Pamela Chenault v. AmeriPride Linen and Apparel , 188 F. App'x 974 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
_____________________________U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
July 12, 2006
No. 05-14192 THOMAS K. KAHN
_____________________________ CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 04-02792-CV-3-IPJ
PAMELA CHENAULT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
AMERIPRIDE LINEN AND
APPAREL SERVICES
also known as AMERICAN LINEN
SUPPLY COMPANY
Defendant-Appellee.
_________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________________________
(July 12, 2006)
Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, CARNES and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Pamela Chenault appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Ameripride Linen
and Apparel Services (“Ameripride”), on her claim of sexual harassment, in
violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. No reversible error has been shown;
we affirm.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
the facts--as supported by the evidence in the record--and reasonable inferences
from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Young v.
City of Palm Bay, 358 F.3d 859, 860 (11th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is
proper where no genuine issue of material fact exists. Id.Chenault challenges the district court’s determination that she did not
establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment that resulted in a tangible
employment action. Chenault, who worked at Ameripride from May 1999 until
November 2003, had a sexual relationship with her supervisor, Steve Brantley,
from February 2003 until she ended the affair in October 2003. On 6 November
2003, Brantley fired Chenault for not notifying him of her absence from work the
previous day; and Chenault alleges that Brantley actually fired her because she
ended their affair.
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To establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment, a plaintiff must show
that: (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she has been subject to unwelcome
sexual harassment; (3) the harassment was because of her sex; (4) the harassment
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of
employment; and (5) there is a basis for holding the employer liable. Pipkins v.
City of Temple Terrace, 267 F.3d 1197, 1199 (11th Cir. 2001).
After reviewing the record, we are not persuaded that Chenault could show
that the alleged harassment by Brantley was because of her sex. Chenault testified
that, before she ended her relationship with Brantley, he suggested to her that she
was missing too much work. Shortly before Chenault ended the affair in October
2003, Brantley met with Mary Geraldine Stanford, General Manager of the
Ameripride plant where he and Chenault worked, and informed her that Chenault
had many absences from work. Stanford recommended that Brantley give
Chenault a written warning about her absences. Brantley then issued Chenault a
written warning stating that her excessive absences could result in her termination.
After Chenault ended her relationship with Brantley, she was absent from work on
November 5; and she did not provide Ameripride with notice of this absence. On
November 6, Brantley told Chenault that she was fired because she had been
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absent from work without calling into Ameripride to inform the company of her
November 5 absence.
Even if Brantley fired Chenault, not for her November 5 absence, but
because--as she claims--she ended their affair, Chenault has presented no evidence
that she was fired because of her sex. See Pipkins, 267 F.3d at 1200 (concluding
that, when plaintiff was fired after ending a consensual sexual relationship with a
supervisor, her termination was “attributable to [the supervisor’s] personal
animosity and would not meet the Title VII requirement that the alteration of terms
and conditions of employment be because of sex”) (internal quotation omitted);
Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., 347 F.3d 1272, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003)
(explaining that, when reviewing an allegation of sexual harassment that resulted
in an employee’s termination, we must determine whether the employer took the
employee’s sex into account when she was terminated). Without this showing, the
district court properly concluded that Chenault had not presented a prima facie
case of sex discrimination.
More important, even assuming that Chenault established a prima facie case
of discrimination, she has not shown that Ameripride’s reason for her termination
--her absence from work without giving the company prior notice--was a pretext
for discrimination. See Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342 (11th Cir. 2002)
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(explaining that, if plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination,
employer has burden of presenting a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
employment decision, which plaintiff then may rebut as pretext for
discrimination). Therefore, the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Ameripride was appropriate.
AFFIRMED.
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