Zinnia I. Chen v. Siemens Energy Incorporated , 467 F. App'x 852 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                     [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT           FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 11-14372              MAY 2, 2012
    Non-Argument Calendar          JOHN LEY
    ________________________          CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 6:10-cv-01330-GAP-DAB
    ZINNIA I. CHEN,
    lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                          lPlaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    SIEMENS ENERGY INCORPORATED,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                         Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (May 2, 2012)
    Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, JORDAN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant Zinnia Chen, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
    dismissal of her 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (“Title VII”) employment discrimination
    lawsuit. Chen filed her Title VII action against her former employer, Siemens
    Energy Inc., alleging that Siemens had discriminated against her in promotion
    decisions on account of her being an asian woman. The district court dismissed
    Chen’s claim for lack of standing, upon learning that Chen, after filing her Title
    VII claim, had filed a petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, and thus, the
    bankruptcy trustee was the only party with standing to prosecute the Title VII
    claim. Chen argues on appeal that this dismissal was in error.
    The existence of standing “is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal
    court.” Alabama v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
    871 F.2d 1548
    , 1554 (11th
    Cir. 1989). We review a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter
    jurisdiction de novo. Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 
    578 F.3d 1252
    , 1260 (11th
    Cir. 2009).
    The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate comprised of
    virtually all of the debtor’s assets. 
    11 U.S.C. § 541
    (a)(1). The Bankruptcy Code
    defines the estate to include “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
    property as of the commencement of the case.” 
    11 U.S.C. § 541
    (a)(1). This
    2
    includes all pre-petition causes of action. Parker v. Wendy’s Int’l., Inc., 
    365 F.3d 1268
    , 1272 (11th Cir. 2004); Barger v. City of Cartersville, 
    348 F.3d 1289
    , 1292
    (11th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, the trustee, as the representative of the bankruptcy
    estate, becomes the only party with standing to bring a cause of action that belongs
    to the estate. Parker, 
    365 F.3d at 1272
    ; Barger, 
    348 F.3d at 1292
    . Unless the
    cause of action is abandoned pursuant to 
    11 U.S.C. § 554
    , the rights of the debtor
    in that cause of action are extinguished. Parker, 
    365 F.3d at 1272
    . Property not
    abandoned under § 554 that is not administered during bankruptcy proceedings
    remains in the estate. 
    11 U.S.C. § 554
    (d). Where a debtor fails to list an interest
    on the bankruptcy schedules, that interest remains in the bankruptcy estate.
    Parker, 
    365 F.3d at 1272
    .
    Here, we conclude that Chen’s Title VII claim became part of her bankruptcy
    estate upon the filing of her Chapter 7 petition. At that point, Chen lost standing, and
    the bankruptcy trustee became the only party with standing to bring the Title VII
    claim, unless the trustee later abandoned the claim from the estate, which has not
    occurred. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment of dismissal.
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-14372

Citation Numbers: 467 F. App'x 852

Judges: Anderson, Dubina, Jordan, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 5/2/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/5/2023