Harco National Insurance Company v. Zurich American Insurance Company , 479 F. App'x 920 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                         [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 11-15075               ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    Non-Argument Calendar              JUNE 26, 2012
    JOHN LEY
    CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 8:10-cv-00027-EAK-TGW
    HARCO NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    FIRST LEASE, INC.,
    Consolidated Plaintiff-
    Appellant,
    versus
    ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    (June 26, 2012)
    Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, JORDAN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    This is an appeal from the district court’s order granting summary judgment
    in favor of Zurich American Insurance Company (“Zurich”), holding that Zurich
    has no duty to defend or indemnify FirstLease, Inc. (“FirstLease”). We review de
    novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Levinson v. Reliance Standard
    Life Ins. Co., 
    245 F.3d 1321
    , 1325 (11th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is
    appropriate when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant
    is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “A genuine
    factual issue exists if the jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.”
    Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 
    506 F.3d 1361
    , 1363 (11th Cir. 2007).
    I.
    Appellant FirstLease was sued in Hillsborough County Circuit Court by
    Howard Bryant, a truck driver, for personal injuries resulting from an accident on
    May 13, 2006, while operating a truck for Southeast Independent Delivery
    Services, Inc. (SEIDS). Bryant performed delivery services for SEIDS and
    entered into an independent truckman’s agreement (“ITA”) with SEIDS as an
    independent contractor. Bryant entered into a rental agreement with FirstLease to
    rent a truck, and his claim against FirstLease was based on negligent maintenance
    of that truck. The rental agreement requires Bryant to maintain insurance to
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    protect FirstLease, as owner of the rented vehicle, and himself, as operator of the
    vehicle, from injuries to third persons. Bryant and SEIDS are insured by Zurich.
    Appellant Harco National Insurance Company (“Harco”), an insurer of
    FirstLease, defended FirstLease pursuant to its insurance policy and settled the
    case. FirstLease filed a third party claim against SEIDS for contractual indemnity.
    SEIDS moved for entry of partial summary judgment, and the circuit court
    determined that the indemnity clause of the rental agreement was unenforceable,
    since FirstLease sought indemnity for claims arising from its own negligence.
    Harco and FirstLease filed a declaratory judgment action in the district court
    to determine their rights against Zurich as SEIDS’s insurer. The parties filed
    cross-motions for summary judgment and agreed that there were no material facts
    in dispute. Harco and FirstLease argued that Bryant was an agent of SEIDS and
    that the Zurich policy covered the rented truck and FirstLease as an additional
    insured. The court found that Bryant and FirstLease were parties to the rental
    agreement but that SEIDS was not a party. The court also found that the
    underlying negligence suit did not involve a shift of liability to FirstLease. The
    court noted that FirstLease could be an “insured” under the Zurich policy only as
    “[a]nyone liable for the conduct of an ‘insured’ described above but only to the
    extent of that liability.” [R. 49 at 38.] The court determined that FirstLease was
    3
    not vicariously liable under the policy because Bryant was not a tortfeasor, and
    thus the statutorily-permitted shift of liability coverage did not apply. Similarly,
    the court found that Zurich had no duty to indemnify Harco for FirstLease’s
    negligence to Bryant.
    II.
    The duty to defend is determined solely by reference to the claimant’s
    complaint, Higgins v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 
    894 So. 2d 5
    , 9–10 (Fla.
    2004), whereas the duty to indemnify is determined by analyzing the facts of the
    case, State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. CTC Dev. Corp., 
    720 So. 2d 1072
    , 1077 n.3
    (Fla. 1998). Harco and FirstLease argue that Zurich had a duty to defend and
    indemnify FirstLease on the underlying action because Bryant was an agent of
    SEIDS. Although the issue of agency is disputed, it is not a genuine issue of
    material fact warranting reversal of summary judgment. The allegations in
    Bryant’s complaint do not trigger Zurich’s duty to defend FirstLease because the
    alleged injured party was Bryant, not a third party. As required by the rental
    agreement, Bryant obtained liability coverage, through Zurich, “for injuries to the
    property and person, including death, of Third Persons, resulting from the
    ownership, use, operation, or maintenance of the Vehicle.” [Rental Agreement, R.
    4
    23-7 (Exh. G).] Because Bryant, not a third party, was allegedly injured, and
    FirstLease was the alleged tortfeasor, Zurich has no duty to defend.
    For the same reasons, Zurich has no duty to indemnify Harco for
    FirstLease’s negligence to Bryant. Zurich’s duty to indemnify only covers liability
    for bodily injury to third parties, and Bryant was a party to the ITA and rental
    agreement, not a third party.
    Accordingly, for the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the district court’s
    grant of summary judgment.
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-15075

Citation Numbers: 479 F. App'x 920

Judges: Dubina, Fay, Jordan, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 6/26/2012

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/5/2023