Southern-Owners Insurance Company v. David W. Moore ( 2017 )


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  •           Case: 14-15386   Date Filed: 09/29/2017   Page: 1 of 21
    
    
                                                                        [PUBLISH]
    
    
    
               IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    
                        FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
                          ________________________
    
                                No. 14-15386
                          ________________________
    
                    D.C. Docket No. 3:12-cv-00601-RV-EMT
    
    
    
    SOUTHERN-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY,
    
                                         Plaintiff - Counter Defendant - Appellee,
    
                                     versus
    
    EASDON RHODES & ASSOCIATES LLC, et al.,
    
                                                 Defendants - Counter Claimants,
    
    LINNIE D. RHODES,
    
                                                                        Defendant,
    
    DAVID W. MOORE, DENISE MOORE,
    
                                    Defendants - Counter Claimants - Appellants.
    
                          ________________________
    
                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Florida
                         ________________________
                              (September 29, 2017)
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    Before TJOFLAT and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges, and GOLDBERG, ∗ Judge.
    
    TJOFLAT, Circuit Judge:
    
           This case arises from a dispute over the scope of the insurance coverage
    
    provided by a standard form Hired Auto and Non-Owned Auto Liability
    
    Endorsement to a corporate general liability insurance policy (the “Endorsement”)
    
    issued by Southern-Owners Insurance Company (“Southern-Owners”) to Easdon
    
    Rhodes & Associates, LLC (“Easdon Rhodes”). Following an auto accident
    
    involving one of its members, Joshua Rhodes, Easdon Rhodes was named as one
    
    of several defendants in a state court negligence action filed by David Moore, who
    
    suffered serious injuries in the crash.1 Southern-Owners agreed to defend the suit
    
    in state court but reserved its rights to deny coverage under the terms of the
    
    Endorsement. Subsequently, Southern-Owners filed an action in the United States
    
    District Court for the Northern District of Florida seeking a declaratory judgment
    
    absolving it of the duty to indemnify or defend Easdon Rhodes, or the other
    
    defendants, against Moore’s negligence suit. After Southern-Owners moved for
    
    summary judgment, the District Court held that the vehicle driven by Joshua
    
    
           ∗
             Honorable Richard W. Goldberg, Senior Judge for the U.S. Court of International
    Trade, sitting by designation.
           1
              David Moore’s wife, Denise Moore, also brought a loss of consortium claim based on
    the injuries suffered by her husband. Because her cause of action is entirely derivative of her
    husband’s negligence claim, we will refer to David Moore as the sole plaintiff in the underlying
    state court action. See Gates v. Foley, 
    247 So. 2d 40
    , 45 (Fla. 1971) (explaining that loss of
    consortium “is a derivative right”). Further, for ease of reference, we treat Moore as the only
    appellant presently before us.
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    Rhodes did not qualify for coverage under the terms of the Endorsement, and, even
    
    if the vehicle had qualified, the existence of a separate insurance policy also
    
    covering the accident triggered the Endorsement’s exclusion clause absolving
    
    Southern-Owners of its duties under the policy. Easdon Rhodes appealed, arguing
    
    the vehicle driven by Joshua Rhodes qualified for coverage and that the
    
    Endorsement’s exclusion clause was ambiguous and could not provide Southern-
    
    Owners with a basis to deny coverage for the accident under Florida law. With the
    
    benefit of oral argument, and after a searching review of the parties’ briefs and the
    
    record, we affirm the District Court’s judgment.
    
                                              I.
    
          Joshua Rhodes and Mark Easdon formed Easdon Rhodes, a limited liability
    
    company, to provide a variety of maintenance- and construction-related services.
    
    Shortly after formation, the company purchased a corporate general liability
    
    insurance policy from Southern-Owners. Automobiles were specifically excluded
    
    from coverage under the original policy, but Easdon Rhodes purchased an
    
    Endorsement which expanded coverage to include certain categories of
    
    automobiles. The text of the Endorsement included an exclusion clause explaining
    
    coverage was only provided under the provision if “you do not have any other
    
    insurance available to you which affords the same or similar coverage.” The
    
    
    
    
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    policy limit for bodily injury and property damage claims covered by the
    
    Endorsement was $1,000,000.00.
    
          On April 1, 2011, a Chevrolet Silverado driven by Joshua Rhodes collided
    
    with a motorcycle driven by David Moore, causing Moore serious injuries. At the
    
    time of the accident, the Silverado was protected by a personal auto insurance
    
    policy issued by Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (the “Nationwide
    
    policy”). In addition to the Silverado, that policy also insured two other vehicles
    
    and provided, among other things, coverage for bodily injury and property damage.
    
    The Nationwide policy limit for bodily injury was $25,000.00.
    
          Following the collision, David Moore and his wife Denise Moore filed a
    
    negligence suit against Joshua Rhodes in state court. Approximately a year later,
    
    the action was amended to name Easdon Rhodes as an additional defendant. In
    
    response to Moore’s filings, Nationwide tendered its policy limit of $25,000, and,
    
    under a reservation of rights, Southern-Owners agreed to provide Easdon Rhodes
    
    with a defense. Southern-Owners then filed this action in the United States District
    
    Court for the Northern District of Florida seeking a declaration that it has no
    
    obligation to defend or indemnify Easdon Rhodes, or the other defendants, against
    
    Moore’s negligence claim.
    
          Southern-Owners moved for summary judgment on April 1, 2014, arguing
    
    the Nationwide policy provided coverage similar to that available under the
    
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    Endorsement and consequently relieved Southern-Owners of any duty to defend or
    
    indemnify Easdon Rhodes under the plain terms of the insurance contract.
    
    Southern-Owners also argued the Silverado driven by Joshua Rhodes was not
    
    covered by the Endorsement in the first instance because it did not meet the
    
    policy’s definition of a hired or non-owned auto. The District Court agreed with
    
    Southern-Owners’ interpretation of the Endorsement and, on October 30, 2014,
    
    granted summary judgment in Southern-Owners’ favor, absolving the insurer of
    
    any duty to defend or indemnify Easdon Rhodes against Moore’s underlying
    
    negligence suit.
    
                                             II.
    
          We review “a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo applying
    
    the same legal standards used by the district court.” Galvez v. Bruce, 
    552 F.3d 1238
    , 1241 (11th Cir. 2008). “Summary judgment is appropriate where ‘there is
    
    no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a
    
    judgment as a matter of law.’” Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga.,
    
    
    247 F.3d 1262
    , 1271 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). We also
    
    review de novo a district court’s interpretation of contract language. Nat’l Fire Ins.
    
    Co. v. Fortune Constr. Co., 
    320 F.3d 1260
    , 1267 (11th Cir. 2003).
    
                                             III.
    
                                             A.
    
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          In this diversity action, we must apply “the substantive law of the forum
    
    state.” Tech. Coating Applicators, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 
    157 F.3d 843
    ,
    
    844 (11th Cir. 1998). Here, we look to Florida law to determine whether Southern-
    
    Owners owed a duty to indemnify or defend its insured against Moore’s suit in
    
    state court. In Florida, the terms used in an insurance contract are given their
    
    ordinary meaning, and the policy must be construed as a whole “to give every
    
    provision its full meaning and operative effect.” Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v.
    
    Anderson, 
    756 So. 2d 29
    , 34 (Fla. 2000). The Florida Supreme Court has
    
    emphasized the necessity of interpreting the “terms of an insurance policy . . . in
    
    their ordinary sense [to provide] a reasonable, practical and sensible interpretation
    
    consistent with the intent of the parties.” Siegle v. Progressive Consumers Ins. Co.,
    
    
    819 So. 2d 732
    , 736 (Fla. 2002) (quoting Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance
    
    Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
    260 So. 2d 249
    , 253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)).
    
    An unambiguous policy provision is “enforced according to its terms whether it is
    
    a basic policy provision or an exclusionary provision.” Hagen v. Aetna Cas. &
    
    Sur. Co., 
    675 So. 2d 963
    , 965 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
    
          If policy language is susceptible to multiple, reasonable interpretations,
    
    however, the policy is considered ambiguous and must be “interpreted liberally in
    
    
    
    
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    favor of the insured and strictly against the drafter who prepared the policy.” 2
    
    Auto-Owners, 756 So. 2d at 34. To allow for such a construction, the insurance
    
    policy “must actually be ambiguous.” Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar.
    
    Co., 
    913 So. 2d 528
    , 532 (Fla. 2005). Courts are not authorized “to put a strained
    
    and unnatural construction on the terms of a policy in order to create an uncertainty
    
    or ambiguity.” Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Sea World of Fla., Inc., 
    586 So. 2d 95
    ,
    
    97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The mere fact that an insurance provision is
    
    “complex” or “requires analysis” does not make it ambiguous. Swire Pac.
    
    Holdings, Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 
    845 So. 2d 161
    , 165 (Fla. 2003).
    
                                                        B.
    
           The central interpretative question presented here is whether the existence of
    
    a separate insurance policy, which paid policy limits for the underlying claim at
    
    issue, qualifies as “similar insurance” under the Endorsement’s exclusion clause
    
    thereby absolving Southern-Owners of any duty toward its insured, Easdon
    
    Rhodes. The exclusion clause provides that insurance protection is only available
    
    under the Endorsement “if you do not have any other insurance available to you
    
    which affords the same or similar coverage.” The parties do not dispute that the
    
    Nationwide policy insuring the Silverado driven by Joshua Rhodes qualifies as
    
    
           2
            This rule applies with even greater force in the context of exclusion clauses which
    courts must “construe[] even more strictly against the insurer than coverage clauses.” Auto-
    Owners, 756 So. 2d at 34.
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    “other insurance” and that the Nationwide policy does not offer the “same”
    
    coverage as the Endorsement. So, whether the Endorsement’s exclusion clause
    
    applies to relieve Southern-Owners of a duty to defend or indemnify Easdon
    
    Rhodes depends on the meaning of “similar coverage,” a term left undefined by the
    
    policy. 3
    
           Southern-Owners contends the phrase “similar coverage” is susceptible to
    
    only a single reasonable interpretation within the context of the Endorsement’s
    
    exclusion clause: “that it triggers whenever another policy . . . is available to pay
    
    for the same liability claimed under the policy at issue.” Moore disagrees and
    
    argues the “similar coverage” language is ambiguous because it could also be
    
    reasonably interpreted to require the presence of another insurance policy covering
    
    the same overall set of risks as the Southern-Owners corporate general liability
    
    policy, not just the specific liability claimed. As Florida law requires the
    
    interpretation of ambiguous insurance policies in favor of coverage, Moore asserts
    
    Southern-Owners cannot use the Endorsement’s exclusion clause to justify
    
    disclaiming its duty to defend and indemnify Easdon Rhodes. Because we find
    
    only a single reasonable interpretation of the Endorsement’s exclusion clause
    
    exists, we decline Moore’s invitation to manufacture uncertainty and now hold that
    
    
           3
             Because we ultimately hold the Endorsement’s exclusion clause unambiguously applies
    to deny Easdon Rhodes coverage here, we need not address the parties’ other interpretative
    arguments regarding the provision’s overall scope.
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    the clause unambiguously operates to deny Easdon Rhodes insurance coverage
    
    here.
    
            Neither party has provided binding authority interpreting the phrase “similar
    
    coverage,” nor have we been able to locate such authority on our own. 4 We must
    
    interpret the clause ourselves beginning with discerning the phrase’s plain meaning
    
    via “references [that are] commonly relied upon to supply the accepted meaning of
    
    [the] words.” Penzer v. Transp. Ins. Co., 
    29 So. 3d 1000
    , 1005 (Fla. 2010)
    
    (quoting Garcia v. Fed. Ins. Co., 
    969 So. 2d 288
    , 292 (Fla. 2007)). Similar means
    
    “alike in substance” or “having characteristics in common.” MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S
    
    COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1093 (10th ed. 1999). And, in the insurance context,
    
    coverage is defined as the “[i]nclusion of a risk under an insurance policy; the risks
    
    within the scope of an insurance policy.” Coverage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
    
    446 (10th ed. 2014). This definition suggests “coverage,” as used in the
    
    Endorsement, has two potential meanings. The term may either refer specifically
    
    to the inclusion of an individual risk covered by an insurance policy, or it may
    
    broadly refer to the overall scope of protection a particular insurance policy offers.
    
    
    
    
            4
             Moore primarily relies on a single unpublished decision, Southern-Owners Ins. Co. v.
    Wall 2 Walls Constr., LLC, 592 F. App’x 766 (11th Cir. 2014), interpreting identical language in
    another Southern-Owners policy. However, we are not bound by unpublished decisions. See
    U.S. Ct. of App. 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (providing that “[u]npublished opinions are not considered
    binding precedent”).
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          Fortunately, we may use the broader context surrounding the phrase “similar
    
    coverage” to select between these two possible meanings. See, e.g., State Farm
    
    Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Mashburn, 
    15 So. 3d 701
    , 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)
    
    (explaining a “single policy provision should not be read in isolation and out of
    
    context, for the contract is to be construed according to its entire terms, as set forth
    
    in the policy and amplified by the policy application, endorsements, or riders”).
    
    Here, the wording of both the Endorsement’s exclusion clause and the Coverages
    
    section of the Southern-Owners corporate general liability policy supports adopting
    
    the narrower definition of “coverage” which specifically refers to the “[i]nclusion
    
    of a risk under an insurance policy.” Coverage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 446
    
    (10th ed. 2014).
    
          First, an examination of the exclusion clause itself reveals the term
    
    “coverage” is intended to reference particularized risks included within a policy
    
    rather than the entire scope of protection the policy offers. The word “coverage” in
    
    the exclusion clause is immediately preceded by the verb “affords” and the
    
    identification of the two discrete risks, bodily injury and property damage, for
    
    which the Endorsement provides protection. To “afford” is commonly defined as
    
    “to furnish, bestow, grant, [or] yield.” OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 222 (2d ed.
    
    2001). So, with this definition in mind, the exclusion clause most naturally reads
    
    as disclaiming insurance protection under the Endorsement “if you do not have any
    
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    other insurance available to you which [furnishes protection against the same or
    
    similar risks, property damage or bodily injury, as provided by the Endorsement].”
    
          This interpretation conforms to the typical understanding of the word
    
    “coverage” when it is employed in ordinary conversation regarding discrete,
    
    particularized risks—insurance consumers simply want to know whether insurance
    
    will cover, or assume the cost of, the risk at issue. The full suite of protections
    
    provided by the insurance policy is not relevant to the basic inquiry into whether a
    
    policy insures against a particular identifiable risk. As the District Court succinctly
    
    explained, common sense tells us that in the context of an endorsement to an
    
    insurance contract adding protection against specific risks otherwise excluded by
    
    the policy, the word “coverage” refers to the specific risk protection being added
    
    rather than the universe of risks covered by the entire policy. Such an
    
    understanding fully comports with the requirements of Florida law which urges us
    
    to interpret the words of an insurance policy in their “ordinary sense.” See Siegle,
    
    819 So. 2d at 736.
    
          Our understanding of “coverage” as referring to the inclusion of a specific
    
    risk in an insurance policy is reinforced by the term’s repeated use within the
    
    Coverages section of the Southern-Owners corporate general liability policy at
    
    issue here. The Endorsement itself explicitly uses coverage in reference to the two
    
    specific types of risks it covers, “Bodily Injury and property damage liability . . .
    
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    arising out of the maintenance or use of an ‘auto.’” Elsewhere, the Coverages
    
    section of the Southern-Owners corporate general liability policy delineates the
    
    particular risks of which Southern-Owners pledges to assume the costs. In both
    
    cases, the use of the term “coverage” is tied to the specific types of risk protected
    
    by the policy. Nowhere in the policy does Southern-Owners use the term
    
    “coverage” to broadly refer to the entire universe of risks associated with the
    
    insurance contract. Instead, the word continually appears in the context of detailed
    
    explanations for a specific risk for which the policy provides coverage.
    
          Additionally, Florida law tells us we must give each term and provision in
    
    an insurance policy operative effect and that we must avoid constructions
    
    rendering particular phrases mere surplusage. See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v.
    
    Romay, 
    744 So. 2d 467
    , 471 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). Only by interpreting
    
    “coverage” to mean the “[i]nclusion of a risk under an insurance policy” do we
    
    ensure that our construction of the Endorsement gives full effect to the proceeding
    
    phrase in the provision’s exclusion clause, “any other insurance.” See Coverage,
    
    BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 446 (10th ed. 2014). Any means “one or some
    
    indiscriminately of whatever quantity.” MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
    
    DICTIONARY 53 (10th ed. 1999). So, the phrase “any other insurance” must refer to
    
    all forms of insurance regardless of the type of policy or the amount of protection
    
    provided. Interpreting coverage to refer to the inclusion of a specific risk in an
    
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    insurance policy preserves this meaning by indicating the form or type of the other
    
    insurance at issue is irrelevant. Instead, the Endorsement’s exclusion clause
    
    remains solely concerned with whether the other available insurance protects
    
    against the same risks as the Endorsement rather than whether it offers the same
    
    overall level of protection. If both the Endorsement and the other available policy
    
    specifically protect against the same or similar risk at issue, the exclusion clause
    
    would apply and eliminate Southern-Owners’ obligations under the terms of the
    
    Endorsement.
    
          On the other hand, interpreting “coverage” to refer to the overall scope of
    
    the protection provided by an insurance policy effectively reads the “any other
    
    insurance” phrase out of the Endorsement’s exclusion clause. Such an
    
    interpretation shifts the clause’s frame of analysis from an evaluation of the
    
    specific risk insured against to the overall scope of coverage offered by the
    
    Endorsement and underlying corporate general liability policy. Under this
    
    construction, the clause would functionally apply only to other non-owned auto
    
    endorsements to corporate general liability policies, because any form of individual
    
    auto insurance would by definition protect a broader universe of vehicles from a
    
    different set of risks. This approach would render the “any other insurance”
    
    language in the Endorsement essentially meaningless since only a very specific
    
    type of insurance would ever fall within the exclusion clause’s purview.
    
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           Not only would this reading of the Endorsement directly contravene Florida
    
    law by reading out relevant policy language, but it would also ignore the practical
    
    realities of the insurance market. Companies and individuals purchase insurance
    
    for the purposes of protecting themselves against particular risks. It is in their
    
    interest to minimize duplicative insurance which serves only to increase cost
    
    without providing a commensurate increase in protection. Thus, the typical
    
    insurance consumer is extremely unlikely to buy insurance policies with the idea of
    
    providing duplicative coverage for risks their existing insurance already covers. If
    
    increased insurance protection for such a risk becomes necessary, it would almost
    
    always be simpler to increase the amount of coverage on the existing policy rather
    
    than incur the transaction costs associated with acquiring duplicative coverage
    
    through another policy. 5 We see that exact scenario born out here through the
    
    Endorsement which provides a limited amount of non-duplicative coverage at a
    
    very low cost as compared to a generalized duplicative insurance policy. Indeed,
    
    the Endorsement carries an annual premium of only $61.29 and provides a policy
    
    limit of $1,000,000.00 for bodily injury or property damage. By comparison, the
    
    bodily injury coverage provided by the personal Nationwide policy also in place on
    
    
    
           5
             Excess-liability and umbrella policies are also available to provide additional insurance
    where consumers desire more coverage than their policies extend. These policies are not
    duplicative because they are not triggered until the policy limits of the underlying insurance
    policy are exhausted.
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    the Silverado at the time of the collision provided a policy limit of only $25,000.00
    
    at an annual cost of $470.00.
    
          This basic understanding of the insurance market also offers strong evidence
    
    that the parties intended to define “coverage” as “[i]nclusion of a risk under an
    
    insurance policy.” Coverage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 446 (10th ed. 2014). In
    
    the original corporate general liability policy Southern-Owners provided to Easdon
    
    Rhodes, risks stemming from the use of automobiles were expressly excluded from
    
    the policy. As Florida law makes clear, the addition of a non-owned automobile
    
    Endorsement was for a specific purpose—to “provide coverage to the insured
    
    while engaged in infrequent or casual use of an automobile.” Lancer Ins. Co. v.
    
    Gomez, 
    799 So. 2d 334
    , 336 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 2001). While the Endorsement
    
    would not totally exempt Easdon Rhodes from paying premiums for ordinary auto
    
    insurance, it would provide cheap, emergency protection for bodily injury and
    
    property damage stemming from the temporary business use of a hired or
    
    borrowed auto that might not be adequately insured otherwise. The Endorsement’s
    
    exclusion clause reinforces this narrow purpose by making clear the provision only
    
    applies when this particularized risk is not protected against by “any other
    
    [available] insurance.”
    
          Easdon Rhodes must have been aware of the basic functioning of the
    
    Endorsement because the company affirmatively added the provision to its
    
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    Southern-Owners corporate general liability insurance policy. Presumably, this
    
    action was taken because the maintenance and construction business conducted by
    
    the company would occasionally necessitate the temporary use of various
    
    automobiles not separately insured by the corporation or its members. In order to
    
    cheaply protect itself from the potential risks stemming from the use of these
    
    temporary vehicles, Easdon Rhodes requested and received a narrowly tailored
    
    Hired Auto and Non-Owned Auto Liability Endorsement to its corporate general
    
    liability policy. It cost about $400 less per year than the Nationwide policy also
    
    covering the Silverado at the time of the collision while providing a policy limit
    
    approximately forty times higher. This substantial discrepancy in cost and policy
    
    limit speaks volumes regarding the intended reach of the Endorsement’s exclusion
    
    clause. Such a low price for such expansive coverage is only adequately explained
    
    by the presence of an exclusion clause which routinely applies, since the specific
    
    risks dealt with by the Endorsement would almost always be covered by some
    
    other auto insurance policy. Interpreting coverage to refer to the overall scope of
    
    the risks dealt with by a particular policy, as Moore suggests, would gut the
    
    exclusion clause’s intended effect, and Easdon Rhodes would effectively be
    
    receiving an insurance windfall via the Endorsement, a nonsensical result.
    
          Accordingly, in the context of the Endorsement’s exclusion clause, only a
    
    single reasonable interpretation of the phrase “similar coverage” exists: that it
    
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    refers to “another policy . . . [that] is available to pay for the same [or similar]
    
    liability claimed under the policy at issue.” In this case, the Nationwide policy in
    
    place at the time of the accident easily falls within this definition. As the District
    
    Court explained, the simple fact the Nationwide policy has already paid its policy
    
    limit to cover the underlying accident sufficiently evidences that it provides similar
    
    coverage to that offered by the Endorsement. Indeed, the Nationwide policy goes
    
    beyond mere similarity and includes protection against exactly the same risks as
    
    the Endorsement, bodily injury and property damage. Accordingly, the
    
    Endorsement’s exclusion clause operates unambiguously to relieve Southern-
    
    Owners of any duty to defend or indemnify Easdon Rhodes, or the other
    
    defendants, against Moore’s negligence action. 6
    
           Moore is correct to point out that we recently reached the opposite
    
    conclusion when interpreting identical language in an unpublished decision,
    
    Southern-Owners Insurance Co. v. Wall 2 Walls Construction, LLC, 592 F. App’x
    
    766 (11th Cir. 2014). However, that decision’s rationale was almost entirely
    
    focused on the ambiguity introduced by the exclusion clause’s use of the term
    
    
    
    
           6
            This common sense conclusion is hardly controversial. Indeed, applying Michigan law,
    we have previously applied an exclusion clause using comparable “same or similar coverage”
    language without any discussion of potential ambiguity. See McGow v. McCurry, 
    412 F.3d 1207
    , 1218–20 (11th Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v.
    Food Movers Int’l, Inc., 
    593 F.3d 1249
     (11th Cir. 2010).
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    “similar.” See id. at 770.7 We agree with our decision in Wall 2 Walls to the
    
    extent that we found the word “similar” ambiguous, standing alone. Id. Without
    
    an adequate frame of comparative reference, it becomes extremely difficult to
    
    pinpoint exactly in what respects and to what extent insurance policies must be
    
    alike to properly qualify as “similar.” However, the opinion in Wall 2 Walls failed
    
    to consider the meaning of “coverage” within the context of the policy it examined.
    
    See id. Properly defined as the inclusion of a specific risk under an insurance
    
    policy, “coverage” supplies the exact limiting factor required to sensibly deploy a
    
    word like “similar.” As we have discussed, the plain meaning of “coverage” limits
    
    the application of “similar” to the simple question of whether a risk is included in
    
    an insurance policy or not. This provides a reasonably precise metric to guide a
    
    reader’s understanding of the word “similar” and obviates any ambiguity the term,
    
    standing alone, might otherwise have.
    
           Moore’s argument that differences in policy limits between the Nationwide
    
    policy and the Endorsement indicates the coverages are not similar is likewise
    
    unavailing. First, as extensively discussed above, “coverage,” within the context
    
    of the insurance industry, refers to the risks a particular policy protects against, not
    
    
    
           7
             Our decision in Wall 2 Walls, like Moore, also relied on the longstanding Florida rule
    that ambiguous policy provisions ought to be construed in favor of coverage. See Wall 2 Walls,
    592 F. App’x at 770. We do not quibble with this doctrinal point. We simply conclude the
    meaning of the policy provision before us is plain and susceptible to only a single reasonable
    interpretation.
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    how much protection the insurance policy actually provides. Thus, the amount of
    
    protection offered is a distinct inquiry from the type of coverage and is not
    
    implicated by the phrase “same or similar coverage.” See Bergman v. Hutton, 
    101 P.3d 353
    , 357–58 (Or. 2004) (defining coverage separately from the limits of
    
    insurer liability provided by the policy itself); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Kesten, 
    561 N.W.2d 486
    , 487 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (rejecting an argument that coverages are
    
    not similar based on different available policy limits as “specious”); Smart v.
    
    Safety Ins. Co., 
    643 N.E.2d 435
    , 437 (Mass. 1994) (determining that, so long as
    
    coverage of a particular risk was “not illusory,” it would still qualify as similar
    
    insurance to another policy offering a substantially greater amount of coverage);
    
    see also Hamilton v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 
    662 A.2d 568
    , 571–72 (N.J. Super. Ct.
    
    App. Div. 1995) (defining the type or scope of coverage a policy provides as a
    
    distinct inquiry from the coverages’ policy limit).
    
           Furthermore, interpreting “coverage” as referencing not just the type but
    
    also the amount of coverage produces absurd results. Adopting this interpretation
    
    would mean “similar coverage” exclusion clauses would trigger only if the other
    
    available insurance policy dealing with the same risks also had an analogous
    
    coverage limit. This position reflects an unrealistic view of the method in which
    
    consumers purchase insurance. Given the transaction costs involved, purchasing
    
    multiple duplicative coverages for the same risk simply does not make sense. To
    
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    the extent coverages overlap at all, it is likely that different policy limits would be
    
    available under each policy to reflect the different insurance objectives sought by
    
    the insured. It is difficult to imagine a scenario offering a rational justification for
    
    purchasing multiple policies all offering the same amount of protection for the
    
    same risk and even more difficult to imagine a potential justification for
    
    purposefully drafting an exclusion clause to bar coverage in this most unlikely
    
    context. We are satisfied that the plain meaning of the Endorsement’s exclusion
    
    clause is concerned only with the type rather than amount of available “similar
    
    [insurance] coverage.”
    
                                               IV.
    
          Admittedly, we have engaged in extensive analysis to justify the common
    
    sense conclusion that an exclusion clause denying coverage in the event the
    
    insured has available “any other insurance with the same or similar coverage”
    
    applies when the insured has another insurance policy paying policy limits for the
    
    underlying liability. But Florida law is clear that ambiguity does not result simply
    
    because complex analysis is required to discern the plain meaning of a provision of
    
    an insurance contract. See Swire Pac. Holdings, 845 So. 2d at 165. Indeed,
    
    Florida courts have repeatedly cautioned that it is improper to “rewrite contracts,
    
    add meaning that is not present, or otherwise reach results contrary to the
    
    intentions of the parties” while seeking to identify ambiguity not actually present
    
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                 Case: 14-15386    Date Filed: 09/29/2017    Page: 21 of 21
    
    
    in the insurance policy. Id. (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Pridgen,
    
    
    498 So. 2d 1245
    , 1248 (Fla. 1986)).
    
          The Endorsement at issue here is not a model of clarity or precision. But
    
    before the policy may be construed against Southern-Owners and in favor of the
    
    insured, we must determine if an ambiguity exists based upon the presence of
    
    multiple reasonable interpretations of the policy language, not the inherent
    
    indeterminacy of linguistic expression. See Excelsior Ins. Co. v. Pomona Park Bar
    
    & Package Store, 
    369 So. 2d 938
    , 942 (Fla. 1979) (noting the Florida rule
    
    requiring the interpretation of ambiguous insurance policies in favor of coverage
    
    applies “[o]nly when a genuine inconsistency, uncertainty, or ambiguity in
    
    meaning remains after resort to the ordinary rules of construction”). Southern-
    
    Owners does not need to create a crystal clear insurance policy. It need only
    
    provide an unambiguous one. It has carried that modest burden. We decline
    
    Moore’s invitation to manufacture ambiguity where none exists. Because we find
    
    the Endorsement’s exclusionary clause unambiguously denies coverage in this
    
    case, we affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment.
    
          AFFIRMED.
    
    
    
    
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