Franklin Owusu-Ansah v. The Coca-Cola Company , 715 F.3d 1306 ( 2013 )


Menu:
  •              Case: 11-13663   Date Filed: 05/08/2013   Page: 1 of 16
    [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 11-13663
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-02664-SCJ
    FRANKLIN OWUSU-ANSAH,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    THE COCA-COLA COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    __________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    _________________________
    (May 8, 2013)
    Before TJOFLAT, CARNES, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
    JORDAN, Circuit Judge:
    On the recommendation of an independent psychologist, Coca-Cola placed
    Franklin Owusu-Ansah, one of its employees, on paid leave and required him to
    undergo a psychiatric/psychological fitness-for-duty evaluation.       After he was
    Case: 11-13663     Date Filed: 05/08/2013   Page: 2 of 16
    cleared to return to work, Mr. Owusu-Ansah sued Coca-Cola, alleging that the
    evaluation violated 
    42 U.S.C. § 12112
    (d)(4)(A), a provision of the Americans with
    Disabilities Act.   The district court granted Coca-Cola's motion for summary
    judgment, concluding that the evaluation was both job-related and consistent with
    business necessity, and therefore permissible under the ADA.
    Mr. Owusu-Ansah now appeals. Following review of the record, and with
    the benefit of oral argument, we affirm.
    I
    We exercise plenary review of the district court's grant of summary
    judgment on Mr. Owusu-Ansah's ADA claim.            See Holly v. Clairson Indus.,
    L.L.C., 
    492 F.3d 1247
    , 1255 (11th Cir. 2007). "Summary judgment is appropriate
    when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
    presents no genuine issue of material fact and compels judgment as a matter of law
    in favor of the moving party." Brown v. Sec'y of State of Fla., 
    668 F.3d 1271
    , 1274
    (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accord Celotex Corp. v.
    Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 322-23 (1986).
    As noted above, we would normally look at all of the record evidence in the
    light most favorable to Mr. Owusu-Ansah. But this is not a typical summary
    judgment case. The magistrate judge issued a report recommending that summary
    judgment be entered in favor of Coca-Cola. In so doing, the magistrate judge laid
    2
    Case: 11-13663       Date Filed: 05/08/2013      Page: 3 of 16
    out the relevant facts, as he found them to exist, viewed through the prism of Rule
    56. Mr. Owusu-Ansah asserts on appeal that the magistrate judge did not view the
    evidence in the light most favorable to him, improperly allowed hearsay evidence,
    and failed to consider certain evidence. Mr. Owusu-Ansah, however, did not file
    any objections to the magistrate judge's recitation of the evidence for Rule 56
    purposes, and under our precedent, that failure to object means that we review the
    facts laid out by the magistrate judge only for plain error or manifest injustice.
    See, e.g., LoConte v. Dugger, 
    847 F.2d 745
    , 749-50 (11th Cir. 1988) ("Findings of
    fact made by a United States magistrate under the authority of 
    28 U.S.C. § 636
    ,
    and which are accepted and adopted by the district court without objection by any
    party, may be reviewed on direct appeal only for plain error or manifest injustice.")
    (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Hall, 
    716 F.2d 826
    , 829 (11th
    Cir. 1983) (defendant who failed to object to magistrate judge's report and
    recommendation could "challenge the district court's findings of fact [taken from
    the report] only under a plain error standard").1
    Mr. Owusu-Ansah has not even attempted to meet the exacting plain error/
    manifest injustice standard, so we take the facts, for Rule 56 purposes, as set out in
    the magistrate judge's report and do not consider other evidence which might have,
    1
    The Supreme Court has held that "a court of appeals may adopt a rule conditioning appeal,
    when taken from a district court judgment that adopts a magistrate's recommendation, upon
    filing of objections with the district court identifying those issues on which further review is
    desired." Thomas v. Arn, 
    474 U.S. 140
    , 155 (1985).
    3
    Case: 11-13663      Date Filed: 05/08/2013    Page: 4 of 16
    according to Mr. Owusu-Ansah, created issues of material fact. Nevertheless, we
    review de novo the magistrate judge's conclusions of law if they were accepted and
    adopted by the district court. See Monroe v. Thigpen, 
    932 F.2d 1437
    , 1440 (11th
    Cir. 1991).
    II
    Mr. Owusu-Ansah began working for Coca-Cola in 1999 as a customer
    service representative at a call center in Dunwoody, Georgia. Coca-Cola promoted
    Mr. Owusu-Ansah three times, eventually elevating him to the position of quality
    assurance specialist in 2005. In that position, Mr. Owusu-Ansah – who monitored
    the performance of frontline call center associates – worked from home but was
    still required to report to the call center for certain meetings.
    One such meeting occurred on December 14, 2007, when Mr. Owusu-Ansah
    met with his manager, Tanika Cabral, for a routine one-on-one. Prior to the
    meeting, Mr. Owusu-Ansah completed a questionnaire, the answers to which
    would then be discussed with Ms. Cabral. Under a section entitled "Barriers to
    success & proposed resolutions," Mr. Owusu-Ansah wrote "Candid discussion
    about work environment." He also wrote a similar response to a question which
    asked, "What steps have you taken to move closer to your career goals?"
    During his meeting with Ms. Cabral, Mr. Owusu-Ansah articulated several
    incidents of alleged mistreatment by his managers and co-workers at Coca-Cola
    4
    Case: 11-13663       Date Filed: 05/08/2013      Page: 5 of 16
    over the course of his employment. Mr. Owusu-Ansah said that from 2000 to
    2009, certain managers and employees had discriminated against him or harassed
    him because he was from Ghana. Prior to his meeting with Ms. Cabral, Mr.
    Owusu-Ansah had never complained to Coca-Cola about any such treatment. Ms.
    Cabral observed that Mr. Owusu-Ansah became agitated during the meeting,
    banged his hand on the table where they sat, and said that someone was "going to
    pay for this."2
    After the meeting, Ms. Cabral went to her own supervisor, Cassandra
    Cliette, and described Mr. Owusu-Ansah's conduct to her. Ms. Cabral and Ms.
    Cliette then contacted Melissa Welsh, Coca-Cola's senior human resources
    manager.     Ms. Cabral explained to Ms. Welsh what had occurred during the
    meeting, including Mr. Owusu-Ansah banging his fist on the table and saying
    someone was "going to pay for this." Upon hearing Ms. Cabral's account, Ms.
    Welsh became concerned "because it sounded as though a threat had been made
    against an employee, or employees of the company."
    Ms. Welsh told Leslie Davis, one of Coca-Cola's security managers, about
    the situation and asked what should be done. Ms. Davis, in turn, suggested they
    2
    In his deposition, Mr. Owusu-Ansah described the meeting with Ms. Cabral as a "routine one-
    on-one," said that no one was upset, and denied banging his fist on the table or saying someone
    was "going to pay for this."
    5
    Case: 11-13663    Date Filed: 05/08/2013   Page: 6 of 16
    contact Dr. Marcus McElhaney, Ph.D., an independent consulting psychologist
    who specialized in crisis management and threat assessment.
    On December 19, 2007, Ms. Welsh met with Mr. Owusu-Ansah and asked
    him to discuss in detail the concerns he had previously expressed to Ms. Cabral.
    Mr. Owusu-Ansah declined to do so. Ms. Welsh then asked Mr. Owusu-Ansah if
    he would be willing to speak to a consultant Coca-Cola used to resolve workplace
    issues. Mr. Owusu-Ansah agreed, and was introduced to Dr. McElhaney, who
    interviewed him right away at the Dunwoody call center.
    In a private conversation with Dr. McElhaney, Mr. Owusu-Ansah discussed
    his concerns and described the alleged instances of discrimination. After this
    meeting, Dr. McElhaney expressed concern to Coca-Cola over the emotional and
    psychological stability of Mr. Owusu-Ansah, noting that there was a "strong
    possibility that he was delusional." Dr. McElhaney concluded that Mr. Owusu-
    Ansah was a "very stressed and agitated individual," and recommended that he be
    placed on paid leave to allow for further evaluation. Coca-Cola followed Dr.
    McElhaney's recommendation and placed Mr. Owusu-Ansah on paid leave
    effective December 19, 2007.
    Following this initial meeting, Dr. McElhaney continued his assessment of
    Mr. Owusu-Ansah by phone and email. At Dr. McElhaney's suggestion, Mr.
    Owusu-Ansah agreed to visit a psychiatrist, Dr. Christopher Riddell, on January
    6
    Case: 11-13663     Date Filed: 05/08/2013    Page: 7 of 16
    14, 2008.    At this session, however, Mr. Owusu-Ansah declined to answer
    questions regarding his employment and workplace issues. He also refused to sign
    a release allowing Dr. Riddell to discuss his impressions with Dr. McElhaney. As
    a result, Dr. McElhaney was unable to complete his evaluation.
    On January 22, 2008, Dr. McElhaney informed Ms. Welsh in writing that he
    remained "concern[ed] about Mr. Owusu-Ansah's apparent level of emotional
    distress and also about his ability to perceive events accurately." Dr. McElhaney
    recommended that Mr. Owusu-Ansah undergo a psychiatric/psychological fitness-
    for-duty evaluation "to rule out the possibility of a mental condition that could
    interfere with his ability to successfully and safely carry out his job duties."
    A week later, Ms. Welsh sent a letter to Mr. Owusu-Ansah informing him
    that, as a condition to his continued employment with Coca-Cola, he was to
    "complete an evaluation to identify whether there were any issues that could
    represent a risk to the safety of others in the workplace."          Failure to do so,
    explained Ms. Welsh, would subject Mr. Owusu-Ansah to immediate termination.
    Mr. Owusu-Ansah received the letter on February 1, 2008.
    Mr. Owusu-Ansah returned for another session with Dr. Riddell – the
    evaluation complained of in this case – on February 20, 2008. As part of the
    psychiatric evaluation, Dr. Riddell recommended that Mr. Owusu-Ansah undergo a
    personality test, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, before being
    7
    Case: 11-13663     Date Filed: 05/08/2013   Page: 8 of 16
    cleared for work.     When Mr. Owusu-Ansah failed to attend a scheduled
    appointment to take the MMPI, Coca-Cola sent a letter advising him that he was
    not in compliance with the conditions outlined in the prior correspondence. Coca-
    Cola also informed Mr. Owusu-Ansah that he would be placed on unpaid leave on
    March 16, 2008, and warned him that continued noncompliance with the
    evaluation process would be considered a voluntary resignation.
    Mr. Owusu-Ansah took the MMPI on March 20, 2008. After reviewing the
    results of the MMPI, which indicated that Mr. Owusu-Ansah's profile was "within
    normal limits," Dr. McElhaney cleared Mr. Owusu-Ansah for return to work. On
    April 22, 2008, Mr. Owusu-Ansah returned to work with Coca-Cola.
    III
    The ADA, in § 12112(d)(4)(A), provides that
    [a] covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not
    make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual
    with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such
    examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with
    business necessity.
    Mr. Owusu-Ansah argues that, contrary to what the district court concluded, Coca-
    Cola violated § 12112(d)(4)(A) by requiring him to undergo the fitness-for-duty
    evaluation. Coca-Cola, not surprisingly, disagrees.
    A
    8
    Case: 11-13663     Date Filed: 05/08/2013   Page: 9 of 16
    We have not yet ruled on whether an employee claiming protection under §
    12112(d)(4)(A) of the ADA must prove that he is disabled. See Watson v. City of
    Miami Beach, 
    177 F.3d 932
    , 935 (11th Cir. 1999) (assuming, but not deciding, that
    § 12112(d)(4)(A) applies to non-disabled employees); Williams v. Motorola, Inc.,
    
    303 F.3d 1284
    , 1290 (11th Cir. 2002) (employee can sue under § 12112(d)(4)(A) if
    her employer perceived her as being disabled). Today we conclude, as have other
    circuits, that § 12112(d)(4)A) protects employees who are not disabled. See Kroll
    v. White Lake Ambulance Auth., 
    691 F.3d 809
    , 816 (6th Cir. 2012); Thomas v.
    Corwin, 
    483 F.3d 516
    , 527 (8th Cir. 2007); Conroy v. New York State Dep't of
    Corr. Servs., 
    333 F.3d 88
    , 94 (2d Cir. 2002); Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain
    Conference Resort, 
    124 F.3d 1221
    , 1229 (10th Cir. 1997).
    Unlike other provisions of the ADA, § 12112(d)(4)(A) does not refer to a
    "qualified individual" – a person who "can perform the essential functions of the
    job" he or she holds or desires "with or without reasonable accommodation," 
    42 U.S.C. § 12111
    (8) – but rather to an "employee." We agree with the Tenth Circuit
    that "[i]t makes little sense to require an employee to demonstrate that he has a
    disability to prevent his employer from inquiring as to whether he has a disability."
    Roe, 
    124 F.3d at 1229
    . Our ruling, moreover, is consistent with our interpretation
    of 
    42 U.S.C. § 12112
    (d)(2) (prohibiting a medical examination to determine
    "whether [a job] applicant is an individual with a disability or as to the nature or
    9
    Case: 11-13663    Date Filed: 05/08/2013   Page: 10 of 16
    severity of such disability," except in limited situations), as not limiting coverage
    to those with disabilities. See Harrison v. Benchmark Elecs. Huntsville, Inc., 
    593 F.3d 1206
    , 1213 (11th Cir. 2010).
    Nevertheless, as explained below, the evaluation conducted at the behest of
    Coca-Cola was both "job-related and consistent with business necessity." It was
    therefore valid under § 12112(d)(4)(A).
    B
    The phrase "job-related and consistent with business necessity" appears not
    only in § 12112(d)(4)(A) of the ADA, but in §§ 12112(b)(6), 12113(a), and
    12113(c) as well. We have said that "job-relatedness is used in analyzing the
    questions or subject matter contained in a test or criteria used by an employer" as a
    basis for an employment decision, while "[b]usiness necessity, in context, is larger
    in scope and analyzes whether there is a business reason that makes necessary the
    use by an employer of a test or criteria" for such a decision. See Allmond v. Akal
    Sec., Inc., 
    558 F.3d 1312
    , 1317 (11th Cir. 2009) (interpreting language in §
    12113(a)) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Because "[a] term
    appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each
    time it appears," Ratzlaf v. United States, 
    510 U.S. 135
    , 143 (1994), we use the
    Allmond definitions here.
    10
    Case: 11-13663    Date Filed: 05/08/2013     Page: 11 of 16
    In Watson we held that in "any case where a police department reasonably
    perceives an officer to be even mildly paranoid, hostile, or oppositional, a fitness
    for duty examination is job related and consistent with business necessity." 
    177 F.3d at 935
    . We explained that "the ADA does not, indeed cannot, require a police
    department to forgo a fitness for duty examination to wait until a perceived threat
    becomes real or questionable behavior results in injuries." 
    Id.
     Although Mr.
    Owusu-Ansah was not employed as a police officer engaged in dangerous work,
    Watson provides some guidance for us. See also Williams, 
    303 F.3d at 1290-91
    (noting in dicta that an employer could have lawfully required medical
    examination for employee who was hostile, made threats, and was insubordinate).
    Given the information it had about Mr. Owusu-Ansah at the time, Coca-Cola did
    not   violate   §    12112(d)(4)(A)     by    requiring     him    to      undergo   a
    psychiatric/psychological fitness-for-duty evaluation. The evaluation, in our view,
    was "job-related and consistent with business necessity."
    The evaluation was "job-related" because an "employee's ability to handle
    reasonably necessary stress and work reasonably well with others are essential
    functions of any position." Williams, 
    303 F.3d at 1290
    . Ms. Cabral reported that
    Mr. Owusu-Ansah – in the course of complaining about discrimination and
    harassment – banged his fist on the table and said in a raised voice that someone
    was "going to pay for this." When he was deposed, Mr. Owusu-Ansah denied
    11
    Case: 11-13663    Date Filed: 05/08/2013    Page: 12 of 16
    having behaved that way during his meeting with Ms. Cabral, and he now points
    out that there were no prior incidents showing that he had a propensity for
    workplace violence.    That, however, is not dispositive.      Although Coca-Cola
    apparently never asked Mr. Owusu-Ansah for his version of what happened at the
    meeting, it did not rely solely on Ms. Cabral's account in ordering the evaluation.
    Coca-Cola knew that Mr. Owusu-Ansah had refused to speak to Ms. Welsh and
    Dr. Riddell about his workplace problems. In addition, Dr. McElhaney – the
    consulting psychologist – expressed "significant concerns" to Coca-Cola about Mr.
    Owusu-Ansah's emotional and psychological stability, and recommended a
    psychiatric/psychological fitness-for-duty evaluation.
    On this record, we conclude that Coca-Cola had a reasonable, objective
    concern about Mr. Owusu-Ansah's mental state, which affected job performance
    and potentially threatened the safety of its other employees. Though Mr. Owusu-
    Ansah worked from home, he had access to and was required to attend meetings at
    the Dunwoody call center. See, e.g., Kroka v. City of Chicago, 
    203 F.3d 507
    , 515
    (7th Cir. 2000) ("We have stated that where inquiries into the psychiatric health of
    an employee are job related and reflect a concern with the safety of employees, the
    employer may . . . require that the employee undergo a physical examination
    designed to determine his ability to work."); Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist.,
    
    197 F.3d 804
    , 812 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[W]e note that the district's obtaining advice
    12
    Case: 11-13663       Date Filed: 05/08/2013     Page: 13 of 16
    that further examination was needed to determine Sullivan's fitness to work
    buttresses the district's claim that it had reason to believe Sullivan could not
    perform some essential aspects of his job."). 3
    For basically the same reasons, the evaluation was also "consistent with
    business necessity."      Though it may not be one of the traditional canons of
    statutory construction, common sense is not irrelevant in construing statutes, 4 and
    in our view an employer can lawfully require a psychiatric/psychological fitness-
    for-duty evaluation under § 12112(d)(4)(A) if it has information suggesting that an
    employee is unstable and may pose a danger to others. See Conroy, 333 F.3d at 97
    ("[B]usiness necessities may include ensuring that the workplace is safe and
    secure."). See also E.E.O.C. v. AIC Sec. Investigations, Ltd., 
    55 F.3d 1276
    , 1283
    (7th Cir. 1995) ("It would seem that a requirement that employees not pose a
    significant safety threat in the workplace would obviously be consistent with
    business necessity: a safe workplace is a paradigmatic necessity of operating a
    business."); Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 
    2 F.3d 1112
    , 1119 (11th Cir. 1993)
    3
    This is not a case like Sanders v. Illinois Dep't of Cent. Mgmt. Servs., No. 09-3207, 
    2012 WL 549325
    , at *12 (C.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2012), where summary judgment was denied because the
    employer ordered a medical examination after an investigation concluded that the employee had
    not made any threats.
    4
    "[T]here is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they
    obviously mean." Roschen v. Ward, 
    279 U.S. 337
    , 339 (1929) (Holmes, J.). See also John Paul
    Stevens, The Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1383
    (1992) ("The fifth canon of statutory interpretation requires judges to use a little common
    sense.").
    13
    Case: 11-13663    Date Filed: 05/08/2013   Page: 14 of 16
    (holding that protecting employees from workplace hazards is a "business
    necessity" under Title VII).
    C
    In challenging the district court's grant of summary judgment, Mr. Owusu-
    Ansah relies on enforcement guidance issued by the EEOC with respect to when §
    12112(d)(4)(A) permits medical examinations. This EEOC guidance, in relevant
    part, provides that a "medical examination of an employee may be 'job-related and
    consistent with business necessity' when an employer has a reasonable belief,
    based on objective evidence, that (1) an employee's ability to perform essential job
    functions will be impaired by a medical condition; or (2) an employee will pose a
    direct threat due to a medical condition."         EEOC, NOTICE NO. 915.002,
    ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: DISABILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES                 AND    MEDICAL
    EXAMINATIONS OF EMPLOYEES UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT ¶ 5,
    
    2000 WL 33407181
     (2000).
    An agency guidance document is entitled to respect only to the extent that it
    has the "power to persuade." Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 
    536 U.S. 101
    ,
    111 (2002). To the extent that it says that objective evidence is needed, we find
    the EEOC enforcement guidance persuasive, see Harrison, 593 F.2d at 1213-14,
    but that does not mean reversal is in order. As explained earlier, Coca-Cola had
    Ms. Cabral's account of Mr. Owusu-Ansah's conduct and statements at the
    14
    Case: 11-13663     Date Filed: 05/08/2013   Page: 15 of 16
    meeting; it knew that Mr. Owusu-Ansah had declined to discuss his workplace
    concerns with Ms. Welsh and Dr. Riddell; and it received the observations and
    recommendations of Dr. McElhaney, the consulting psychologist who had met
    with Mr. Owusu-Ansah. Coca-Cola therefore had sufficient objective evidence
    that Mr. Owusu-Ansah had a potentially dangerous mental condition.
    Insofar as Mr. Owusu-Ansah contends that Coca-Cola also needed evidence
    that he was a "direct threat," a term defined by the ADA as "a significant risk to the
    health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation,"
    see 
    42 U.S.C. § 12111
    (3), we disagree.          Significantly, ¶ 5 of the EEOC's
    enforcement guidance is worded disjunctively, so that a "direct threat" is required
    only if the employer does not have objective evidence that a medical condition will
    impair an employee's ability to perform an essential job function. Here, as we have
    explained, Coca-Cola had objective evidence – e.g., the concerns of Ms. Cabral
    and the observations and recommendations of Dr. McElhaney – that Mr. Owusu-
    Ansah was under emotional distress and was exhibiting signs of mental instability.
    And, as we have said before, "an employee's ability to handle reasonably necessary
    stress and work reasonably well with others are essential functions of any position.
    15
    Case: 11-13663      Date Filed: 05/08/2013       Page: 16 of 16
    Absence of such skills prevents the employee from being 'otherwise qualified.'"
    Williams, 
    303 F.3d at 1290-91
     (citation omitted). 5
    IV
    The district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Coca-Cola is
    affirmed.
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    The term "direct threat," though present in other provisions of the ADA (e.g., §§ 12113(b) and
    12182(b)(3)) does not appear in § 12112(d)(4)(A). One may therefore question whether the
    EEOC should have used that term in providing guidance about § 12112(d)(4)(A). But given our
    analysis we need not and do not decide today whether the "direct threat" language in ¶ 5 of the
    EEOC's enforcement guidance is persuasive. Cf. Sullivan, 
    197 F.3d at 812
     ("There is no good
    reason to confine an employer's ability to determine the fitness of employees only to instances
    where they pose a direct threat."); Watson, 
    177 F.3d at 935
     ("[T]he ADA does not, indeed
    cannot, require a police department to forgo a fitness for duty examination to wait until a
    perceived threat becomes real or questionable behavior results in injuries.").
    16
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-13663

Citation Numbers: 715 F.3d 1306

Judges: Carnes, Jordan, Tjoflat

Filed Date: 5/8/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/6/2023

Authorities (18)

jane-roe-v-cheyenne-mountain-conference-resort-inc-national-employment , 124 F.3d 1221 ( 1997 )

Allmond v. Akal Security, Inc. , 558 F.3d 1312 ( 2009 )

United States v. Christopher Hall , 716 F.2d 826 ( 1983 )

Holly v. Clairson Industries, L.L.C. , 492 F.3d 1247 ( 2007 )

Harrison v. Benchmark Electronics Huntsville, Inc. , 593 F.3d 1206 ( 2010 )

walter-fitzpatrick-wayne-e-hall-william-j-hutchinson-thomas-jones , 2 F.3d 1112 ( 1993 )

Vincent J. Krocka, Cross-Appellee v. City of Chicago, an ... , 203 F.3d 507 ( 2000 )

jan-thomas-v-jim-corwin-chief-of-the-kansas-city-missouri-police , 483 F.3d 516 ( 2007 )

Daniel Loconte v. Richard Dugger, Robert A. Butterworth , 847 F.2d 745 ( 1988 )

Melanie Williams v. Motorola, Inc. , 303 F.3d 1284 ( 2002 )

Richard A. Sullivan v. River Valley School District, and ... , 197 F.3d 804 ( 1999 )

Watson v. City of Miami Beach , 177 F.3d 932 ( 1999 )

Carl J. Monroe v. Morris Thigpen, Leland Lambert , 932 F.2d 1437 ( 1991 )

us-equal-employment-opportunity-commission-and-randall-wessel-as , 55 F.3d 1276 ( 1995 )

Roschen v. Ward , 49 S. Ct. 336 ( 1929 )

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, Administratrix of the Estate of ... , 106 S. Ct. 2548 ( 1986 )

Ratzlaf v. United States , 114 S. Ct. 655 ( 1994 )

National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan , 122 S. Ct. 2061 ( 2002 )

View All Authorities »