Shane P. Czetli v. Secretary, DOC , 212 F. App'x 879 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 27, 2006
No. 06-12344 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 06-00165-CV-ORL-28-KRS
SHANE P. CZETLI,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, DOC,
FL ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(December 27, 2006)
Before DUBINA, BLACK and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Florida prisoner Shane P. Czetli, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s sua sponte dismissal without prejudice of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition.
The district court dismissed the petition because Czetli failed to pay the appropriate
filing fee, submit an affidavit of indigency, or file an in forma pauperis (IFP)
application. Czetli also appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to
reconsider, in which he requested his § 2254 petition be reinstated. We granted a
certificate of appealability on the following issues:
(1) Whether the district court properly dismissed the pro se 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 petition without first giving the petitioner notice and an
opportunity to pay the filing fee or file the required documentation to
proceed in forma pauperis.
(2) Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the dismissal without
prejudice after he submitted an indigency application.
As an initial matter, the COA frames the issue as whether the district court
properly dismissed Czetli’s § 2254 petition. While the record reflects Czetli has in
fact filed only a motion to extend time, rather than a § 2254 petition, the district
court repeatedly referred to the motion as a petition, and otherwise treated it as
such. Thus, we will accordingly treat Czetli’s motion to extend time as a § 2254
petition.
We review a district court’s order dismissing an action for failure to comply
with local rules for an abuse of discretion. Kilgo v. Ricks, 983 F.2d 189, 192 (11th
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Cir. 1993). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), a district court has
the authority to dismiss actions for failure to comply with a local rule of the
district court. Id. The district court may exercise this power sua sponte, pursuant
to the inherent power of federal courts to manage their dockets. Pond v. Braniff
Airways, Inc., 453 F.2d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 1972).1
Rule 1.03(e) of the Local Rules of the Middle District of Florida states:
The Clerk shall accept for filing all prisoner cases filed with or
without the required filing fee or application to proceed in forma
pauperis. However, a prisoner case will be subject to dismissal by
the Court, sua sponte, if the filing fee is not paid or if the application
is not filed within 30 days of the commencement of the action.
In discussing a local rule requiring a timely response to a motion to dismiss,
this Court noted a local rule “should not serve as a basis for dismissing a pro se
civil rights complaint where, as here, there is nothing to indicate plaintiff ever was
made aware of [the local rule] prior to dismissal.” Mitchell v. Inman, 682 F.2d
886, 887 (11th Cir. 1982). Following Mitchell, we held a district court’s local rule
requiring timely opposition to a motion for summary judgment did not constitute
constructive notice to a pro se inmate that the motion for summary judgment
would be taken under advisement within 10 days. Moore v. Florida, 703 F.2d
1In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this
Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior
to close of business on September 30, 1981.
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516, 520 (11th Cir. 1983). Also, where a district court sua sponte dismissed a
state prisoner’s § 1983 complaint for failure to pay an initial partial filing fee, we
vacated and remanded, concluding the district court erred by not taking reasonable
steps to discover whether the prisoner complied with its IFP order to pay an initial
partial filing fee. Wilson v. Sargent, 313 F.3d 1315, 1321 (11th Cir. 2002).
Here, there is no evidence in the record suggesting the district court made
Czetli aware of Local Rule 1.03(e) before dismissing his case. Czetli had no
actual notice of the consequences of not complying with this particular local rule,
and the mere existence of the rule did not constitute constructive notice to Czetli, a
pro se inmate. See Moore, 703 F.2d at 520; Mitchell, 682 F.2d at 887. Further,
the district court made no inquiry as to whether Czetli complied with the local
rules or whether his failure to comply was beyond his control before dismissing
Czetli’s petition. See Wilson, 313 F.3d at 1321. Thus, the district court abused its
discretion by dismissing Czetli’s petition without first giving him notice and an
opportunity to pay the filing fee or file the required documentation to proceed IFP.
We vacate and remand to the district court for further proceedings.2
VACATED AND REMANDED.
2
Because we conclude the district court abused its discretion in sua sponte dismissing
Czetli’s petition, we need not address the district court’s denial of Czetli’s motion for
reconsideration.
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