United States v. Dago Noel Mejia-Andrade , 616 F. App'x 985 ( 2015 )

Case: 15-12171 Date Filed: 10/02/2015 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 15-12171
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 9:14-cr-80196-DTKH-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DAGO NOEL MEJIA-ANDRADE,
a.k.a. Richard Noel,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(October 2, 2015)
Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 15-12171 Date Filed: 10/02/2015 Page: 2 of 3
Dago Noel Mejia-Andrade, who pled guilty to violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)
by illegally reentering the United States after deportation, appeals his 12-month-
and-1-day sentence. On appeal, Mejia-Andrade argues that his sentence is
substantively unreasonable because the district court imposed a five-month upward
variance from the guideline range of one to seven months based upon an improper
weighing of Mejia-Andrade’s criminal and immigration history. After review,1 we
affirm.
During Mejia-Andrade’s sentencing, the district court considered and
discussed the § 3553(a) factors, including the nature and circumstances of Mejia-
Andrade’s offense, Mejia-Andrade’s history and characteristics, the need for a
sentence that provides deterrence and protects the public, the kinds of sentences
available, the applicable guideline range, pertinent policy, and the need to avoid
unwarranted sentencing disparities. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court
need do no more than weigh the § 3553(a) factors, consider the defendant’s
argument at sentencing, and apply its discretion to impose a reasonable sentence.
United States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the
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We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse of discretion
standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). The party who challenges the sentence
bears the burden to show that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the record and the
§ 3553(a) factors. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). A court may
abuse its discretion if it: (1) fails to consider relevant factors that were due significant weight;
(2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor significant weight; or (3) commits a clear error of
judgment by balancing the proper factors unreasonably. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160,
1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). We assess substantive reasonableness in light of the totality of
the circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
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weight to be accorded to the § 3552(a) factors is committed to the sound discretion
of the district court); see also United States v. Garza-Mendez, 735 F.3d 1284, 1290
(11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 54 (2014) (holding that the district court
need not discuss each factor expressly).
After consideration, the district court concluded that Mejia-Andrade’s
criminal history and multiple illegal entries into the United States merited an
upward variance sufficient to deter Mejia-Andrade and “get [his] attention that
[illegal reentry after deportation] really is serious.” While we require that a district
court provide a “sufficiently compelling” explanation for an upward variance from
the guideline range, we must give due deference to the district court’s decision that
the § 3553(a) factors justify the variance. Gall, 552 U.S at 50, 51. As this Court
stated in Irey:
We may not—it bears repeating—set aside a sentence merely because
we would have decided that another one is more appropriate. A
district court’s sentence need not be the most appropriate one, it need
only be a reasonable one. We may set aside a sentence only if we
determine, after giving a full measure of deference to the sentencing
judge, that the sentence imposed truly is unreasonable.
612 F.3d at 1191 (citations and footnote omitted). Giving a full measure of
deference to the judgment of the district court, we cannot say that Mejia-Andrade’s
sentence is truly unreasonable.
AFFIRMED.
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