Wayne R. Lindsey v. United States , 450 F. App'x 864 ( 2012 )


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  •                                                                     [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT           FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-14721              JAN 6, 2012
    Non-Argument Calendar          JOHN LEY
    ________________________          CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 7:08-cv-90031-HL-TQL, 7:00-cr-00012-HL-MSH-3
    WAYNE R. LINDSEY,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                         Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll                         Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (January 6, 2012)
    Before CARNES, WILSON and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Wayne Lindsey, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
    court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate. Lindsey’s § 2255 motion
    alleged numerous claims of ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate
    counsel. We granted a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) on the following
    issue:
    Whether the district court erred when it failed to address Lindsey’s
    argument that appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance by
    failing to argue that United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    , 
    125 S. Ct. 738
    , 
    160 L. Ed. 2d 621
    (2005), should apply retroactively and that the
    application of departures and enhancements to increase his sentence
    above the base offense level violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth
    Amendments, in violation of Clisby v. Jones, 
    960 F.2d 925
    , 936 (11th
    Cir. 1992).
    On appeal, Lindsey argues that the district court violated Clisby because it
    did not address his claim that his appellate counsel had been ineffective by failing
    to argue on direct appeal that Booker should apply retroactively and that the
    application of departures and enhancements to increase his sentence above the
    base offense level violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. Lindsey
    goes on to address the substantive merits of the Booker issue and the calculation of
    his guideline range at sentencing.
    In a § 2255 proceeding, we review legal issues de novo and factual findings
    for clear error. Thomas v. United States, 
    572 F.3d 1300
    , 1303 (11th Cir. 2009).
    2
    Appellate review is limited to the issues specified in the COA. 
    Id. We liberally
    construe pro se pleadings. Tannenbaum v. United States, 
    148 F.3d 1262
    , 1263
    (11th Cir. 1998).
    District courts must resolve all claims for relief raised in habeas
    proceedings, regardless of whether relief is granted or denied. See Clisby v. Jones,
    
    960 F.2d 925
    , 936 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc); see also Rhode v. United States, 
    583 F.3d 1289
    , 1291 (11th Cir. 2009) (applying Clisby to § 2255 motions to vacate).
    A claim for relief is any allegation of a constitutional violation. 
    Clisby, 960 F.2d at 936
    . Two claims may be distinct even if both allegations arise from the same
    alleged set of operative facts. 
    Id. When a
    district court fails to address all of the
    claims, we “will vacate the district court’s judgment without prejudice and remand
    the case for consideration of all remaining claims . . . .” 
    Id. at 938.
    Ineffective
    assistance of counsel constitutes a violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
    rights, and thus is a claim of a constitutional violation. Strickland v. Washington,
    
    466 U.S. 668
    , 684-86, 
    104 S. Ct. 2052
    , 2063-64 (1984).
    The district court erred by failing to address all of the claims contained in
    Lindsey’s § 2255 motion. The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
    (R&R) adopted by the district court specifically addressed each of Lindsey’s other
    claims, but omitted any discussion of the issue that gave rise to our grant of COA.
    3
    The Government contends Lindsey failed to put the district court on notice of the
    omission by objecting to the R&R, and Lindsey therefore waived his right to
    appeal. However, “[t]he absence of objections to the [R&R] limits the scope of
    appellate review of factual findings to plain error or manifest injustice but does not
    limit review of legal conclusions.” United States v. Warren, 
    687 F.2d 347
    , 348
    (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Hardin v. Wainwright, 
    678 F.2d 589
    , 591 (5th Cir.
    Unit B 1982).1 Because a Clisby error is the lack of a legal conclusion, an omitted
    objection has no impact on our analysis. Finally, although both parties suggest
    that we could decide the merits of the omitted claim ourselves, doing so would
    exceed the scope of the COA and contradict the rule announced in Clisby. See
    
    Thomas, 572 F.3d at 1303
    , 1305 n.6; 
    Clisby, 960 F.2d at 938
    .
    Because the district court did not address all of Lindsey’s claims, the
    opinion of the district court is vacated without prejudice and the case remanded for
    consideration of whether Lindsey’s appellate counsel provided ineffective
    assistance by failing to argue that Booker should apply retroactively and that the
    1
    In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 
    661 F.2d 1206
    , 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), this
    Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to
    close of business on September 30, 1981, as well as all decisions by a Unit B panel of the former
    Fifth Circuit, Stein v. Reynolds Securities, Inc., 
    667 F.2d 33
    , 34 (11th Cir. 1982).
    4
    application of departures and enhancements to increase his sentence above the
    base offense level violated the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments.
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
    5