers Assistance Program
    and comply with any treatment or counseling recommendations resulting from that
    evaluation. Additional time away from the practice of law could be beneficial and
    an incentive for Ford to get the assistance and support that she needs before she can
    be considered for reinstatement.
    {¶ 34} Finally and notably, neither party objected to the board’s
    recommendation of a consecutive indefinite suspension. After reviewing the
    record, the applicable law, and the board’s report and recommendation, I believe a
    consecutive indefinite suspension is appropriate in this case.
    Conclusion
    {¶ 35} I would find that a consecutive indefinite suspension with the
    conditions recommended by the board is the appropriate sanction for Ford’s serious
    violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct in this case and would conclude
    that this suspension begins as of the date of this opinion. A consecutive indefinite
    suspension, a sanction that neither party objected to, is supported by law and is the
    best solution to protect the public and to help Ford get the assistance that she needs.
    Because the majority opinion reaches a different conclusion as to when the
    indefinite suspension in this case should begin, I must respectfully concur in part
    and dissent in part.
    _________________
    Joseph M. Caligiuri, Disciplinary Counsel, and Michelle R. Bowman and
    Martha S. Asseff, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator.
    Elizabeth L. Ford, pro se.
    _________________
    13