United States v. Joseph D. Baughns , 542 F. App'x 875 ( 2013 )

Case: 12-16405 Date Filed: 10/25/2013 Page: 1 of 8
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-16405
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:12-cr-00012-CAR-CHW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSEPH D. BAUGHNS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 12-16406
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:08-cr-00016-CAR-CHW-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOSEPH D. BAUGHNS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
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(October 25, 2013)
Before MARCUS, PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In this consolidated appeal, Joseph Baughns appeals his 85-month total
sentence, imposed after pleading guilty to one count of being a felon in possession
of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and revocation of his supervised
release, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), on an earlier felon in possession of a firearm
conviction. On appeal, Baughns argues that: (1) the district court’s decision to run
his 61-month sentence for the conviction offense and the 24-month sentence for
the revocation of supervised release consecutively was procedurally unreasonable,
because the district court failed to explain why it was imposing the sentences
consecutively; and (2) his 61-month, above-guideline sentence is substantively
unreasonable because the district court gave no weight to Baughns’s mitigating
evidence. The government argues that Baughns waived any right to a direct appeal
of the substantive reasonableness of his 61-month sentence because of an appeal-
waiver provision in his plea agreement. After careful review, we affirm.
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We review the sentence a district court imposes for “reasonableness,” which
“merely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion.” United States v. Pugh,
515 F.3d 1179, 1189 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338,
351 (2007)). We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de novo. United
States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008).
In reviewing sentences for reasonableness, we typically perform two steps.
Pugh, 515 F.3d at 1190. First, we “‘ensure that the district court committed no
significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating)
the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing
to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any
deviation from the Guidelines range.’” Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007)).1 The district court is not, however, required to discuss all of the §
3553(a) factors in explaining its sentencing decision. United States v. Talley, 431
F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005).
1
The § 3553(a) factors include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the
history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense; (3) the need for the sentence imposed to afford adequate deterrence; (4) the need to
protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training
or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) the
pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted
sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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Relevant to the procedural reasonableness of the district court’s sentence in
this case are the law and Sentencing Guidelines concerning consecutive sentences.
The United States Code provides that “[t]he [district] court, in determining whether
the terms imposed are to be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively, shall
consider, as to each offense for which a term of imprisonment is being imposed,
the factors set forth in section 3553(a).” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b). Further, the
Sentencing Guidelines provide that “[a]ny term of imprisonment imposed upon the
revocation of probation or supervised release shall be ordered to be served
consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that the defendant is serving.”
U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f). The commentary to § 7B1.3 also says that “it is the
Commission’s recommendation that any sentence of imprisonment for a criminal
offense that is imposed after revocation of probation or supervised release be run
consecutively to any term of imprisonment imposed upon revocation.” Id. §
7B1.3, comment. (n.4).
If we conclude that the district court did not procedurally err, we consider
the “‘substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-
discretion standard,’” based on the “‘totality of the circumstances.’” Pugh, 515
F.3d at 1190 (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). Applying “deferential” review, we
must determine “whether the sentence imposed by the district court fails to achieve
the purposes of sentencing as stated in section 3553(a).” Talley, 431 F.3d at 788.
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“[W]e will not second guess the weight (or lack thereof) that the [court] accorded
to a given factor ... as long as the sentence ultimately imposed is reasonable in light
of all the circumstances presented.” United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 872
(11th Cir. 2010) (quotation, alteration and emphasis omitted), cert. denied, 131
S.Ct. 2962 (2011). We will not reweigh the relevant § 3553(a) factors, and will not
remand for resentencing unless the district court committed a clear error of
judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by imposing a sentence outside the
range of reasonable sentences. United States v. Langston, 590 F.3d 1226, 1237
(11th Cir. 2009). A district court’s unjustified reliance upon any one § 3553(a)
factor may be a symptom of an unreasonable sentence. United States v. Crisp, 454
F.3d 1285, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006). A district court’s failure to give mitigating
factors the weight a defendant contends they deserve, however, does not render the
sentence unreasonable. United States v. Lebowitz, 676 F.3d 1000, 1016-17 (11th
Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 1492 (2013). A sentence imposed well below
the statutory maximum penalty is an indicator of a reasonable sentence. See
United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008). The party
challenging the sentence bears the burden to show it is unreasonable. United
States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S.Ct. 674(2010).
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Here, Baughns has failed to demonstrate that the district court imposed a
procedurally unreasonable sentence by denying his request for concurrent
sentences on his supervised release revocation and felon in possession of a firearm
conviction. The district court expressly said that it considered the § 3553(a)
factors in imposing the sentence. After the district court imposed the consecutive
sentences, it specifically explained its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors,
including: Baughns’s criminal history; the nature and circumstances of the current
felon in possession of a firearm offense, and its similarities to his previous felon in
possession of a firearm offense; Baughns’s history and characteristics; the need for
adequate deterrence; and the need to protect the public from further criminal
activity by Baughns. Contrary to Baughns’s assertion, the district court’s
discussion of the § 3553(a) factors was in no way “cursory.” Although the district
court did not specifically discuss how the § 3553(a) factors justified the
consecutive nature of the sentence, Baughns points to no authority requiring the
court to do so. In any event, there is no requirement that the district court even
discuss all the § 3553(a) factors. See Talley, 431 F.3d at 786. Furthermore, by
imposing consecutive sentences, the district court followed the § 3553(a)(5) factor
of the policies and recommendations of the Sentencing Commission regarding
revocation of supervised release. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5).
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Turning to substantive reasonableness, we first must determine whether
Baughns has waived his right to appeal this issue through the appeal waiver in his
plea agreement. A sentence appeal waiver will be enforced if it was made
knowingly and voluntarily. United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1350-51
(11th Cir. 1993). To establish that the waiver was made knowingly and
voluntarily, the government must show either that (1) the district court specifically
questioned the defendant about the waiver during the plea colloquy, or (2) the
record makes clear that the defendant otherwise understood the full significance of
the waiver. Id. at 1351.
We have enforced an appeal waiver where “the waiver provision was
referenced during [the defendant’s] Rule 11 plea colloquy and [the defendant]
agreed that [he] understood the provision and that [he] entered into it freely and
voluntarily.” United States v. Weaver, 275 F.3d 1320, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001). An
appeal waiver “cannot be vitiated or altered by comments the court makes during
sentencing.” United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2006).
In this case, Baughns’s appeal waiver is valid. Baughns acknowledged that
he understood that he could not appeal the sentence imposed by the district court
“except for very limited reasons.” Additionally, Baughns agreed that he “freely
and voluntarily waive[d] [his] right to appeal [his] sentence except under limited
circumstances.” Although the district court did not engage in a long discussion
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about the appeal waiver with Baughns, the district court certainly did more than
simply “reference” the waiver and Baughns certainly agreed that he understood the
provision and entered into it freely and voluntarily. Finally, although the
presentence investigation report (“PSI”) stated that Baughns retained the right to
appeal if the district court imposed a sentence greater than the advisory guideline
range, this does not render the appeal waiver invalid. Because an appeal waiver
cannot be “vitiated or altered” by a district court’s comments during sentencing, it
likewise cannot be “vitiated or altered” by a probation officer in his preparation of
the PSI. Therefore, because Baughns’s appeal waiver only preserved his right to
appeal in the event of an upward departure under U.S.S.G. §§ 5K2.0 or 4A1.3,
Baughns has waived his right to appeal the imposition of his 61-month sentence.2
AFFIRMED.
2
In any event, the issue is meritless. As we’ve discussed, the district court said that it had
considered the various § 3553(a) factors and expressly addressed several of the factors and how
they affected the district court’s sentencing decision.
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