Rafael Vergara Hermosilla vs The Coca-Cola Company , 419 F. App'x 917 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                     FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-12894
    MARCH 25, 2011
    Non-Argument Calendar
    JOHN LEY
    ________________________                  CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-21418-KMM
    RAFAEL VERGARA HERMOSILLA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    THE COCA-COLA COMPANY,
    a Delaware Corporation,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (March 25, 2011)
    Before EDMONDSON, PRYOR and COX, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    On interlocutory appeal, The Coca-Cola Company (“Coca-Cola”) appeals the
    district court’s entry of a preliminary injunction restraining it from disseminating the
    song Wavin’ Flag (Coca-Cola Spanish Celebration Mix) unless adaption credit is
    given to Plaintiff Rafael Vergara Hermosilla (“Vergara”) whenever his lyrics are used
    “and either: (1) the original English composer is credited or (2) a composer is often
    credited with such a use.” (Dkt. 31 at 15.) After review, we find no abuse of
    discretion in the entry of the preliminary injunction.
    From time to time we review a district court’s grant or denial of a request for
    a preliminary injunction without reviewing the “intrinsic merits” of the case. Revette
    v. Int’l Ass’n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 
    740 F.2d 892
    , 893
    (11th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). We do so here.
    “[A]n abuse of discretion standard recognizes there is a range of choice within
    which we will not reverse the district court even if we might have reached a different
    decision.” Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 
    403 F.3d 1223
    , 1226 (11th Cir. 2005)
    (citation omitted). “The expedited nature of preliminary injunction proceedings often
    creates not only limits on the evidence available but also pressure to make difficult
    judgments without the luxury of abundant time for reflection.” Cumulus Media, Inc.
    v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc., 
    304 F.3d 1167
    , 1171 (11th Cir. 2002).
    We find no clear abuse of discretion in the district court’s grant of a
    preliminary injunction in this case. We need not, and do not, decide the ultimate
    issue of whether Coca-Cola will prevail.
    2
    Coca-Cola raises four arguments in support of its appeal. First, Coca-Cola
    argues that the district court erred because the court’s remedy was improper under
    copyright law and contrary to the parties’ agreement. Second, Coca-Cola argues that
    it was entitled to continue its use of the song because its license was irrevocable.
    Third, Coca-Cola argues it is entitled to continue using the song under the derivative
    works exception. Fourth, Coca-Cola argues that Vergara cannot enjoin its use of the
    song because the parties are joint authors. The first two arguments merit brief
    comment.
    Coca-Cola’s first argument is based on the fact that copyright law does not
    recognize a right to attribution. Vergara responds that the remedy lies within the
    scope of the district court’s equitable discretion. We agree with Vergara. While
    Coca-Cola characterizes the injunction as one forcing it to provide adaption credit,
    the injunction is really one that enjoins Coca-Cola’s dissemination of the Spanish
    Celebration Mix. Recognizing the financial burden this injunction would place on
    Coca-Cola, however, the court gives Coca-Cola the option to disseminate the song
    with attribution to Vergara. Thus, while Coca-Cola would have us believe that the
    injunction is in response to Vergara’s improper claim for lack of attribution, the
    district court’s injunction is really a proper exercise of its authority under the
    Copyright Act to construct an injunction that limits the damage of an alleged
    3
    copyright violation. See 
    17 U.S.C. § 502
    (a) (providing that “Any court having
    jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this title may . . . grant temporary and final
    injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain
    infringement of a copyright.”). If anything, the district judge went to great lengths
    to narrowly tailor this injunction to minimize the economic impact it would have on
    Coca-Cola.
    Addressing Coca-Cola’s second argument, we agree that the district court
    erroneously concluded that any implied license Coca-Cola held was not supported by
    consideration when the agreement was made. But this error does not change the
    result on this appeal. The terms of any implied license have not yet been established;
    thus Coca-Cola cannot yet invoke any such agreement as a defense. An evidentiary
    hearing would be required to flesh out the terms of any such agreement. The district
    court held no evidentiary hearing, but Coca-Cola did not request an evidentiary
    hearing. We will not, under these circumstances, find that the district court abused
    its discretion by failing to find that an implied license barred the grant of injunctive
    relief.
    While there may be merit to some of Coca-Cola’s arguments, we have an
    undeveloped record, and cannot conclude on this record that the grant of this
    injunction was an abuse of discretion. A thorough review can be had following
    4
    development of the record and the district court’s decision about whether to grant a
    permanent injunction.
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-12894

Citation Numbers: 419 F. App'x 917

Judges: Cox, Edmondson, Per Curiam, Pryor

Filed Date: 3/25/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023