Walter Oliver Melvin v. Commr. of IRS , 303 F. App'x 791 ( 2008 )


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  •                                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT                     FILED
    ________________________          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    December 17, 2008
    No. 08-13329                     THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                    CLERK
    ________________________
    Agency No. 21192-06
    WALTER OLIVER MELVIN,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    versus
    COMMISSIONER OF IRS,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    United States Tax Court
    _________________________
    (December 17, 2008)
    Before DUBINA, BARKETT and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant Walter Oliver Melvin, proceeding pro se, appeals the U.S. Tax
    Court’s final decision in favor of the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue
    Service (“Commissioner” or the “IRS”) on his petition for redetermination of
    deficiency. On appeal, Melvin first argues that he was entitled to deduct $6,000
    from his 2003 income tax returns because his 1985 divorce decree ordered that he
    pay alimony, through the seizure of property to be credited at the rate of $500 per
    month, to his ex-spouse. He asserts that, because he was required to pay all of the
    alimony in advance, he should thus be allowed to claim a deduction on his 2003
    tax return. Second, Melvin argues that he was denied due process of law because
    his trial before the Tax Court was cut short before he was allowed to hear the
    position of, and cross-examine, the IRS.
    I. Tax Deficiency
    We review a Tax Court’s conclusions of law de novo and its factual findings
    for clear error. Creel v. Comm’r, 
    419 F.3d 1135
    , 1139 (11th Cir. 2005). “The
    Commissioner’s determination of a deficiency is presumed correct, and the
    taxpayer has the burden of proving it is incorrect.” Webb v. Comm’r, 
    872 F.2d 380
    , 381 (11th Cir. 1989).
    Section 215 of the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) states, “[i]n the case of
    an individual, there shall be allowed as a deduction an amount equal to the alimony
    or separate maintenance payments paid during such individual’s taxable year.”
    I.R.C. § 215(a), 
    26 U.S.C. § 215
    (a). It further states that alimony means any
    2
    alimony payment as defined in I.R.C. § 71(b) “which is includible in the gross
    income of the recipient under section 71.” I.R.C. § 215(b), 
    26 U.S.C. § 215
    (b).
    Section 71(b) of the I.R.C. states:
    (1) In general. -- The term “alimony or separate maintenance
    payment” means any payment in cash if --
    (A) such payment is received by (or on behalf of) a spouse
    under a divorce or separation instrument,
    (B) the divorce or separation instrument does not designate
    such payment as a payment which is not includible in gross
    income under this section and not allowable as a deduction
    under section 215,
    (C) in the case of an individual legally separated from his
    spouse under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance,
    the payee spouse and the payor spouse are not members of the
    same household at the time such payment is made, and
    (D) there is no liability to make any such payment for any
    period after the death of the payee spouse and there is no
    liability to make any payment (in cash or property) as a
    substitute for such payments after the death of the payee
    spouse.
    I.R.C. § 71(b), 
    26 U.S.C. § 71
    (b).
    “If [a] statute’s meaning is plain and unambiguous, there is no need for
    further inquiry. The plain language is presumed to express congressional intent
    and will control a court’s interpretation.” United States v. Fisher, 
    289 F.3d 1329
    ,
    1338 (11th Cir. 2002).
    3
    Because in 2003 Melvin admittedly made no alimony payments, as defined
    in the I.R.C., we conclude that he was not allowed to claim an alimony deduction
    on his 2003 income tax returns. Melvin was thus unable to meet his burden to
    show that the Commissioner erred in Melvin’s deficiency determination, and the
    Tax Court properly entered a decision in the Commissioner’s favor.
    II. Due Process
    The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that “[n]o person
    shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S.
    Const. amend. V. Rudimentary due process includes reasonable notice and an
    opportunity to rebut the charges and be heard. American Druggists Ins. Co., Inc. v.
    Bogart, 
    707 F.2d 1229
    , 1237 (11th Cir. 1983).
    The IRS made its arguments known to Melvin in both its answer to his
    petition, and its pretrial memorandum. At Melvin’s trial before the Tax Court,
    Melvin and the Commissioner had the opportunity to challenge each other’s
    arguments. Furthermore, Melvin and the Commissioner prepared memoranda
    addressing their arguments raised during trial. We thus conclude from the record
    that Melvin was afforded the opportunity to be heard, both at his trial and in a
    memorandum of law. See 
    id.
     Accordingly, his due process argument fails.
    For the above-stated reasons, we affirm the Tax Court’s judgment.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-13329

Citation Numbers: 303 F. App'x 791

Judges: Barkett, Dubina, Per Curiam, Pryor

Filed Date: 12/17/2008

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/2/2023