Marvin Anthony Hudgson v. Joseph D. Hubbard , 358 F. App'x 116 ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
DECEMBER 23, 2009
No. 09-11635 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 08-01628-CV-4-VEH
MARVIN ANTHONY HUDSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JOSEPH D. HUBBARD, District Attorney
of Calhoun County, Alabama,
MALCOLM B. STREET, JR., Circuit Judge,
individual and official capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(December 23, 2009)
Before EDMONDSON, BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Marvin Hudson, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s application of Younger abstention to his motion to enjoin a pending state
criminal proceeding and the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. §
1983 civil rights complaint. Seeing no reversible error, we affirm.
Hudson was arrested on charges for distribution of cocaine and resisting
arrest in 2007. He moved to quash the warrants and to obtain copies of the
supporting affidavits, and later moved for a writ of mandamus compelling their
production. In response, the district attorney decided to nolle prosequi Hudson’s
charges, after which the state trial judge dismissed the mandamus petition. Thirty-
two days later, the DA obtained a new indictment and reinstituted the charges.
Hudson thereafter filed a Section 1983 civil rights claim in the Middle District of
Alabama, alleging bad faith prosecution. He sought a stay of the criminal
proceedings during the pendency of his Section 1983 claim, a permanent
injunction against the DA (Hubbard) who brought the action, and declaratory
judgment on the constitutionality of the warrant procedures in his case.
The magistrate judge reviewed Hudson’s claims for frivolity, and
recommended that the district judge abstain from issuing the injunctions and
dismiss the Section 1983 suit sua sponte. The district judge agreed, concluding
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that Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), precluded an injunction against the
state trial. To the extent that Hudson sought dismissal of the charges against him,
the district judge considered this effort a complaint on the fact or duration of his
imprisonment. The district judge determined that such a complaint is cognizable
only in 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus proceedings, and not in Section 1983 suits.
The court dismissed Hudson’s complaint sua sponte, pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This appeal followed.
We review a district court’s refusal to enjoin a state criminal proceeding for
abuse of discretion. Wexler v. Lepore, 385 F.3d 1336, 1338 (11th Cir. 2004) (per
curiam). We review de novo a decision to dismiss a claim under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A. Alba v. Montford, 517 F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).
Federal courts should not enjoin pending state court criminal proceedings
absent special circumstances. Younger, 401 U.S. at 53–54; Green v. Jefferson
County Comm’n, 563 F.3d 1243, 1250 (11th Cir. 2009). “Our Federalism”
requires that federal courts apply this abstention doctrine if the challenged
proceeding is a “state judicial proceeding . . . implicat[ing] important state interests
[and] there [is] an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise
constitutional challenges.” Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar
Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) (emphasis omitted). While state proceedings are
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accorded a presumption of propriety, federal courts are not entirely barred from
enjoining proceedings. See Hughes v. Attorney Gen. of Fla., 377 F.3d 1258, 1263
(11th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court created exceptions to Younger abstention
when “(1) there is evidence of state proceedings motivated by bad faith, (2)
irreparable injury would occur, or (3) there is no adequate alternative state forum
where the constitutional issues can be raised.” Id. at 1363 n.6 (citing Younger, 401
U.S. at 53–54).
Hudson’s claim is for “bad faith”: he fails to meet either of the other
exceptions. While he broadly claims that the district attorney and state trial judge
acted in bad faith, Younger requires more. He must make a “substantial
allegation” showing actual bad faith. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 48 (noting that bad
faith prosecutions are brought with no intention of securing a conviction or with an
intention to harass). Hudson makes no allegation that the district attorney or judge
acted with the kind of impropriety envisioned by the first Younger exception.1 The
district court properly declined to enjoin the state trial.
Hudson also argues that the district court erred when it sua sponte dismissed
his claim under the PLRA. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) (“On review, the court shall .
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Hudson’s arguments on the reinstituted proceedings are similarly unavailing. A decision
to nolle prosequi a case in Alabama is not a final disposition of the matter. See Williams v.
State, 494 So. 2d 819, 823–24 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986). The district court properly abstained
from enjoining the state proceedings on this ground.
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. . dismiss the complaint . . . if [it] fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.”). Here, the magistrate judge treated Hudson’s Section 1983 claim as a
challenge to the “fact or duration of his confinement.” The district court adopted
the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the claim be dismissed, as “habeas
corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or
duration of his confinement.” Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1289 (11th Cir.
2002) (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973)).
The application to Hudson of the federal habeas statute -- here, 28 U.S.C. §
2254 -- is incorrect. Section 2254 habeas corpus relief challenges the fact or
duration of a state criminal conviction: it is a postconviction remedy. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a) (“[A] court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas
corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court . .
. .”) (emphasis added). Here, Hudson is challenging a pendant state criminal
proceeding; so, his petition is governed by § 2241. See Medberry v. Crosby, 351
F.3d 1049, 1062 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that all habeas petitions are governed by
§ 2241, and that § 2254's provisions do not apply to pretrial detention). To that
end, the district court erred in accepting the magistrate judge’s recommendation
that Hudson’s claims can only proceed on a § 2254 petition.2
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Hudson’s potential reliance on Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and progeny
would be misplaced, as those cases examine the interrelationship between Section 1983 claims
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But this error is not reversible, because we may “affirm the district court’s
judgment on any ground that appears in the record, whether or not that ground was
relied upon or even considered below.” Harris v. United Auto. Ins. Group, Inc.,
579 F.3d 1227, 1232 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation and alterations omitted). No
construction of Hudson’s allegations or his complaint yield a cognizable claim
under Section 1983. His complaint fails to allege involvement in wrongdoing by
the named defendants, precluding a potential claim for false arrest or
imprisonment. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389–90. Here, the named defendants
caused or allowed Hudson to remain in prison “pursuant to [legal] process,” for
which a false arrest or imprisonment claim does not lie. Id. Hudson has similarly
failed to allege facts (state prosecution has not ended in his favor) supporting a
claim for malicious prosecution or for an improper warrant procedure in Calhoun
County. His claims must be dismissed.
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
and Section 2254 petitions. Section 2241 habeas petitions to stay state criminal proceedings are
governed by the same abstention principles set out above. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,
393–94 (2007) (“If a plaintiff files a false arrest claim before he has been convicted (or files any
other claim related to rulings that will likely be made in a pending or anticipated criminal trial),
it is within the power [that is, the discretion] of the district court, and in accord with common
practice, to stay the civil action until the criminal case or the likelihood of a criminal case is
ended.”).
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