Emmanuel Ebeh v. St. Paul Travelers , 459 F. App'x 860 ( 2012 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-10553 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar MARCH 1, 2012
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 8:09-cv-02628-JDW-TBM
EMMANUEL EBEH,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ST. PAUL TRAVELERS,
CHARTER OAK FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY,
PAT REDMOND,
JOHN MIKOS,
Dr.,
LAKESIDE OCCUPATIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, P.A.,
Defendants-Appellees,
METRO STORAGE, LLC, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(March 1, 2012)
Before CARNES, PRYOR, and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Emmanuel Ebeh, an African American male proceeding pro se, filed a
lawsuit in federal district court against Lakeside Occupational Medical Centers,
P.A., alleging negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, violation of Florida’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat.
§ 501.201 et seq., and race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district
court dismissed Ebeh’s complaint after concluding that res judicata bars all of his
claims. This is Ebeh’s appeal.
I.
Ebeh filed a complaint in Florida state court alleging that Lakeside
mistreated him when he sought medical treatment for work-related injuries. The
complaint asserted various state law claims, including negligent misrepresentation
and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and a race discrimination claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Lakeside moved to dismiss the complaint because Ebeh
failed to comply with Florida’s pre-suit requirements for medical malpractice
actions. The Florida court granted that motion, dismissing the complaint “with
prejudice.” That dismissal was affirmed on appeal. See Ebeh v. Lakeside
Occupational Med. Ctrs., P.A., 22 So. 3d 79 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).
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Ebeh then filed a complaint in federal court asserting all of the same claims
that were included in his state court complaint plus a new claim under Florida’s
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq. Lakeside
moved to dismiss all of the claims based on res judicata, asserting that the state
court’s involuntary dismissal of Ebeh’s complaint “with prejudice” operated as an
adjudication on the merits. That dismissal, Lakeside argued, also precluded
Ebeh’s new FDUTPA claim because the claim arose from the same set of facts as
the other causes of action that the state court dismissed. The district court agreed
with Lakeside and dismissed Ebeh’s entire complaint on res judicata grounds.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s determination that a claim is barred by
res judicata. E.E.O.C. v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 383 F.3d 1280, 1285 (11th Cir.
2004). We also review de novo a district court’s interpretation of state law. Jones
v. United Space Alliance, L.L.C., 494 F.3d 1306, 1309 (11th Cir. 2007).
“[W]hen a federal court exercises federal question jurisdiction and is asked
to give res judicata effect to a state court judgment, it must apply the res judicata
principles of the law of the state whose decision is set up as a bar to further
litigation.” Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758 F.2d 1486, 1509 (11th
Cir. 1985) (quotation marks omitted). Because Lakeside contends that a Florida
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state court judgment bars Ebeh’s federal lawsuit, we apply Florida’s doctrine of
res judicata to this case. According to that doctrine, an earlier lawsuit precludes a
later lawsuit if (1) the two suits involve the “same parties”; (2) the first suit was
resolved by “a court of competent jurisdiction”; (3) the first suit ended with a
“judgment on the merits”; and (4) the two suits are based upon “the same causes of
action.” Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101, 105 (Fla. 2001).
The first three prongs are easily met here. First, Ebeh filed his state lawsuit
and federal lawsuit against the same party, Lakeside. Second, the Florida state
court that dismissed Ebeh’s complaint is a court of competent jurisdiction. Third,
the state court judgment dismissing Ebeh’s complaint operates as an adjudication
on the merits because the court did not specifically say that its order of involuntary
dismissal was not an adjudication on the merits. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b); see
also Allie v. Ionata, 503 So. 2d 1237, 1242 (Fla. 1987) (“Unless otherwise
specifically exempted, a dismissal constitutes an adjudication on the merits.”).
We now turn to the fourth prong of Florida’s res judicata doctrine,
determining whether the two lawsuits involve “the same cause of action.” In the
state and federal complaints, Ebeh asserted identical claims for negligent
misrepresentation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and race
discrimination. Those three claims, therefore, are barred by Florida’s doctrine of
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res judicata.
Ebeh’s FDUTPA claim is also barred even though he did not raise it in the
state complaint. Under Florida law, “the doctrine of res judicata . . . bars from
subsequent litigation all claims that were raised or could have been raised in the
first cause of action.” Felder v. State, Dep’t Mgmt. Servs., 993 So. 2d 1031, 1034
(Fla. 1st DCA 2008); see also Fla. Dep’t Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101, 107
(Fla. 2001) (“[R]es judicata bars relitigation in a subsequent cause of action not
only of claims raised, but also claims that could have been raised.”); Jenkins v.
Lennar Corp., 972 So. 2d 1064, 1065 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2008) (“The doctrine of res
judicata bars re-litigation of a cause of action for claims that were raised and could
have been raised in a prior action.”). Ebeh’s FDUTPA claim is another theory of
recovery for the same harm that he attempted to redress when he filed the state
court complaint. Because he could have asserted the FDUTPA claim at that time,
he is barred from asserting it now.
AFFIRMED.
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